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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
e Emotional Logic of Participation in Intergroup Violence
by
Christopher Claassen
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 
James L. Gibson, Chair
Existing theories of intergroup violence focus on the motives of group or leaders. But why
do thousands of people choose to take part given the dangers and risks? is dissertation de-
velops a model, the entitlement-blame-anger model, to explain participation in intergroup
violence. According to this model, participation is motivated by emotional reactions of in-
tergroup anger. Anger is useful in this respect because it shapes both the preference for
confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part. Intergroup anger, in turn, is trig-
gered by appraisals that the outgroup are to blame for some harm suffered by the ingroup.
Blame and anger are then rooted in evaluations of group endowments and group entitle-
ments. ese are widely-shared beliefs concerning who gets what and who deserves what
in a given society. us, when group endowments and group entitlements are incongruent,
either because the outgroup are enjoying resources to which they are not entitled, or the
ingroup getting less than their share, the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced and large
numbers of ingroup members may become willing to take part in violence directed at that
group.
e theoretical model is tested using an original survey dataset collected from a rep-
resentative sample of  residents of of Alexandra, in Johannesburg, South Africa, where a
national wave of attacks against immigrants began in , and where intergroup tensions
remain. Analysis of the survey data shows that each of the links in the model—from group
x
entitlement violations to blame, blame to anger, and anger to participation intentions—is
supported, even controlling for possible confounds such as previous participation in vio-
lence, the inĘuence of peers and leaders, and exposure to material competition with the
outgroup.
A few other factors also emerge as important determinants of participation in in-
tergroup violence. Support for violence increases both the desire to participate and the
intensity of intergroup anger. ere is also some evidence of an instrumental pathway to
participation: street traders, who compete with foreign traders for customers, show an in-
creased likelihood of taking part in future violence, but only when they are also exposed
to the social pressures produced by attendance at community policing meetings. Hearing
friends and acquaintances blame the outgroup increases an individual’s own level of out-
group blame. Hearing leaders blame the outgroup, in contrast, increases the level of inter-
group anger. Finally, authoritarian values also result in greater blame of the outgroup, but
only when coupled with perceived violations of group entitlements.
xi
“Reason is … the slave of the passions.”
– David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
xii
CHAPTER 
Introduction
V across ethnic, religious, national, and communal lines continues toplague many parts of the world. In late , for example, a campaign of brutalattacks on the Rohingyaminority clouded Burma’s democratic dawn. Earlier, in
August, Bengalis in Assam state in India were the targets of violence. e year did not begin
peacefully either, with episodes of intergroup violence taking place in Macedonia, Egypt,
Pakistan, and South Sudan.
Despite being widespread and pervasive, we are still uncertain about why intergroup
violence occurs, and why it occurs where and when it does. One reason is probably its tu-
multuous, protean nature. But another reason is that most scholars of intergroup violence
take a “top-down” approach and ignore the question of why thousands of people take part.Ƭ
In contrast to other forms of collective violence, such as civil war, intergroup violence com-
prises attacks of civilians by civilians; it is thus deĕned by mass participation. As such, the
question of why ordinary people take part looms as especially important in understanding
intergroup violence.
It is also the question I attempt to answer in this dissertation. Although I examine
a number of different explanations, my focus is on developing and testing a psychological
theory of participation in intergroup violence. I call this theory the entitlement-blame-anger
ƬHorowitz (, ) also makes this point.

model. According to thismodel, themost immediate determinant of an individual’s decision
to join an attack against another group is the emotion of intergroup anger—anger felt on
behalf of one’s group and directed against some other group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith
). e attraction of an emotional explanation for participation in violence is threefold.
First, anger is a powerful mechanism for producing aggression because it shapes both the
preference for confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part (Huddy, Feldman, and
Cassese ; Lerner and Keltner ). Second, emotions have a compulsive quality—they
override our will and inĘuence our capacity for reasoning (Frijda )—and are thus ideal
for explaining behavior that is risky and without muchmaterial beneĕt. ird, emotions are
produced by appraisals of situations and group goals (Frijda ; Lazarus ; Mackie,
Devos, and Smith ; Smith and Ellsworth ), allowing an individual-level process of
decision-making to be embedded in a broader social context.
e entitlement-blame-anger model makes use of this latter feature of emotion by
embedding angry reactions in shared beliefs about the ingroup and outgroup. Building off
the large body of research on anger (Averill ; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure ;
Lazarus ; van Zomeren et al. ), I argue that the immediate trigger of intergroup
anger is a perception that the outgroup is to blame for some harms—unemployment, lack of
housing, low status—suffered by the ingroup. And linking these psychological ĕndings back
to macrolevel political science research, I argue that the antecedent of blame, and the ulti-
mate cause of intergroup anger, is beliefs about group entitlement (Horowitz ). ese
are historically-developed understandings concerning the position and privileges deserved
by each group in a society (Blumer ). us, when one group perceives that another has
violated these group entitlements—by accessing jobs or housing thought to belong to the
ingroup, for example—the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced, and large numbers of
ingroup members may become willing to take part in violence directed at that group.
Existing studies of anger and intergroup aggression have used student samples and

artiĕcial laboratory situations (Mackie, Devos, and Smith ; van Zomeren et al. ).
Instead, I test the entitlement-blame-anger model with the aid of an original survey of 
residents of Alexandra, an urban slum in South Africa, where a national wave of violence
between locals and African immigrants began. By using a sample for whom intergroup vio-
lence is a realistic phenomenon, my data thus add external and construct validity to existing
studies.
e main contribution of this dissertation is to explain why people participate in
intergroup violence. ere are, however, three further implications of this research. First,
because mass participation is so necessary for intergroup violence, it helps sheds light on
why it occurs at all. Second, it extends the study of emotions in political science from the
attitudes and voting behavior of the American public (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen
; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese ; Brader ) to a non-Western setting, and to a
more contentious form of political behavior. ird, political scientists have long made use
of concepts such as legitimacy, justice, and fairness (e.g. Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird ;
Mutz and Mondak ). is dissertation outlines a mechanism by which such normative
considerations translate into mass behavior: perceptions of illegitimacy, injustice, and un-
fairness trigger anger, and anger increases the desire for confrontation and helps overcome
the dilemmas of collective action.
e dissertation proceeds as follows. e second chapter begins with a deĕnition
of intergroup violence, before reviewing existing research on the topic. I then turn to a
description of the events of the  anti-immigrant attacks in SouthAfrica and a discussion
of the existing explanations that have been offered. e chapter concludes by presenting the
case for examining participation in intergroup violence, and for focusing on an emotional
pathway to participation.
e third chapter develops this theoretical model. It begins with a review of research
on emotions in psychology, American politics, and conĘict studies, with a particular focus

on the cognitive-appraisal model that is now dominant in psychology. I then explicate the
entitlement-blame-anger model of participation. ere are three components: intergroup
anger as the motivation for participation; outgroup blame as the trigger of anger; and group
entitlement violations as the roots of blame. I also consider a number of alternative expla-
nations for each of these three outcomes.
e fourth chapter outlines the methods used to collect and code the data. I begin
this chapter with a consideration of various research designs and methods and an explana-
tion of why a public opinion survey of Alexandra is preferred. I then describe the survey
procedures in detail. I pay particular attention to explicating the sampling of respondents
and the measurement of key variables such as participation and anger.
e ĕh chapter tests the theoretical model using the survey data. e model has
a stepwise nature, with three dependent variables, participation, anger, and blame. Each is
tested in turn. I ĕnd support for each of the links—from group entitlement violations to
blame, blame to anger, and anger to participation intentions—even controlling for possible
confounds such as previous participation in violence, the inĘuence of peers and leaders, and
exposure to material competition with the outgroup. e ĕnal chapter concludes.

CHAPTER 
Intergroup Violence
.. Introduction
... Deĕnitions
What is “intergroup violence,” and indeed, what counts as a “group?” Before examining
existing research on the prevalence, consequences, and etiology of intergroup violence, I
need to deĕne these terms.
Groups are social categories resulting from a cleavage () that produces a sense of
identiĕcation among the individuals so categorized; () that is fairly enduring over time; and
() is recognized, bymost individuals within a society, as a meaningful way of cutting up the
social world. e ĕrst criterion is necessary to ensure that groups are psychologically salient
to individuals. As Tajfel () showed, however, even minimal groups can produce some
identiĕcation. e second and third criteria are thus included to limit our focus to major
groups that are of social or political importance.
is deĕnition excludes groups that may produce a deep sense of identiĕcation, but
are not widespread social classiĕcations, such as gangs and supporters of particular sports
teams. It includes ethnic groups, and thus—according to Horowitz’s () widely used
deĕnition—also national, linguistic, racial, religious, and sectarian groups. It also includes
social categories that are usually considered non-ethnic, such as caste and class—should

these bemeaningful andwidely-sharedways of discussing the social world in a given society.
In some societies, this deĕnition of groups will also include social categories that divide
people based upon their ideological beliefs or partisan affiliation.Ƭ In sum, the concept of
group that will be used in this dissertation is thus somewhatmore inclusive than the concept
of ethnicity as used in comparative politics; while all ethnic groups are considered to be
groups, not all groups are ethnicities.
Having a deĕnition of groups, we can now move on to deĕning “intergroup vio-
lence.” ere are three necessary features. First, the violence is collective, meaning that
perpetrators number in the dozens, hundreds, or thousands. is criterion permits the sep-
aration of political from criminal violence (Brubaker and Laitin ).ƭ Second, the targets
are chosen largely because of their presumedmembership in a group (Horowitz ). is
distinguishes intergroup violence from violent protests (Muller ) where violence is ei-
ther indiscriminate or directed at the authorities. is condition also excludes “race-riots”
in Britain and the United States (Lieberson and Silverman ). ese oen take the form
of violent protest, and are labelled according to the group membership of the protagonists
rather than the targets. ird, both the victims and perpetrators of intergroup violence are
civilians, although the state may tacitly back one side. is excludes civil wars, insurgencies,
and rebellions (Blattman and Miguel ) from the deĕnition, because these are forms of
violence that are carried out by regular or irregular soldiers. It also excludes mass killings
and genocide. With the partial exception of the Rwandan genocide, the perpetrators of such
atrocities are members of armed forces (Valentino ).
Intergroup violence thus encompasses lynchings (Brundage ), ethnic riots and
ƬEllis and Stimson () argue, for example, that ideology in the United States has both symbolic and
operational meanings: it is a set of identities and a way of summarizing policy preferences. American liberals
and conservatives are thus groups by my deĕnition.
ƭOn collective violence, see Tilly (); on violence, see Collins ().
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pogroms (Horowitz ), electoral violence (Snyder ), and violence against immi-
grants (Dancygier ). On the whole, it is a more spontaneous form of violence than
civil war or terrorism, although planning and leadership may well be in place (see Horowitz
, –). It tends to erupt quite quickly and dissipate aer a few weeks or months,
while civil wars can drag on for years.
... Prevalence
Intergroup violence is surprisingly common andwidespread. I began this dissertationwith a
list of conĘicts that occurred over the  months from January to December of . Look-
ing back over the preceding few years, incidents of intergroup violence that are signiĕcant
enough to have be widely reported in newspapers in the United States include the attacks
between Christians and Muslims in Egypt in , and Nigeria in , between Kyrgyz
and Uzbek in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, also in , and between Chinese and Uyghur in Ürümqi,
China in . Casting our view back over the twentieth century, Horowitz’s encyclopedic
e Deadly Ethic Riot () documents major episodes of intergroup violence in Burma,
Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Chad, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Taiwan, Tajikistan, ailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbek-
istan. In some of these countries intergroup violence is endemic—Brass, for example, claims
that “hardly a month passes in India in which a Hindu-Muslim riot does not occur that is
large enough to be noted in the press” (, ). Intergroup violence used to occur reg-
ularly in western, developed countries too. Olzak (, ) shows, for example, that
intergroup violence was common in the United States in the period between the middle of
the nineteenth century until the Second World War.
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... Political Consequences
Being an essentially intergroup phenomenon, intergroup violence may appear to be of pe-
ripheral concern to political science. But this view would be mistaken, for a number of
reasons. First, incidents of intergroup violence typically result in signiĕcant loss of life and
human rights violations. e range is large: while some episodes produce no human casu-
alties, and may go unnoticed outside the country of occurrence, others lead to thousands of
deaths. e India-Pakistan partition riots, for example, were estimated to have caused more
than , fatalities (Horowitz , ).
Intergroup violencemay also be a harbinger ofmore severe political conĘict. Rwanda,
Burundi, and Turkey experienced intergroup violence before being plunged into their re-
spective genocides (Horowitz ), while the Sri Lankan civil war was directly preceded
by the riots of  (Brass ). While an attack on another group represents a visceral
expression of animosity against that group, it also stands as a challenge to state authority
(Landau ).
Finally, intergroup violence threatens the spread and stability of democracy. Violence
against other groups is more likely in new and partially democratic systems, where leaders
compete for power among electorates whose ethnic and religious loyalties may trump all
other interests (Goldstone et al. ; Horowitz ; Rabushka and Shepsle ). Ethnic
riots in India, for example, are intimately linked to electoral competition (Wilkinson ).
If communal violence becomes an entrenched electoral strategy in a new democracy, the
consequences for the consolidation of democracy are dire.
enext section discusses the case of intergroup violence that forms the backdrop for
this dissertation: the wave of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa in . is section
begins by describing how this violence unfolded and then outlines existing research that
has sought to explain why the attacks took place. e chapter then continues by returning
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to the literature on intergroup violence more generally. I describe how much of this body
of research takes an ecological-level approach and focuses on the interests of groups and
leaders. I conclude the chapter by making the case for a micro-level study of participation
in intergroup violence.
.. Anti-Immigrant Violence in South Africa
ConĘict between ethnic and racial groups has marked and deĕned the history of South
Africa. e two main groups of European settlers, English and Afrikaans, ended up on
the opposite sides of a brutal civil war. Both groups clashed with the African inhabitants of
the land they settled. By the middle of the th century, this faultline between white and
black had deepened and hardened into the oppressive racial system of apartheid.
In the s, just as the institutions and laws of apartheid were crumbling, a new
frontline of intergroup tension began to emerge between native South Africans and foreign
nationals from neighboring African countries, particularly Mozambique and Zimbabwe
(Waller ). At the time,Mozambiquewas emerging from a quarter century of civil war as
one of the poorest countries in the world (United Nations Development Programme ).
Zimbabwe was initially more prosperous, but entered a political and economic crisis aer
the fraudulent  election, from which it is yet to emerge. ere are no reliable ĕgures on
the extent of immigration to South Africa, but it is likely that millions of Mozambicans and
Zimbabweans have crossed the South African border since  in search of a better life.Ʈ
South Africans have not welcomed these newcomers with open arms. Data from
the  World Values Survey show that South Africans are the most xenophobic nation of
ƮEstimates vary from, to million (Waller ). One of themore sophisticated studies concludes
that around , foreign nationals reside in the city of Johannesburg alone (Center for Development and
Enterprise ).
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any included in the sample (Mattes et al. ). Another survey from  found that 
of South Africans wanted foreign nationals, regardless of their legal status, to be deported
(Mattes et al. ). One manifestation of this xenophobia has been a high level of hate
crimes committed against foreign nationals, oen taking the form of rough justice meted
out by a crowd (Harris ).
... e  Attacks
One such incident of anti-immigrant violence occurred on the evening of May th 
in Alexandra, a densely populated township⁴ near the heart of Johannesburg.⁵ A mob in
the largely Zulu-speaking “Beirut” area of Alexandra gathered and began toyi-toying⁶ and
chanting anti-immigrant slogans such as “phansi amakwerekwere”—Zulu for “down with
foreigners” (Nyar , ). Several smaller groups split off andwent door to door searching
for foreigners. Anyone who could not pass their test, to provide the Zulu word for “elbow,”
was beaten. Two were killed that ĕrst night.
In contrast to previous incidents, the violence only intensiĕed over the following
days. By the th of May, Alexandra was in uproar, with thousands of residents toyi-toying,
attacking anyone believed to be foreign, and clashing with police. Looting, violence, and the
⁴Township has two meanings in South Africa. e ĕrst meaning is technical, is used in town-planning,
and refers to a unit of area. e second meaning is popular, and refers to a residential area that was reserved
for non-whites under South Africa’s apartheid policy. Although townships may contain shacks or even entire
informal settlements, many also have areas of formal houses that resemble suburbs in all respects. Despite the
demise of apartheid, the term, along with analogues such as “location” or “kasi,” is in widespread use in South
Africa.
⁵is brief account draws heavily on the more detailed discussion in Monson and Arian ().
⁶e toyi-toyi is a protest dance, oen accompanied by singing or chanting and frequently seen at political
rallies and gatherings.

destruction of property also began to occur in other townships in and around Johannesburg,
including Diepsloot, Tembisa, andokoza. By the following week, the violence had spread
to downtown Johannesburg and parts of Cape Town. Finally, aer three weeks, a measure of
calm returned, leaving  people dead,  wounded, and , displaced (Misago et al.
).
Aside from the attacks in downtown Johannesburg, the violence was conĕned to
townships populated largely by black South Africans. e targets were foreign nationals
who lived in these same areas. Zimbabweans were particularly well-represented among the
victims (UN News Service ), but Mozambicans, Malawians, and—at least in the Cape
Town area—Somalis were also attacked (Misago et al. ). Forty-one of the dead were
foreign nationals, with the other twenty-one being South African.⁷
... Research on the Causes of the  Attacks
e “xenophobic attacks,” as they were quickly dubbed by the South African press, shocked
the nation and spurred much discussion among the commentariat. A number of more rig-
orous pieces of researchwere also produced. emost important ĕnding from this literature
is the role of informal community leaders in organizing the attacks (Misago et al. ; Mis-
ago ). In Alexandra, these individuals were either the leaders who served as community
⁷It is unclear how the South Africans were killed, although three possibilities stand out. First, foreigners
in some affected areas appear to have fought back (Dube ). Shopkeepers, in particular, may have been
armed (Misago et al. , ). Second, as the Marikana massacre of September  tragically showed, the
South African police tend to act in a very heavy-handed and indiscriminate manner when faced with a violent
crowd. ird, smaller ethnic groups such as Ndebele and Shangaan overlap the borders that separate South
Africa from its neighbors. South Africans of these ethnic groups may be been misperceived by other locals as
being foreign.
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representatives in particular community policing districts or were part of the old induna⁸
leadership that still holds some authority in the hostels in Johannesburg.
e induna leadership system was introduced during the apartheid era to help man-
age the hostels, which were built in townships around Johannesburg to serve as labor reser-
voirs for domestic and industrial employment. Community policing districts (or “commu-
nity policing fora”) have quite a different history. ey emerged out of the nested system of
yard, block, and street committees that were set up, in Alexandra and other South African
townships, in the s as a means of defending and mobilizing the community in the face
of increasingly harsh repression from the apartheid state (Bonner and Nieagodien ,
).
Aer the fall of apartheid, the state tried to use these informal structures to rebuild
community trust and conĕdence in the South African police (Steinberg b). Police con-
duct joint patrols with the leaders of community policing fora. ey also liaise with these
leaders and the indunas when investigating crimes (Misago et al. ). ese tactics have
bolstered the legitimacy of the police, but have also had the unintended consequence of
handing over tremendous authority to the informal leaders in townships like Alexandra.
As one might expect, authority without accountability has corrupted at least some
of these community leaders. eir dealings with police grants these leaders an inĘuence
over policing that can be monetized. Some leaders have also cast themselves as gateways
to government services, charging residents of their areas for services that should be free
(Misago et al. ). Despite the hostels having been abandoned by the city, for example,
their indunas still collect rent from residents (Vearey ). Misago et al. () report that,
unsurprisingly, there is competition to become an induna or leader of a community policing
forum.
⁸Induna is Zulu for “chief.”
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Informal leaders thus appear to have organized anti-immigrant violence in  to
consolidate their positions of authority. Given the high levels of anti-immigrant prejudice in
South African townships (Southern African Migration Project ), an attack on African
immigrants could increase community support for leaders, and would allow leaders to Ęex
their muscles and demonstrate their ability to “get things done.” Targeting foreigners may
also have been judged as likely to avoid arousing much police interest, given reports of tacit
signals of support from police (Misago et al. ) and more generally, widespread xeno-
phobia within the police (Newham, Masuku, and Dlamini ).
A second strand of research on the  attacks emphasizes the motives of groups,
rather than community leaders. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti () and Steinberg (a)
argue that the  attacks were triggered by competition between locals and foreigners over
the scarce resources of jobs and public housing. Research does indicate that African immi-
grants in Johannesburg are more likely to be working than black South Africans. Despite
the difficulties of obtaining a representative sample of this group, one study ĕnd that  of
foreign nationals are self-employed, with another  employed by someone else (Center
for Development and Enterprise ). is same study ĕnds that locals believe that foreign
nationals are willing to work for lower wages.⁹
ere are several ways in which locals compete with foreigners for public housing.
Although the sale of these homes is not legally permitted, Steinberg (a) claims that some
residents sell to foreigners to earnmoney. eAlexandra residents whowere interviewed by
(Misago et al. ) allege, furthermore, that foreign nationals bribe officials or fraudulently
obtain South African identity documents so as to obtain government housing. Alexandra
has also always been marked by tensions over housing. e township was initially one of
the few areas in urban South African where black South Africans could legally own a plot of
⁹Misago et al. () report hearing similar sentiments in their interviews.
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land (Bonner andNieagodien ). ese rights were stripped away during the apartheid
era, leaving residents of the area without legal tenure. is legal uncertainty over ownership
of land and houses in Alexandra has yet to be resolved (Alexandra Renewal Project ND).
A third strand of research on the  attacks links the outbreak of violence to sym-
bolic motives shaped by the history of Alexandra and South Africa. Residents’ lack of legal
tenure, for example, has resulted in great sensitivity to any hint that newcomers, such as for-
eign immigrants, may be “jumping the queue” for public housing (Bonner and Nieagodien
). Nieagodien () argues that this insider-outsider divide extends beyond conĘict
over housing and, indeed, shapes beliefs about who has the right to even claim residence in
townships like Alexandra. Such insider-outsider frames of reference are particularly likely
to be utilized by South Africans because as Landau () points out, the the central feature
of the apartheid project was a deĕnition of black South Africans as aliens in the land of their
birth. ese authors thus link the  attacks to historically-shaped and collectively-held
beliefs about who deserves what in Alexandra.
In sum, existing research on the  anti-immigrant violence in South Africa fo-
cuses on of the causal roles of leadership, intergroup resource competition, and shared be-
liefs about the rights and privileges deserved by locals and foreigners. Yet these researchers’
use of convenience samples, qualitative interviews, and blunt district-level indicators sug-
gests that caution is warranted in accepting their conclusions. Moreover, to anticipate a
paradox that emerges from the broader literature on intergroup violence: while groups or
leaders may have stood to beneĕt from an attack on immigrants, why did thousands of peo-
ple join in? As I will argue in the ĕnal section of this chapter, understanding the  at-
tacks—and intergroup violence more generally—requires an analysis from “below” as well
as “above:” from the perspectives of participants as well as the more familiar perspectives
of leaders or groups. First, however, I will examine the large body of existing research on
intergroup violence
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.. e Causes of Intergroup Violence
A large and diverse literature examines intergroup and political violence.Ƭ⁰ But there are a
few main theories and approaches that recur throughout. Most notably, the predominant
approach taken by scholars is “top-down:” violence is characterized as an event, and various
macro-level factors and processes are proposed as causes. Within this literature, a major
distinction can then bemade between studies that see groups as the key actors driving ethnic
violence, and those that focus on leaders. Each of these strands of the literature will be
examined in turn.
... eMotives of Groups
Anatural approachwhen investigating the question of why groups are locked in conĘict is to
ask what the groups want; in other words, to search for group-level motives. A large number
of authors take just this approach. ere are two quite distinct sets of groupmotives that have
been proposed by scholars: ĕrst, realistic group interests such as jobs, houses, welfare, safety,
and security; and second, symbolic group concerns such as group esteem, status, position,
and entitlement.
e ĕrst theory proposing that intergroup conĘict results from clashing group inter-
ests is the social psychological theory of realistic group conĘict (Campbell ). It holds
that competition between groups over scarce resources increases tension and conĘict. is
theory is most closely associated with the work of Muzafer Sherif, who, in the famous “Rob-
ber’s Cave” experiments, manipulated features of a boys’ summer camp to show that varia-
tions in intergroup animosity follow closely from the degree to which groups are pitted in
competition or required to cooperate (Sherif ).
Ƭ⁰Broad overviews include Brubaker and Laitin () and Horowitz ().
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Both political scientists and sociologists have offered similar explanations for ethnic
conĘict. Robert Bates (; ), for example, argues that ethnic groups in post-colonial
African states were a handy means of forming political coalitions because ingroup mem-
bers share a language and culture. Ethnic groups then became vehicles for competition over
power and access to state resources. In sociology, Olzak () shows that violence against
blacks and immigrants in the United States over the period from  to  was caused by
labor market competition. is competition for jobs was produced, in turn, by the desegre-
gation of labor markets and inĘows of immigrant workers. Posen () imports the con-
cept of the security dilemma from international relations and applies it to intrastate ethnic
conĘict. When state authority is weakened, he claims, any attempt by one group to bolster
their security may be interpreted by another group as a signal of an aggressive intention.
Each group’s desire for security produces a spiral of increasing mutual threat and conĘict.ƬƬ
ese theories of group competition rest on the assumption that groups act to secure their
collective security or material welfare. Intergroup conĘict thus results when these realistic
group preferences collide.
Other scholars have linked intergroup conĘict tomore symbolic group concerns. Pe-
tersen’s () “resentment” model of ethnic violence posits that subordinate groups tend to
feel resentment and a concomitant desire to raise their group status. Such groupsmay attack
higher status groups if an opportunity, such as a weakening of state authority, is provided.
In Ethnic Groups in ConĘict, Horowitz () makes a related argument. Individuals, he
says, desire to belong to groups that are seen as worthy. Group worth is only deĕned relative
to other groups, however, producing intergroup tension.
While these symbolic theories hold that intergroup violence is motivated by the
ƬƬSteinberg (a) uses the same logic to explain why the violence took place in South African in ,
arguing that the attacks were triggered by competition between locals and foreigners over jobs and housing.
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perceived injustice of one group’s subordination, Horowitz () also argues that inter-
group violencemay be caused by one group believing in the rightfulness of their dominance.
Weiner () notes that such asymmetrical beliefs about group entitlement result when the
outgroup are migrants, or are perceived to be migrants. In these situations, the indigenes
or “sons of the soil” believe that their group should be top of the pecking order, with the
“foreigners” subordinate. Fearon and Laitin () have recently resuscitated this idea and
posited that it may be an neglected cause of many civil wars. ere is also a close parallel
between these group entitlements theories, and the arguments advanced by Nieagodien
() and Landau (), which explain South Africa’s  violence as driven by beliefs
that foreign nationals are not entitled to the same rights as South Africans.
... e Interests of Leaders
Another tradition of research argues that intergroup conĘict may be the result of leaders
competing for power. One of the ĕrst examples of this tradition is a classic book byRabushka
and Shepsle () on democracy in ethnically divided societies. e authors argue that
when voters vote according to ethnicity rather than policy or ideology, there is no incentive
for leaders to appeal to the center. Indeed, no center may even exist. Leaders thus compete
to “out-bid” one other using chauvinistic appeals and denigrations of the outgroup, while at-
tempts at moderation are countered with accusations of treachery. Violence between groups
then occurs as a by-product of the interaction between the primacy of ethnic identity and
democratic competition.
Snyder () presents a similar model to account for nationalist violence. In newly
democratized countries, he argues, elites use nationalism to rule “in the name of the people”
without having to cede actual power and rule “by the people.” e masses are persuaded to
accept nationalist myths through elite control of themedia. Given that groups aremobilized
using competing and exclusionary national visions, fear and antipathy follow, with violent
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conĘict not far behind.
Perhaps the most prominent thread of this elite inĘuence theory has been developed
to account for ethnic riots in India. Brass (, ) describes how a nexus of actors
beneĕt from Hindu-Muslim riots: local politicians who stand to improve their position,
merchants who are in competition with Muslims, criminals who proĕt from looting behind
the smokescreen of chaos. In concert, these actors produce an “institutionalized riot system”
that operates in certain Indian cities to keep intergroup tensions high.
Wilkinson () develops a more falsiĕable account that also clariĕes the role of
leaders. He argues that the degree of electoral competition and whether or not Muslims
are in the majority coalition determines whether state-level politicians have an incentive
to respond if local instigators try to set up a religious riot. Incumbents who draw some
support fromMuslims, who are in coalition with other parties that do so, or who anticipate
requiring Muslim support in future, are more likely to prevent riots. Incumbents who rely
only on Hindu votes may see an electoral beneĕt from a Hindu-Muslim riot because such
violence increases the salience of the ethnic dimension of politics at the expense of the policy
dimension.
Varshney () agrees with this story but adds a twist: the electoral beneĕt of
Hindu-Muslim violence is contingent on the nature of civil society in a city. Where so-
cial networks cut across communal lines, he argues, voters will punish Hindu nationalist
parties for instigating violence, and intergroup relations remain largely peaceful. In cities
where such interethnic ties are not present, however, the electorate is more likely to favor
Hindu nationalist parties in the aermath of Hindu-Muslim violence.
Finally, Dancygier () presents a synthesis of these group-driven and leader-
driven approaches that takes both the interests of leaders and groups into account. She
examines violence committed by locals against immigrants in the United Kingdom. When
economic conditions are poor, competition over resources—especially housing—intensiĕes.

Immigrants that are mobilized and geographically clustered in signiĕcant voting blocs are
able to attract the attentions of politicians, and thus obtain housing resources from the state.
Locals then attempt to inĘuence the provision of housing by voting for anti-immigrant par-
ties or by directly attempting to deter immigrants through violence.Ƭƭ
us, in sum, a large body of research examines the causes of intergroup violence.
Much of this literature is situated at the ecological level of analysis, and views intergroup
violence through the lenses of groups or leaders. In the latter perspective, intergroup vio-
lence is typically regarded as a means by which leaders pursue power or wealth, while from
the perspective of groups, intergroup violence is believed to be driven by competition over
resources, whether material or symbolic.
.. Conclusion: e Paradox of Participation
In addition to considering the role of leaders and the grievances of groups, a full under-
standing of intergroup violence requires that we also examine why people participate in
intergroup violence. An account of participation, in other words, appears necessary, if not
sufficient, for a full explanation of intergroup violence.
It is necessary because mass participation constitutes intergroup violence. Without
signiĕcant levels of participation, an incident of intergroup violence would amount to little
more than the criminal behavior of a gang of thugs. Moreover, without the smokescreen
of mass participation, leaders and initial participants would be more visible and thus more
reluctant to get involved.
Yet both the leader-focused and group-focused theories of intergroup violence can-
not account for participation. Indeed, the theories I have described in the previous section
ƬƭMisago and colleagues’ () account, which emphasizes the role played by community leaders in the
 violence in South Africa, is another example of this leader-interest tradition of research.
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result in a number of paradoxes when extended to the level of individuals and the question
of mass participation.
Beginningwith the leader-focused theories of intergroup violence; even if one agrees
that leaders stand to beneĕt fromorchestrating communal violence, it is unclear how they get
large numbers of participants to do their bidding (Horowitz ; Petersen ; Varshney
). e theories presented in the previous section are largely silent when it comes to the
micro-level mechanisms linking the interests of leaders and mass participation in violence.
An obvious extension of the leader-interest model is for leaders, who stand to beneĕt from
violence, to pay for a mob to carry out an attack. But there is no evidence that this occurs.
e community leaders who are believed to have organized the attacks in the South African
violence of  control few resources and thus clearly did not pay participants.ƬƮ
Participation in intergroup violence is also dangerous and non-normative. Partici-
pants may encounter resistance from the state or a targeted ethnic group (Horowitz ).
Retribution may follow. Most people are also strongly averse to physically attacking others
(Collins )—a feature of human nature that is largely ignored in studies of intergroup
violence. Existing theories of leader-instigated intergroup violence tell us little about why
any individual would face these costs of taking part.
A related problem exists for the group interest models. While ingroup members
may well believe that the outgroup are threatening their access to resources, it remains un-
explainedwhy such individuals would participate in risky violence for the possible provision
of work opportunities and housing that could just as easily be taken up by non-participants.
Public housing and jobs are public goods and are thus non-excludable: even those who do
not take part can access these goods. ey are also typically supplied by the state or market,
ƬƮOnly . percent ofmy survey respondents stated, in their answers to a question on this issue, that “some”
or “many” participants had been paid. Despite oversampling participants, Scacco () only ĕnds ĕve indi-
viduals who admit to being paid to take part in the  Nigerian riots.
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and thus not controlled by the organizers of intergroup violence.
e problem exists, moreover, whether one regards the nature of group interests as
primarily material or largely symbolic. One may desire a higher status for one’s group, but
also desire not to be injured or arrested because of participation in an attack on a higher-
status group. Discourses that characterize the outgroup as outsiders or interlopers are, more-
over, shared by all members of a community, and thus cannot account for why some indi-
viduals take part in violence against this outgroup, while others do not.
Understanding participation is thus necessary for understanding intergroup vio-
lence. But why is it not sufficient? One might think that if participation were so important,
we could then ignore leaders. We cannot, because leaders are almost certainly also necessary
for violence to occur. e reason is that, regardless of the numbers of people who are willing
to attack another group, intergroup violence requires coordination and thus some measure
of organization. At a minimum, there has to be some focal point, such as the announcement
of election results, or the judgement of a prominent trial, that permits the coordination of
behavior. In most cases, a focal point has to be supplied by individuals who have both an
interest in violence occurring and have the authority to be heard by large numbers of their
fellow group members.Ƭ⁴ In these cases, leaders are necessary.Ƭ⁵
Fortunately, there is a substantial body of research, reviewed earlier in this chapter,
on the motivations and methods of leaders in situations of intergroup violence. e task of
this dissertation is to complement this understanding by investigating the forgotten side of
intergroup violence: mass participation. In the next chapter, I begin this task by present-
ing a model that explains why individuals are motivated to take part in such risky acts of
Ƭ⁴Community policing meetings, for example, were used as the focal points for organizing the violence of
 in South Africa (Misago et al. ), and  in Nigeria (Scacco ).
Ƭ⁵Note that this explanation of the role of leadership allows for endogenous leaders, who arise only at
moments of conĘict, before disappearing back into the masses (see Horowitz , –).
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intergroup aggression.
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CHAPTER 
Participation in Intergroup Violence
.. Introduction
... Emotion in Psychology
Classical thinkers recognized that human behavior has diverse motivations. ere is a long-
standing dichotomy inWestern philosophy, for example, between the interests and the pas-
sions as spurs of behavior (Elster ). Despite such early prominence, emotion fell out of
favor for long periods in the social sciences.
When the behaviorist paradigm reigned supreme in early twentieth century psychol-
ogy, emotion was regarded as a descriptive rather than an explanatory concept. External,
observable factors were preferred (Smith and Lazarus ). In the s however, emo-
tions re-entered mainstream psychology. Somewhat surprisingly, this was in part due to
the cognitive revolution, whose focus on information processing required both that we peer
inside the black box of the humanmind and allowed us to do so (Lazarus ).Ƭ e cogni-
tive revolution also offered a powerful and durable theoretical framework for understanding
Ƭ“Cognition” is not synonymouswith conscious, deliberative reĘection, which is but one type of cognition.
e deĕnition of cognition in the American Psychological Association’s Glossary of Psychological Terms, for
example is: “processes of knowing, including attending, remembering, and reasoning; also the content of the
processes, such as concepts and memories” (American Psychological Association ND).
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how emotions work, appraisal theory (Roseman and Smith ).
Before describing the appraisal theory of emotions, which explains how emotions
work, I will ĕrst describe how emotions are categorized. As it turns out, one of the central
problems in the study of emotions is simply to count them.
An inĘuential paradigm, although now in decline, boils emotional variation down to
one or two dimensions. Different researchers have different labels for these dimensions: va-
lence versus arousal (Russell ), positivity versus negativity (Watson and Tellegen ),
or anxiety versus enthusiasm (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen ). In these theories,
speciĕc emotions, such as anger and fear, are considered less important than their underly-
ing dimensions.
Another approach treats emotions as discrete entities. Such researchers focus on
around half a dozen “core” or “basic” emotions, typically: anger, fear, sadness, happiness
and, possibly, contempt and shame (Darwin ; Ekman ; Ekman, Levenson, and
Friesen ; Izard ; Shaver et al. ). ese emotions can readily be recognized in
photographs of faces, and have been shown to consistently recur across cultures (Ekman
, ). Panksepp () argues that neuroscientiĕc evidence on emotional systems in
the brain also corroborates this view of a small number of core emotions.
Quite aside from ontological debates on the nature of the emotions, this core emo-
tionsmodel has an additional beneĕt for the task at hand. Unlike the dimensional approach,
it permits a conceptual separation between anger and other negative emotions, like fear. To
anticipate my theory a little, participation in violence requires an emotion that produces a
tendency to approach the eliciting event or actor, and anger is the only negative emotion
that produces this behavioral tendency. Indeed, as Lerner and Keltner () and Huddy
et al. () show, anger and fear have quite distinct behavioral consequences in this re-
spect: while anger results in approach, fear produces avoidance. e distinction between
anger and other negative emotions is thus very important for explaining participation in

intergroup violence.
While the core emotions model tells us how emotions can be categorized, the cog-
nitive appraisal model describes the triggers of each of these core emotions (Frijda ;
Lazarus ; Roseman ; Roseman and Smith ; Scherer ). Appraisals, which
are evaluations of situations and events (Roseman ), are the causes of emotional reac-
tions.ƭ ey may be Ęeeting impressions (feeling threatened by the sudden sound of foot-
steps in a dark street) or more conscious considerations (reminding yourself that an un-
fortunate event was not your fault to assuage your guilt). On the whole, appraisals are are
relatively automatic evaluations, but are accessible to consciousness upon some reĘection.
Appraisal theorists argue that speciĕc emotions are reactions to particular patterns
of appraisal. Although researchers differ on the details, they tend to agree that there are
between ĕve and ten dimensions of appraisal that are important in distinguishing which
emotion, if any, is triggered (Lazarus ; Ortony, Clore, and Collins ; Roseman ;
Smith andEllsworth ). One of themajor dimensions is goal congruence (Lazarus ).
Events that are perceived to be congruent with one’s goals tend to produce positive emo-
tions such as happiness and pride, while those that are incongruent oen result in negative
emotions like guilt, anger, and fear. Another important dimension is agency (Roseman
)—the actor to which an individual attributes responsibility for some event. Perceiving
that the self is responsible is linked to pride, but also guilt and shame; other-responsibility is
associated most prominently with anger; while believing that no actor is responsible—that,
ƭe reason for emphasizing evaluations of situations, rather than the objective situations themselves, re-
lates to the evolutionary origins of emotion. e objective factors that might have threatened the well being of
our ancestors—crocodiles, a drop in one’s social status, an approaching group of strange people—are numer-
ous, perhaps intractably so (Smith and Lazarus ). But this inĕnite variety of threats (or opportunities)
can be greatly reduced in number if only the essential features of any situation are encoded using the mind’s
perceptual apparatus.
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for example, the event is merely an accident of fate—can lead to emotions like fear or sad-
ness.Ʈ
Appraisal theory not only explains the determinants of speciĕc emotion, but also
describes their behavioral consequences. Each emotion produces a particular “action ten-
dency” (Frijda ), which is a set of cognitions and judgments that orient the body toward
particular behaviors. Anxiety, for example, focuses attention on sources of threat (Mogg
et al. ), heightens sensitivity to risk, and produces a shi toward risk aversion (Lerner
and Keltner ). Emotions are not reĘexes, so they do not produce behavior in a deter-
ministic fashion. But emotions do make particular behavioral patterns more likely: they
lead to “states of action readiness,” in the words of Nico Frijda (, ). e anxious indi-
vidual will be more likely to scan the environment for information and detect, ĕxate upon,
and move away from any perceived threats.
us, according to the appraisal model, each emotion is triggered by a particular set
of situational appraisals, and is associated with a particular behavioral tendency. ere is
a functionalist logic to this theory because behavioral responses are tailored to situations,
via appraisals and emotions (Keltner and Gross ). Given this functionalism, it is no
surprise that the appraisalmodel is consistent with evolutionary accounts of emotion. Tooby
and Cosmides (), for example, describe emotions as superordinate control mechanisms
that evolved to produce adaptive behavioral responses in the presence of ĕtness threats and
opportunities.
is is appealing for explaining participation in intergroup violence, for two reasons.
Ʈe appraisal model is a culturally-invariant, universal theory of emotion. Some scholars, particularly
anthropologists (see Lutz and White ) and sociologists (see oits ), take a relativistic approach and
argue that emotions are culturally speciĕc. However, studies of emotion experience and appraisal, using sam-
ples from  countries, have found that while the objects of appraisal (goals, etc.) vary across cultures, the
processes (incongruence, agency, etc.) remain much the same (Scherer ).

First, the emotion-behavior link is strong. Indeed, emotions frequently have a compulsive
quality: theirmost familiar phenomenological feature is the sense that they override our will
in some way (Frijda ).⁴ In David Hume’s () memorable words, “reason is … the
slave of the passions.”⁵ is emotion-behavior link would appear to be just the mechanism
needed to explain why people take part in the risky and non-normative behavior we observe
in episodes of intergroup violence.
e second reason that emotions are appealing for explaining participation is that
they permit a link between individual behavior and the broader situations in which inter-
group violence occurs. e reason is that appraisals—the determinants of emotions—are
evaluations of situations. A large amount of research on intergroup violence emphasizes
the importance of various contextual or situational factors such as labor market competi-
tion (Olzak ), the relative status of two groups (Petersen ), and ethnic heterogeneity
within civic organizations (Varshney ). e appraisal model of emotion thus permits
an emotional explanation of participation that can be linked to ĕndings from the body of
macro-level research on intergroup violence.
Appraisal theory thus offers a powerful and useful theory of emotion for explaining
behavior. Indeed, political scientists are increasingly turning to emotions to provide new or
updated theories of political behavior. Surprisingly, however, fewer political scientists use
⁴e experience of being angry, for example, is frequently described in the English language using
metaphors such as “blowing up,” “red mist,” and “blind rage.” ese all imply a diminution of vision or a
loss of control of one’s will.
⁵Roseman and Smith () point out that this feature of emotion is a function of the automatic nature of
many appraisals. Emotion is triggered before conscious considerations can intervene. Evolutionary theorists
would additionally argue that the compulsiveness of emotional experience is a feature designed to enable be-
haviors that, although adaptive in the long run, may not be favored by one’s immediate conscious preferences
(Frank ; Tooby and Cosmides ).
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emotion to understand collective and intergroup violence. In the next section I outline the
existing literature on emotions and political behavior and emotions and conĘict.
... Emotions and Politics
Perhaps because of the inĘuence of economics since Anthony Downs’ An Economic eory
of Democracy (), political scientists have been somewhat slower to embrace emotional
explanations compared to psychologists. Although Lasswell’s () study of personality
and the behavior of political leaders made use of emotion back in the s, the concept
only really entered mainstream political science in the new millenium.⁶
Nowadays, research on emotions and politics thrives in the subĕeld of American
political behavior. One of the most important applications has been in the area of voting
behavior. Marcus (), for example, investigates how emotional reactions to presidential
candidates shape vote choice, while Brader () examines how emotional cues are used
in campaign advertisements to inĘuence voters. Valentino et al. () foreshadow some
of the themes of this dissertation by going beyond candidate choice and showing that the
emotion of anger inĘuences whether voters actually participate in elections.
Other researchers have examined the role that emotion plays in political cognition.
Lodge and Taber () and Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (), for example, show that
emotion inĘuences both how and what people learn about politics, while Marcus, Neuman,
andMacKuen () argue that aversive emotions (anger, disgust, and hatred) result in par-
tisan patterns of cognition while anxiety produces a more deliberative style of information
processing.
Of particular relevance for this dissertation, research on intergroup attitudes has also
made fruitful use of emotional mechanisms. One of the early forays was a paper by Kuk-
⁶See Marcus () for a review of the literature on emotions and politics before this point.
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linski et al. (), which argued that political tolerance is shaped in larger part by emo-
tions than by more conscious considerations. A later paper by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim,
and Hirsch-HoeĘer () conĕrms this ĕnding, and adds that hatred is the emotion most
closely associated with intolerance in Israel. Banks and Valentino () shows that racial
prejudice is underpinned by the emotion of anger while Brader, Valentino, and Suhay ()
ĕnd that anti-immigrant prejudice is a response to anxiety. Researchers have also examined
the effects of emotion on support for state aggression. Huddy et al. () ĕnds that anxiety
reduces support for military action against terrorists, while Halperin et al. () show that
anger moderates the effect of hatred on Israeli support for compromise with Palestinians.
is research shows that emotion intersect in important and sometimes unexpected
ways with political attitudes and behavior. In particular, anger has been linked to antipathy
to outgroups and a greater likelihood of political participation. e next section examines
the few exampleswhere political scientists have employed emotion to understand intergroup
violence.
... Emotions and Intergroup Violence
Emotion is even less common in the subĕeld of comparative politics than in American poli-
tics. is is surprising when one considers that contentious collective behavior such as riots,
protests, and revolutions—“passionate politics,” as sociologists Goodwin, Jasper, and Poletta
() put it—are commonplace in world politics. And while emotion has proven invalu-
able in explaining the more reasonable aspects of politics, such as choosing a presidential
candidate, it should be even more useful for understanding conĘict and collective violence.
e most prominent work in this surprisingly small political science literature on
emotions and conĘict is Understanding Ethnic Violence by Roger Petersen (). Petersen
develops four models of ethnic violence; each is associated with one of four emotions—fear,
hatred, rage, and resentment. e approach is macro-level and historical, so each emotion

is conceived as a collective experience that is triggered by particular events in multi-ethnic
societies. e fear model closely resembles the logic of the security dilemma: when state au-
thority breaks down, groups come to fear the threat that each poses to the other. Intergroup
hatred is experienced when two groups have a long history of previous attacks, while resent-
ment is felt by lower status groups toward higher status groups. Fear, hatred, or resentment
of another group make aggression against that group more likely. e ĕnal model of rage is
similar to frustration-aggression theory (Berkowitz ): frustrated group ambitions pro-
duce aggression, which is displaced onto another group.
Despite the use of emotional mechanisms linking situations and conĘict, Petersen’s
models of conĘict are situated at the level of the group and thus do not speak directly to the
question of who participates. His evidence is, moreover, historical, and thus cannot be used
to separate participants from non-participants—nor, indeed, those who experience resent-
ment or rage from those who do not. Nevertheless, Petersen’s use of emotion as a mediator
between intergroup situations and intergroup violence is a powerful theoretical framework
that informs the model of participation that I will present later in this chapter. His model
of resentment also resonates with my theory in its focus on thwarted group entitlement and
the resulting confrontational, negative emotion.
Another prominent example of research that uses emotion to understand conĘict is
Elisabeth Jean Wood’s (; ) research on the Salvadorian civil war. Unlike Petersen,
Wood explicitly focuses on civilian participation. She argues that insurgents weremotivated,
in part, by the emotional beneĕts of “moral outrage” and “the pleasure of protest.” Wood’s
focus on understanding participation in conĘict and her consideration of emotional moti-
vationsmarks her research as a important contribution in the literature on political violence.
However, the nature of the conĘict that Wood examines—an insurgency against a
state—raises the question of how her results generalize to violence that occurs between two
groups. In addition, Wood’s ĕndings are based on open-ended interviews with participants.

It is possible that her conclusions are colored by the human tendency to view one’s own be-
havior in a self-serving fashion (Trivers ; vonHippel andTrivers ). It would be very
unlikely, for example, for her interviewees to admit that they took part simply because they
were afraid (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein ), whether or not this was their true mo-
tive. It also is questionable whether people’s motivations for some past behavior are readily
accessible given a brief period of conscious reĘection some years aer the event.
e two best examples of existing research that develop emotional accounts of po-
litical violence—the books by Petersen () and Wood ()—leave much unanswered.
Petersen does not use micro-level data; while Wood does, her interview methods are not
ideal for testing hypotheses about emotionalmechanisms. BothWood’s “moral outrage” and
Petersen’s “resentment” are also somewhat unusual emotions. ey are, however, closely re-
lated to one of the emotions regarded as a universal, core emotion. is emotion is anger,
and it forms the motivation for the theory of participation in intergroup violence I propose
in this dissertation. I now turn to developing and explicating this theory of participation in
intergroup violence.
.. e Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model of Participation
e entitlement-blame-anger model (see Figure .) takes an appraisal theory view of emo-
tion and adapts it to a situation of intergroup conĘict. Moving from right to le in Figure
., from the more immediate hypothesized causes of participation to the more distant but
also more foundational: the emotion of interest is intergroup anger; this provides the moti-
vation for participation in violence against the other group. Anger is primarily triggered by
appraisals of blame, so this is the next link in the causal chain. I then embed appraisals of
blame in historically shaped beliefs about the status and welfare thought to be deserved by
each group; when these group entitlement beliefs are violated, I hypothesize, blame follows.

Figure .. e Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model Model of Participation in Intergroup Violence
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e components of the proposed model of participation and their hypothesized causal links.
e stepwise nature of this model means that it can be broken up into its three con-
stituent links and analyzed link by link. ere are thus three outcomes of interest, and three
dependent variables: participation in intergroup violence, intergroup anger, and outgroup
blame. is section will proceed ĕrstly by explaining the theory and evidence supporting
each of these links. Once the rationale for the model is in place, I will move to consider
eight alternative models. Some of these, such as realistic group conĘict theory, are expected
to have an impact on all three outcome variables. Others, such as authoritarianism-threat
theory, are only hypothesized to play a role in one (in this case, attributions of outgroup
blame).
Given the large number ofmodels, variables, and hypotheses thatwill be presented, it
is perhaps wise to begin with a roadmap. Table . serves this function. e nine theoretical
models are distributed across the rows of the table, and their names are listed in the lemost
column, with the entitlement-blame-anger model ĕrst. e next three columns list each of
the endogenous variables used in this model; these will be the dependent variables when it
comes to the data analysis. e cells of the table list the variables, from each model, that will
be hypothesized to have an effect on the dependent variable of interest. Hypothesis numbers
are in parentheses.
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... Anger: eMotivation for Participation in Violence
Anger is the emotion that most people would associate with aggressive behavior, an intu-
ition conĕrmed by survey and experiment research (Averill ; Berkowitz ; Panksepp
; Tedeschi and Felston ).⁷ As the appraisal model of emotions predicts, the effect
of anger on aggressive behavior is mediated by a number of cognitive mechanisms. Most
notably, anger is marked by an aggressive behavioral tendency; it produces a desire, in other
words, for confrontation (Averill ; Kulik and Brown ; Mackie, Devos, and Smith
; van Zomeren et al. ). Anger thus inĘuences the perceived beneĕts of aggres-
sion, but it shapes the perceived costs of aggressing too. Anger results in reduced percep-
tions of risk (Huddy et al. ) and diminishes the importance of risk in decision-making
(Lerner and Keltner ). It leads to judgments that are more superĕcial and stereotypical
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer ) and “allows a person to maintain an aggres-
sive intention over time” by focusing attention on the perceived triggers of the emotion and
thus establishingmore robust memories of these triggering events (Anderson and Bushman
, ).
Anger is typically conceived as an emotion that is directed at other individuals. In-
⁷Existing research, particularly by Petersen () and Halperin Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-
HoeĘer (); Halperin et al. () might appear to suggest that emotions other than anger may be linked
with participation in violence. Petersen outlines four emotional models of ethnic conĘict: fear, resentment,
rage, and hatred. Research on categorization of emotions based on facial expressions (Ekman ), the statis-
tical clustering of emotion words (Shaver et al. ), and emotional structures in the brain Panksepp ()
suggest that resentment, rage, and possibly hatred are varieties of a core emotion, anger. I thus regard these
terms as varieties of the basic anger experience. Fear, along with correlates such as anxiety, is indeed a sepa-
rate basic emotion. But, as Lerner and Keltner () and Huddy et al. () show, fear and anxiety produce
contemplation, risk aversion, and withdrawal. ey are thus unlikely to be associated with participation in
intergroup violence.

tergroup violence, however, is a form of collective action that is directed at other groups.
Explaining participation in such violence requires that anger be extended from interper-
sonal situations to the intergroup. Mackie, Devos, and Smith () argue that such an
interpersonal–intergroup mapping can be accomplished using the well-known process of
social identiĕcation. When social groups are salient, a large body of evidence shows that
individuals categorize themselves into one of the available groups, identify with their group,
see themselves as groupmembers rather than as individuals, and take the goals and values of
the group as their own (Tajfel and Turner ; Turner et al. ). is social identiĕcation
allows us to think about groups as agents. In situations where social groups are relevant and
salient, it is thus meaningful to speak of feelings of intergroup anger.
Mackie, Devos, and Smith () also test whether intergroup anger has the behav-
ioral effects that we might expect from the literature on interpersonal anger. ey assign
subjects to groups based on self-reported beliefs on various controversial topics, and ĕnd
that experimentally manipulated intergroup anger produces a desire to confront a group of
people who subscribe to differing views. van Zomeren et al. () provide a further test:
they ĕnd that students who have been manipulated to feel intergroup anger at university
administration are more likely to desire collective action against the administration.
While intergroup anger has not been used to explain aggressive behavior—or even
behavioral intentions—outside of the laboratory, it seem likely that it would increase the
likelihood of participation in intergroup violence. My ĕrst hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis .. Intergroup anger increases an individual’s intention to participate in inter-
group violence.

... Outgroup Blame: e Trigger of Anger
e previous section discussed the effects of anger on behavior, action tendencies, and
decision-making. Social psychologists have also researched the appraisals that cause an-
gry responses. ree emerge as particularly important. First, those who perceive that some
event is incongruent with an important personal goal typically experience anger (Lazarus
). Anger, in other words, requires a negative trigger—a harm or a threat of some kind.
Second, anger results when another agent (as opposed to either the self or the situation) is
seen as the cause of the negative trigger (Smith and Ellsworth ). Anger is thus likely
to be produced when an individual perceives that she has been harmed, and that another
party is responsible (Averill ; Betancourt and Blair ; Frijda ; Ortony, Clore,
and Collins ).
While these two appraisals are oen thought to be sufficient for anger, an angry re-
sponse is particularly likely when the harm is tinged with a sense of unfairness: when it
violates expectations of what ought to be (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure ; Kulik and
Brown ; van Zomeren et al. ; Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano ). Disrespect,
for example, is a common everyday trigger of anger (Bettencourt and Miller ; Cohen
et al. ; Ferguson and Rule ), while, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conĘict,
Ginges et al. () show that violations of ingroup taboos result in greater anger and sup-
port for violence against the outgroup. A third appraisal linked to angry reactions is thus an
evaluation that the other actor behaved in an unfair or illegitimate fashion.
is set of appraisals—a evaluation of harm, an attribution of responsibility, a per-
ception of unfairness—is closely related to the concept of blame. Shaver (), for example,
argues that blame is composed of three components: an attribution of causation, an attri-
bution of responsibility (knowingly having caused the harm), and an attribution of blame-
worthiness (acting without justiĕcation). Ferguson and Rule () suggest a four-step pro-

cess involving inferences of causality, avoidability, intentionality, and motive acceptability.
ese models all argue that blame is deeply intertwined with normative evaluations of the
fairness of the other actor’s behavior.⁸ Blame thus involves an attribution of responsibility
for some negative event, with an additional evaluation that the event itself or the action of
the blamed party is unfair in some way.
Although laboratory research has linked blame to both anger and violence (Betan-
court and Blair ), Debra Javeline (b; a) is one of the few researchers to have
investigated the role that blame plays in collective political action.⁹ Javeline distinguishes
between speciĕc blame, which is directed at a single target, and diffuse blame, which is dis-
tributed among several. Speciĕc, but not diffuse, blame is linked to participation in protests
during a Russian wage arrears crisis of . Although Javeline does not measure anger, it
is quite plausible that Russians who blame particular actors are more likely to participate in
collective action because they are angry.
Hypothesis .. Blame of the outgroup for some harm experienced by the ingroup produces
higher levels of intergroup anger.
... Group Entitlements: e Roots of Blame
Although he restricts his analysis to the macrolevel, Petersen’s () emotional models of
ethnic violence offer a means of linking emotions (and thus blame) to situations. He argues
⁸Causal attributions and fairness judgements are intertwined because perceiving that an unfair act has
occurred leads to a search for the cause, or for someone to blame. And whether an act is seen as unfair or
illegitimate is partly contingent on who caused it: being questioned by the police, for example, may be taken
to be a legitimate action, whereas an interrogation by another civilian would not be.
⁹Political scientists have explored other topics related to blame, including the considerations that people
use when blaming political actors (Gibson and Gouws ; Malhotra and Kuo ), and the impact of
partisan blame on vote choice (Marsh and Tilley ).

that contextual and historical factors such as previous conĘicts or status differentials produce
collective emotions, and thus violence. Petersen’s () resentment model also suggests a
particular way to embed blame and anger in contexts: he argues that resentment follows
when a group believes that it both occupies a lower status than some other group, and that
this lower status is unfair.
Figure .. Psychological Comparisons ineories of ConĘict
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ere is a long tradition of research on intergroup comparisons and conĘict. is
research in conceptually summarized in Figure .. Each of the four panels depicts one
model of conĘict. Within each panel, there are four possible group evaluations: () the ac-
tual level of symbolic andmaterial resources enjoyed the the ingroup—which I call “ingroup
endowments”—and () that enjoyed by the outgroup (outgroup endowments); () the level

of resources deserved by the ingroup (ingroup entitlements); and () by the outgroup (out-
group entitlements).Ƭ⁰
e top le panel indicates the hypothesis that inequality—a comparison of the en-
dowments enjoyed by the ingroup and some outgroup—leads to conĘict. e ĕrst author
to state this hypothesis was Aristotle, who suggested that inequality causes “revolutionary
sentiment.” e inequality-conĘict link has been tested, examined, and reformulated by nu-
merous researchers (for a review, see Lichbach ). Some authors ĕnd evidence support-
ing the hypothesis (Russett ), others ĕnd against the hypothesis (Mitchell ), and
yet others ĕnd a more complex relationship between inequality and conĘict (Nagel ;
Muller ).
Another venerable hypothesis, advanced ĕrst by Tocqueville (), is that rebellion
occurs when a period of improving welfare is followed by a sharp decline. e psychological
underpinnings are a comparison between the welfare that a group are expecting and the
welfare they actually end up enjoying (see the top right panel of Figure .). Davies ()
used a similar dynamic in his “J-curve” theory of revolution.
While the inequality-conĘict hypothesis holds that conĘict is rooted in a comparison
of the endowments of groups, the J-curve hypothesis claims that conĘict is determined by a
comparison between endowments and entitlements, relative deprivation theory combines
these two sets of comparisons. Gurr (), for example, argued that “men rebel” when they
compare what they have and what they believe should have—and they form beliefs about
what they should have by observing what others have (depicted in the bottom le panel of
Ƭ⁰Some of the theories I will survey here focus only on material resources, while others focus on symbolic
resources (such as group status and respect). ere is evidence that both matter for intergroup conĘict—on
symbolic, see Sears, Hensler, and Speer () and Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (); on material,
see Bobo () and Olzak (). I thus include both material and symbolic resources in the concepts of
group endowments and group entitlements.

Figure .). is theory of relative deprivation has, however, received mixed empirical sup-
port (Muller ; Snyder and Tilly ). One particular problem is that evaluations of
personal well-being tend to have weak relationships with many political outcomes, includ-
ing vote choice (Alvarez and Nagler ; Kiewiet ), intergroup prejudice (Sniderman,
Hagendoorn, and Prior ), and support for redistribution (Gibson ).
Runciman () addresses this issue by scaling relative deprivation theory up from
interpersonal comparisons to intergroup comparisons. His “fraternal relative deprivation”
theory rests on comparisons between three main evaluations: the resources enjoyed by the
ingroup and some outgroup, as well as the resources believed to be deserved by the ingroup
(Crosby ).
Yet despite Runciman’s inclusion of group-level comparisons, relative deprivation
theory still appears deĕcient as an explanation for intergroup violence because it fails to
account for why individuals mobilize around an ingroup and attack an outgroup. Rela-
tive deprivation theory was originally formulated as an explanation for violence against the
state—protest, rebellion, and revolution. And violence against another group, according to
my argument, requires feelings of anger, and attributions of blame of that outgroup. Blame,
in turn, is composed of evaluations that the ingroup has been harmed, the harm is unfair,
and the outgroup is responsible. is attribution of responsibility and sense of unfairness
would seem, however, to require an fourth intergroup evaluation to be added to the relative
deprivation model: the level of symbolic and material resources that the outgroup deserves.
Without this fourth evaluation, it is not clear how blame is attributed to the other group;
without blame, participation in intergroup violence seems unlikely.
e resulting model, the lower right panel in Figure ., is consistent with a number
of similar theories of intergroup conĘict and violence. One of the most prominent is Her-
bert Blumer’s () classic notion of “group position.” Group position theory focuses on
the degree to which a particular group views both their and some other group’s situations

as fair or deserved.ƬƬ As Bobo and Hutchings (, ) interpret the theory, “[f]eelings
of competition and hostility emerge from historically and collectively developed judgments
about the positions in the social order that in-group members should rightfully occupy rel-
ative to members of an out-group.”
A related idea is offered by Horowitz (), although he calls the evaluation “group
entitlement,” a practice that I will follow here. Horowitz notes that a recurring phenomenon,
in situations of intergroup violence, is for the attacking group to make claims about their
greater entitlement than the target group, oen because the former believe that the latter are
migrants who arrived decades or even centuries ago. e targets are interlopers, in other
words, while the attackers are “sons of the soil,” to use Weiner’s () memorable phrase.
Fearon and Laitin () have resuscitated these ideas about group entitlement and outlined
a “sons of the soil” theory of ethnic civil war, albeit one that has yet to be tested.
Petersen () also echoes these theories with his resentment model, which I in-
troduced earlier. is model claims that a group with a lower status than another group,
who also see this subordinate position as illegitimate, will be more likely to attack the higher
status group. Petersen’s focus on group status illustrates that group comparison models do
not have to be restricted to comparisons of material welfare; symbolic goods may be just as
important.
ese theories, from sociologists and political scientists, offer support for group en-
titlement violations as a cause of intergroup violence. I thus hypothesize that perceived
violations of group entitlements beliefs underpin appraisals of blame and feelings of anger
directed at outgroups. ese violations of group entitlements require the comparison of
four separate intergroup evaluations: ingroup and outgroup endowments, and ingroup and
outgroup entitlements (see the bottom right panel of Figure .). ere are thus two means
ƬƬSee also Mutz and Mondak’s () concept of “sociotropic fairness.”

by which group entitlements can be violated. First, when the outgroup is believed to have
“risen above their rank” and obtained resources they do not deserve; and second, when the
ingroup’s endowments are incongruent with the more loy position that they believe they
deserve.
Hypothesis .. Perceived violations of group entitlements result in increased blame of the
outgroup.
While this literature on fraternal relative deprivation, group position, and group en-
titlement supports this hypothesis, there is a another, quite different line of reasoning that
can be used to support the link between violations of group entitlement, on the one hand,
and blame and anger, on the other. is line of reasoning has to do with the role that these
four intergroup evaluations played in the evolution of human social cognition.
A number of authors, from disciplinary backgrounds as divergent as biology, psy-
chology, and political science, have argued that the evolutionary roots of anger lie in sup-
porting the norms that regulate social life (Fessler ; Ostrom ; Sell, Tooby, and Cos-
mides ; Trivers ). While norms are generally a powerful method of fostering co-
operating in systems of social exchange, they need to be policed to guard against cheating
(Axelrod ). Confronting non-cooperators imposes substantial ĕtness costs, however,
with the result that it is not in the immediate interests of any individuals to defend social
norms given the private cost of doing so. Anger provides a means for resolving such norma-
tive conĘicts, because as Frank () argues, it provides a credible deterrent against norm
violation. Anger is a credible deterrent precisely because it () increases the desire for ag-
gression, () reduces the perceived risk of confrontation, and () others know that anger is
associated with () and ().
is evolutionary argument links anger to violations of general social norms. But
other evidence suggests that the evolution of anger can also be traced back to violations of

norms of position. Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides () argue that anger evolved to resolve
normative disputes over position in dominance hierarchies. Dominance hierarchies have
a good claim to be the original social norms (Cummins , ) because they regulate
the lives of many social animals, particularly primates (Barkow ; de Waal ). Like
any social norms, dominance hierarchies stipulate what individuals ought to do; in this case,
the resources that each individual is permitted according to their position on the hierarchy
(Ellis ).
Dominance hierarchies,moreover, require a particular cognitive architecture: amind
that is able to track the interpersonal allocations of resources, and compare these to the in-
terpersonal allocation of resources that ought to exist. is, however, is exactly the logic of
group entitlement comparisons (lower right panel in Figure .). ere is thus a striking
resemblance between the cognitive computations required for dominance hierarchies, and
the psychological underpinnings of the group entitlement–blame–anger–conĘict theory I
have just presented.
Group entitlement violations are the ĕnal, most fundamental component of the
entitlement-blame-anger model (Figure .). ese violations of group entitlements—the
outgroup getting more than they deserve, or the ingroup, less—produce blame, anger, and
an increased desire for aggression against the offending group. If outgroup blame and inter-
group anger is widespread, the conditions are fertile for political entrepreneurs to organize
a collective event—a march, a meeting, etc.—that may boil over into violence. e cogni-
tive and behavioral correlates of anger suggest that it is the angry who are more likely to
participate in any such collective action, and to strike the ĕrst blows should violence occur.
I have discussed several quite distinct lines of evidence that point toward this role
that group entitlements play in blame, anger, and participation in intergroup violence. is
role is suggested by a large literature on the causes of revolution, rebellion, ethnic violence,
and prejudice; it is also consistent with a very different literature on the cognitive and emo-

tional adaptations necessary for human ancestors to operate in an environment governed
by social norms.
ere is one ĕnal reason, however, why group entitlements are attractive as the un-
derpinnings of a theory of participation in intergroup violence. As Bobo and Hutchings
(, ) put it, they are “historically and collectively developed judgments.” ey thus
allow us to link the individually-experienced and somewhat transient emotion of anger to
the more enduring and contextually-embedded beliefs and normative expectations about
the position and privileges which each group in a society is thought to be entitled. While
our ability to track and remember group entitlement cognitions is probably hard-wired, the
form that these cognitions take—especially the entitlements of the in- and outgroups—are
shaped by shared beliefs that are rooted in time, place, and culture.
is concludes my description of, and argument for, the entitlement-blame-anger
model of participation. As a secondary task, I will also test eight other models that are ex-
tracted from existing research on intergroup relations, conĘict, and violence. ese models,
and their accompanying hypotheses, are described in the next section.
.. Alternative Models
My focus on an emotional pathway to intergroup violence does not rule out the possibility
that other factors could also be important. Different individuals may have diverging moti-
vations for the same observed behavior. is section thus examines eight alternative models
for participation in intergroup violence, and states hypotheses that will be tested in Chapter
. Table . lists these eight models in the rows of the table; some are hypothesized to have
effects on all the dependent variables of participation, anger, and blame; others on only one
or two.

... Selective Incentives
e classic theory of collective action posits selective incentives as one of the primary meth-
ods by which groups and leaders are able to generate signiĕcant levels of participation (Lich-
bach ; Olson ). e problem is that the outcome of collective action is typically a
public good that can be enjoyed by all group members, whether or not they took part in its
production. Selective incentives deter free-riding by selectively directing rewards to partic-
ipants.
Recent research on the motivations of participants in civil wars ĕnds that private
incentives such as payments play a prominent role in decisions about whether or not to
ĕght (Humphreys and Weinstein ). Payments of participants are more likely when vi-
olence is backed or organized by powerful leaders, for the simple reason that these leaders
are more likely to have material resources to reward participants. is is not the case in
many instances of intergroup violence however: community policing leaders in Alexandra
and other South African townships have low incomes.Ƭƭ In addition, the chaos and confu-
sion of intergroup violence means that it would be very difficult for leaders to monitor the
behavior of those they have paid. Paying people is therefore a poor method of organizing
participation.
It is not surprising that only one percent of my survey respondents believed that
“some” or “many” people were paid during the  riots. is ĕnding echoes Scacco’s
() research in Nigeria, where, despite heavily oversampling rioters, she only found ĕve
individuals who admitted to having been paid to take part in the  riots. Both theory
and evidence thus suggest that selective payments are not an important factor in motivating
ƬƭOne indication of their level of income comes from Misago et al. (). ey report that, in the days
aer the  attacks, community leaders were charging foreigners R (about .) to visit their friends and
family in Alexandra.

participation in intergroup violence.
One selective incentive does stand out as a plausible explanations forwhy people take
part. Some researchers emphasize looting as a reason for participation in urban riots in the
United States (Banĕeld ; DiPasquale and Glaeser ). Such riots are directed at the
authorities, to the extent that any target exists, while intergroup violence is directed against
another social group. But both forms feature mob-based mass violence, suggesting that
lootingmay also play a role in participation in intergroup violence. In this view, participants
are not motivated by antipathy to the outgroup, but only by the possibility of grabbing some
spoils of war.
Hypothesis .. Beliefs that participation yields opportunities for looting are associated with
greater intentions of participating in intergroup violence.
... Social InĘuence
A large literature on social inĘuence shows that people’s behaviors, attitudes, and percep-
tions are affected by those around them (Turner ). ere are two main types of social
inĘuence. e more famous of the two is conformity, when an individual changes her at-
titudes or behavior to ĕt in with a group, illustrated most vividly in Solomon Asch’s clas-
sic line-length experiments (Asch ). e other type of social inĘuence is compliance,
where an individual change her behavior in acquiescence to a request (Cialdini and Gold-
stein ). A memorable illustration of compliance is the behavior of the experimental
participants in Stanley Milgram’s studies of obedience (Milgram ).
While compliance can be seen as a public display of obedience, conformity maymay
be either public or private (Festinger ). Public conformity involves conformist behavior
or speech, while private conformity is associated with changes in personal attitudes and

beliefs.ƬƮ
e public-private distinction maps onto two different mechanisms of inĘuence:
normative and informational (Deutsch and Gerard ). e behavior and speech of oth-
ers exerts informational inĘuence when it supplies information about the distribution of be-
liefs and preferences among a relevant population, and it exerts normative inĘuence when
it produces social pressure to act in a certain way.
Informational inĘuence is thought to be based on a desire to have accurate informa-
tion about the world. It is especially likely to operate when information is limited or when
a situation is ambiguous or complex (Festinger ). is characterizes many social sit-
uations, particularly the issue of who is to blame for the hardships faced by the ingroup.
Informational inĘuence results in conformity in private attitudes, which, in turn, may then
produce public, behavioral conformity.
Normative inĘuence operates out of a desire to be accepted by others, particularly
those within one’s reference group. e real or perceived expectations of these other group
members creates social pressure that leads to behavioral conformity, and perhaps also com-
pliance. is pressure has been shown to have such effects even when the behavior is pri-
vately opposed by individuals (Kuran ).
Social inĘuence is hypothesized to have two distinct effects on participation in in-
tergroup violence. e ĕrst is a direct effect on participation itself; the second is an indirect
effect that is mediated by beliefs that the outgroup is to blame for some harm to the ingroup.
Each of these hypothesized effects will be discussed in turn, beginning with the direct effect.
A number of scholars have noted the importance of social context and social inĘu-
ence in producing mass participation in rebellion, revolution, and genocide. Taylor (),
for example, argues that communities that participated in rebellions in Europe and China
ƬƮPrivate conformity is also known as acceptance or internalization.
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tended to exhibit two organizational features. First, they showed webs of overlapping hor-
izontal ties, where each individual regularly interacted with numerous other members of
the community. Second, these communities were governed by strong norms of general-
ized reciprocity, which demand that all community members help each other without an
expectation of immediate reward.
Other scholars of rebellion and collective violence have conĕrmed the importance
of one or both of these factors. Scott () argues that Vietnamese villages with stronger
norms of reciprocity had a greater capacity for collective action and were more likely to
rebel when their welfare was threatened. Petersen () exploits the same argument to
explain why certain communities supported the anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania while
others did not. Using survey data from Liberia, Humphreys andWeinstein () show that
the number of ties to other participants in the civil war increases a respondent’s likelihood
of also being a rebel. Fuji () uses the same model to account for participation in the
Rwandan genocide, as does McDoom (), although he uses a unique geospatial dataset
on the location of perpetrators’ and victims’ houses in one village in Rwanda.
A related set of ĕndings can be found in research on participation in what McAdam
calls “high risk activism.” McAdam () argues that while ideological ideological identiĕ-
cation with the civil rights movement “pushed” individuals toward participation, member-
ship in activist groups was required to “pull” people into the  Freedom Summer project.
Similarly, Finkel and Muller ĕnd that membership in an activist movement is a key factor
shaping participation in “unconventional” protest in s West Germany (Finkel, Muller,
and Opp ; Finkel and Muller ).
Returning to the psychological literature on social inĘuence, it seems likely that com-
munities, organizations, or institutions featuring numerous horizontal ties and practices
of generalized reciprocity are also able to exert considerable normative inĘuence on their
members. When individuals interact with many others in a particular community—and
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have expectations of future interactions—each of its members cares a great deal about how
they are viewed by others. is normative inĘuence is likely to produce a signiĕcant degree
of social pressure to conform to the behavior of others and comply with requests to take part
in collective action.
While organizers and other participants may plausibly exert normative inĘuence on
others, they can also threaten to harm individuals who refuse to take part. In situations of
intergroup violence, there is thus a third mechanism that should be added to the normative
and informational mechanisms already identiĕed: coercive inĘuence. Given that the group
intends to use violence on its targets, a threat to use it on a recalcitrant group member is
credible. Individuals who are members of community organizations will also be known by
other members and, as a consequence, they will be identiĕable and prone to intimidation
should they choose to not participate in collective action.
Applying this theory to intergroup violence in South Africa, the contexts where indi-
viduals would be most exposed to norms of generalized reciprocity and embedded in webs
of horizontal interactions are the community policing meetings. As noted in the previ-
ous chapter, these informal institutions grew out of the street and block committees that
emerged in the s as a means of resisting apartheid. ey have a history of producing
collective action. Attendance in these community meetings will thus expose individuals to
normative and coercive pressure to participate in future violence, which, in turn, is expected
to produce behavioral compliance.
Hypothesis .. Attendance in community meetings results in greater intentions to take part
in future intergroup violence.
e group is also expected to exert an indirect effect on participation in intergroup
violence by shaping individual beliefs about the degree of blame to attribute to the outgroup.
A wide variety of studies have shown the effects of social inĘuence on political and
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social opinions. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (), for example, claim that prefer-
ences for parties or candidates are contagious, while Mutz () argues that “impersonal
inĘuence”—perceptions of the opinions of others—shapes individual’s own political opin-
ions. Political scientists have been particularly interested in the effects of people’s discussion
networks. Huckfeldt and Sprague () argue that these networks constrain opportunities
for interaction and the delimit the information one hears from peers; Mutz shows that the
heterogeneity of discussion networks increases political tolerance (b), but decreases
participation (a); and Druckman and Nelson () argues that heterogeneity miti-
gates the effects of of elite framing.
In sum, there is considerable evidence that people’s attitudes are affected by the opin-
ions and behavior of others, particularly those with whom they interact. Such attitudes are
private (or at least shared only with an interviewer) and thus shaped more by informational,
than by normative, inĘuence. In other words, people take heed of the opinions of their fam-
ily, friends, and others within their reference group when forming their own attitudes about
political phenomena.
Consequently, there is reason to believe that a similar process operates when it comes
to blame of an outgroup. To the extent that an individual hears many of her fellow group
members blaming the outgroup for the woes of the ingroup, she will be more likely to regard
these allegations of blame as reliable information. is informational inĘuence is expected
to result in attitudinal conformity, such that the individual becomesmore likely to blame the
outgroup herself. To the extent that this effect materializes, and blame is additionally linked
to participation in intergroup violence, then this effect forms a second pathway between
social inĘuence and participation, one that manifests indirectly.
Hypothesis .. Greater exposure to expressions of outgroup blame by an individual’s peers
produces increased blame, by that individual, of the outgroup.

... Elite Mobilization
ere is a widespread popular belief that political leaders are not only capable of “foment-
ing,” “instigating,” or “provoking” intergroup violence, but that they regularly exercise this
capability too (e.g. Reeves ; Kirkpatrick ). More systematic research does indeed
argue that leaders can beneĕt ĕnancially and politically from intergroup violence (Misago
; Olzak ; Wilkinson ). Leaders are useful for intergroup violence because they
may be in a position to provide a focal point, such as a march or a meeting, around which
people can coordinate an attack on another group. In addition to this organizational role,
some researchers argue that leaders also play an informational role in shaping mass partic-
ipation. In other words, leaders may attempt to persuade members of their group to blame
the outgroup (DeFigueiredo and Weingast ; Glick ).Ƭ⁴
A number of scholars claim that leaders have successfully blamed outgroups in his-
torical examples of genocide or ethnic war. Historians, for example, argue that the Nazi
party was able to convince Germans that Jews were to blame for their woes (e.g. Staub
). In Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal concluded that the radio station
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille mobilized thousands of ordinary people to take part in the
genocide (ICTR ). In the case of Yugoslavia, DeFigueiredo and Weingast () claim
that Milosevic manipulated ordinary Serbs’ uncertainty about the motives of Croat leaders,
thus increasing Serbian fear and his support. More generally, Snyder () argues that
leaders are able to sell exclusionary nationalistic myths to the public through their control
of the media and the “marketplace of ideas,” paving the way for ethno-nationalist war.
Other scholars are less convinced about the inĘuence that leaders have on public
beliefs and opinions. Gibson andHoward () presents an interesting case from late s
Ƭ⁴Another informational role that is possibly played by leaders is to signal to the public that violence enjoys
support from the authorities (Horowitz ; Yanagizawa-Drott ).
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Russia, where elite attempts to blame Jews did not succeed. Yanagizawa-Drott () argues
that radio in Rwanda signaled authoritative support for violence rather than shaped mass
perceptions of blame. In a reconciliation ĕeld experiment using a radio drama in Rwanda,
Paluck () furthermore ĕnds that media messages are able to change perceived social
norms, but not personal beliefs (such as blame).
e large body of research on “elite inĘuence” in American politics may be able to
reconcile these divergent claims. is literature shows that leaders do have some effect, but
that citizensmoderate elitemessages in variousways. One particularly importantmoderator
is the effect of framing; research shows that leaders may pick the considerations used by the
public to evaluate an issue, but are not able to change attitudes on that issue more directly
(Chong and Druckman ). An example in the area of intergroup relations is supplied by
Kinder and Sanders (), who ĕnd that varying the framing of affirmative action affects
the role that “racial resentment” plays in public opinion about this issue. In sum, although
elite messages are by no means decisive, and may be attenuated or moderated by the public,
it remains plausible that scapegoating by leaders has an effect on mass beliefs.
Hypothesis .. Greater exposure to expressions of outgroup blame by community leaders
produces increased blame, by individuals, of the outgroup.
... Realistic Group ConĘict
One of the most prominent theories of intergroup violence is realistic group conĘict theory.
In the previous chapter, I discussed some examples of macro-level research that has used
this theory to account for the occurrence of violence between groups (e.g. Bates ; Olzak
). It can also be utilized, however, to explain why some people participate while others
do not.
Groups may compete over various resources. Existing research (Steinberg a;
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Misago et al. ; Nyar ) suggests that three resources are particularly important in
stoking intergroup tensions in Alexandra: jobs, public housing, and customers for street
traders.Ƭ⁵ Locals who are unemployed, live in low quality housing, or make their living sell-
ing goods in the streets of Alexandra, are thus particularly likely to compete with foreigners
for access to resources.
Moreover, such individuals could stand to beneĕt should an attack on foreigners be
carried out, because one consequence of such attacks is that large numbers of the targeted
group Ęee the area, producing a shi in the degree of competition over resources. ese
individuals can thus be said to face collective incentives for violence (Klandermans ).
Collective incentives therefore motivate participation in intergroup violence because vio-
lence holds the possibility of reducing competition over resources
is reduction in competition is, however, a public good, and as discussed earlier,
public goods are non-excludable—they can be enjoyed by all group members, regardless
of who took part in their provision. As such, the group faces the classic collective action
dilemma: all itsmembers would prefer to free ride on the efforts of others rather than partic-
ipate themselves (Olson ). Although collective incentives may account for one group’s
motivation to attack another, the translation of this motivation into collective action re-
quires that sufficient individuals actually be willing to take part in violence. Collective in-
centives are thus necessary but not sufficient for participation. A means of monitoring the
participation of individual groupmembers, and applying pressure to those whomight prefer
to not take part, is also required.
ese monitoring and mobilizing functions can be performed by informal institu-
tionswith their repeated face-to-face interactions and norms of ingroup reciprocity. Alexan-
Ƭ⁵Labor market and housing competition have also been identiĕed as a determinant of intergroup violence
in other settings (Dancygier ; Olzak ).
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dra Scacco’s () research in Nigeria, which I mentioned in the previous chapter, utilizes
just such amodel. She ĕnds that poorer residents of Jos and Kaduna participated in the 
Nigerian riots to defend their neighborhoods, but only if they were also active members of
neighborhood security organizations. Poorer residents had a collective incentive to partici-
pate, she argues, because their homes were likely to be destroyed if not defended. Wealthier
residents had more secure homes and thus did not need to mobilize to protect their prop-
erty. Poverty thus provided the motive for conĘict with another group, and the mobilizing
ability of social networks provides the means by which this motive could be transformed
into collective action.
While Scacco’s model may generalize to other examples of intergroup violence, in-
cluding local-foreigner conĘict in Alexandra, the particular collective incentives she as-
sumes are not a factor in South Africa. Foreigners, whowere the targets of the South African
attacks, were far outnumbered and either Ęed or fought for their lives, rather than gather-
ing to defend their homes. To the extent that locals were motivated by collective incentives,
defense of their homes was not one of these.Ƭ⁶ Rather, as I have argued, the unemployed,
those living in low quality housing, and street traders are the social categories who are most
likely to face collective incentives for participation. In Alexandra, the mobilizing institu-
tions are the community policing fora where the  attacks began. e requirement that
individuals both be motivated via a collective incentive, and be mobilized by community
networks then implies a conditional relationship between the three measures of exposure to
material competition with the outgroup and attendance at community policing meetings.
e hypotheses are as follows:
Ƭ⁶e particular collective incentive proposed by Scacco also appears to not be sufficient for participation
in intergroup violence. It would seem that at least some rioters with more aggressive, violent, and destructive
intentions are required, or else no defense would be needed in the ĕrst place.
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Hypothesis .. Unemployment and attendance at communitymeetings jointly produce greater
intentions to participate in intergroup violence.
Hypothesis .. Living in low quality housing and attendance at community meetings jointly
produce greater intentions to participate in intergroup violence.
Hypothesis .. Making a living as an informal trader and attendance at communitymeetings
jointly produce greater intentions to participate in intergroup violence.
Exposure to material competition with the outgroup is also expected to result in
anger and blame of that group. Because these are individually-held attitudes and emotions,
rather than collective action, there is no expectation that they require the mobilizing power
of community social networks. ere is thus no conditional relationship; competing with
the outgroup over jobs, houses, or customers should be sufficient for elevated levels of anger
or blame. e anger hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis .. Unemployment produces higher levels of anger at the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Living in low quality housing produces higher levels of anger at the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Making a living as an informal trader produces higher levels of anger at the
outgroup.
Finally, the realistic group conĘict hypotheses for blame:
Hypothesis .. Unemployment produces increased blame of the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Living in low quality housing produces increased blame of the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Making a living as an informal trader increased blame of the outgroup.

... Frustration-Aggression.
elongest-standing psychological theory of violent collective action is frustration-aggression
theory, which dates back to the study by Dollard et al. (). A more contemporary rein-
terpretation of frustration-aggression theory by Berkowitz () describes frustrations as
“aversive events.”Ƭ⁷ e model is then straightforward: frustrations increases the likelihood
of aggressive behavior.
ere is a clear resemblance to appraisal theories, which argue that goal incongru-
ence triggers anger.Ƭ⁸ Frustration-aggression theory remains useful, however, because it
permits an explanation of displaced aggression, where aggression is directed at a target other
than the source of the frustration (Berkowitz ).Ƭ⁹ In contrast, the appraisal model of
anger predicts that anger will be directed at the same actor who is believed to have caused
the triggering harm.
Ƭ⁷ese are objective, not subjective conditions.
Ƭ⁸Indeed, the appraisal theory of anger can be seen as a development and reĕnement of frustration-
aggression theory. Even Leonard Berkowitz, who has championed frustration-aggression theory since the
s, appears to admit this: “my position regarding appraisals should be clear from the start: I have no doubt
that people’s evaluations of situations greatly determine what emotions they will experience” (Berkowitz ,
).
Ƭ⁹Displacement of aggression is closely related to the phenomenon of scapegoating. Scapegoating, in in-
tergroup contexts, is when “an out-group is unfairly blamed for having intentionally caused an in-group’s
misfortune” (Glick , ). Positing that an outgroup has been scapegoated implies that they have been
unfairly blamed by the ingroup. As I described in the previous chapter, research on the employment and hous-
ing situations of foreigners in Alexandra is quite limited. But it does appear plausible that immigrants take up
jobs and houses that locals might otherwise enjoy. Moreover, current international norms restrict employ-
ment and public housing to citizens. It is thus not completely clear, in this case, that outgroup blame is unfair.
I thus avoid using the term “scapegoating,” and stick to “blame.” I do not take a stand on whether this blame
is unfair or not.
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In Alexandra, two aversive conditions stand out as potential frustrations. First, the
daily grind of poverty would provide a sustained aversive experience that might produce
aggression. Scholars have linked poverty to participation in both civil war (Humphreys and
Weinstein ) and ethnic riots (Brass ).
Hypothesis .. Poverty results in greater intentions of participation in intergroup violence.
e second potential source of frustration is support for an opposition political
party. Since , all local electoral wards in Alexandra have been held by ANC candi-
dates. e party has also controlled the balance of power in the city of Johannesburg, the
province of Gauteng, and the National Assembly since the ĕrst elections of the democratic
era in . While individuals who do not support any partymay be disengaged or alienated
from politics, those who support opposition parties are more likely to be frustrated with the
continued unemployment, lack of housing, and poverty of townships like Alexandra.
Hypothesis .. Support for an opposition party results in greater intentions of participation
in intergroup violence.
Frustrations may also produce intergroup anger as well as participation in violence.
e original frustration-aggression model of Dollard et al. () was situated within a be-
haviorist psychology and thus ignored the emotions. Berkowitz’s (; ) “cognitive-
neoassociationist” reinterpretation, however, remedies this oversight by arguing that aver-
sive events produce negative emotions—particularly anger—which then result in aggres-
sion. Following the discussion in the previous section, being poor and supporting an oppo-
sition party are hypothesized to be frustrations that result in intergroup anger.
Hypothesis .. Poverty is expected to result in greater levels of intergroup anger.
Hypothesis .. Support for an opposition party is expected to result in greater levels of inter-
group anger.

Finally, the fact that frustration-aggression theory can, in principle, account for scape-
goating means that it could also provide an explanation for why outgroups are blamed for
hardships and harms suffered by the ingroup. Frustrations, in other words, may produce
a displacement of blame as well as a displacement of aggression. Poverty and support for
opposition parties is expected to be associated with greater blame of the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Poverty is expected to result in increased blame of the outgroup.
Hypothesis .. Support for an opposition party is expected to result in increased blame of the
outgroup.
... A Culture of Violence
A large interdisciplinary literature argues that variations in violence, particularly homicide,
are produced by variations in norms regarding the appropriate use of violence. In pre-state
societies, where there is no overarching authority to supply impartial justice, it is neces-
sary to cultivate a reputation for formidability to deter predation from others (McCullough
; Pinker ). is need for deterrence produces tit-for-tat norms of behavior (Ax-
elrod ), and systems of revenge (McCullough ) and honor (Cohen et al. ).
Chagnon (), for example, estimates that  of mortality he observed amongst the
Yanomamö of the Amazon basin was due to revenge killings. Where state authority is im-
posed, however, such tit-for-tat norms are no longer useful and tend to be replaced by norms
of civility (Elias ), which proscribe rather than recommend violence. is process of
norm change may be quite slow: Gastil () argues that the high regional variation in
homicide levels in the United States is the product of a persistent “culture of violence” that
remains in the South.
Anumber of authors have claimed that SouthAfrican townships are similarly gripped
by a culture of violence (Hamber ; Kynoch ). Despite townships falling under the
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aegis of the apartheid state, this state was not a neutral arbiter of justice. Indeed, by the
s the townships had become the frontlines of an insurgency, with the police being far
more interested in repression than law enforcement Steinberg (b). In response, as I
stated in the previous chapter, township activists set up the informal institutions of street
and block committees to defend against police incursions and root out informants. Under
such threatening and anarchic conditions, it seems likely that violence gained some norma-
tive approval.
Despite the advent of democracy in , it still took an additional ĕve years before
the community of Alexandra came to tolerate police patrols of their area Steinberg (b).
Normative support for violence no doubt also lingers in Alexandra. Individuals who sub-
scribe to norms approving of violence are expected to be more likely to participate in inter-
group violence.
Hypothesis .. Normative support for violence is associated with a greater likelihood of par-
ticipation in intergroup violence.
Normative support for violence is also expected to be associatedwith increased anger,
quite aside from the effect on participation in intergroup violence. e reason is that ap-
praisal theorists sometimes argue that the costs of aggression are one of the appraisals that
produce anger (Frijda ; Lazarus ; Mackie, Devos, and Smith ). When aggres-
sion is costly, the argument goes, anger is less likely to be experienced, while fear or sadness
become more likely.ƭ⁰ us, to the extent that individuals regard violence as proscribed,
they will be more likely to view aggression as costly, and less likely to experience anger.
ƭ⁰e use of this appraisal may appear to suggest that anger is the outcome of a cost-beneĕt calculus where
it is “chosen” only when the costs are not prohibitive. ere is indeed a resemblance to models of instrumental
choice. But this resemblance comes about because anger is an adaption; it provides a credible deterrent against
predation by other individuals (Frank ; Trivers ). Part of this evolutionary logic is that anger becomes
counterproductive when an opponent is too formidable (Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides ): it would be better

Hypothesis .. Normative support for violence is associated with lower levels of intergroup
anger.
... Authoritarianism andreat
A large body of research has linked authoritarian values with intolerance of, prejudice to-
ward, and support for aggression against, other groups . An initially psychoanalytic theory
(Adorno et al. ; Fromm ), Feldman () has provided a contemporary revision.
He argues that authoritarianism is a psychological orientation or value dimension, which
balances the individual need for autonomy with the group need for order. e authori-
tarian pole of this orientation emphasizes social conformity, respect for authority, and a
disapproval of difference.
Feldman and Stenner (Feldman and Stenner ; Stenner ) offer a compelling
account of the mechanics behind the authoritarianism–intolerance effect. Authoritarian
dispositions, they argue, are activated by threatening contexts. Only when activated do these
dispositions produce authoritarian attitudes and behavior. ere is a social-functionalist
logic to their theory: under benign conditions of peace and prosperity, authoritarian val-
ues remain abstract, but when conditions deteriorate and group welfare is threatened, au-
thoritarian values cohere, and begin to exert a greater control over behavior and political
attitudes (Feldman ). It is thus neither solely individual predispositions nor solely sit-
to give in and sacriĕce some resources than stumble into a one-sided battle. While instrumental models of
“rational choice” focus on rationality at the individual level, this evolutionary story about anger focuses on
rational at the genetic level (or, as (Dawkins ) put it,“selĕsh genes”). ere is no necessary correspondence
between these levels. Moreover, anger is (or was) adaptive only over long periods of time and on average across
populations of individuals. Although there may still be contemporary situations in which it is advantageous
(and thus “rational”) to get angry, there are alsomany situations where anger is disadvantageous. Anger is thus
not a choice in the everyday sense of the word (Elster ).
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uational threats that produce behavioral expressions of authoritarianism, but authoritarian
predispositions and situational threats working in tandem. Some have disputed this inter-
active authoritarian-threat dynamic (Hetherington and Suhay ), but the experimental
evidence does provide support (Stenner ; Lavine et al. ; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas
).
Authoritarian values, coupled with perceptions of group threats, appear promising
as an explanation for outgroup blame (Gibson and Howard ), for two reasons. First,
one of the main effects of this authoritarian-threat dynamic is a decrease in tolerance for
difference, and outgroups are usually different to the ingroup in important ways. Second,
the authoritarian-threat dynamic produces a pattern of cognition that can be described as
self-deception. Lavine et al. (); Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas (), for example, experi-
mentally induce threat and show that authoritarians are more likely to engage in motivated
reasoning, and thus more likely to search for information that conĕrms their existing be-
liefs. Blaming outgroups, whichmay take the form of scapegoating, or “unfair blame” (Glick
), appears particularly likely if individuals engage in motivated reasoning.
Hypothesis .. Authoritarian values and perceptions of threat to the ingroup jointly produce
increased blame of the outgroup.
... Psychoanalytic Projection
An early, psychodynamic model of blame and aggression is the theory of projection. is
theory holds that unpleasant and aversive thoughts, emotions, and memories are repressed
or redirected in some way (Freud ; Glick ). Feelings of guilt and anxiety are par-
ticularly likely to be projected on to another target (Gollwitzer ). Using the concept of
intergroup emotions, this theory can be tailored to ĕt intergroup situations. Another group
is blamed when an individual experiences unacceptable or disagreeable feelings about her
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own group. In Alexandra, the obvious source for these emotions is the  attacks against
immigrants. According to the psychoanalytic theory of scapegoating, blame of the outgroup
may be a projection of ingroup members’ negative emotions about their group’s role in the
violence.
Hypothesis .. Negative emotions about the  attacks are associated with increased
blame of the outgroup.
.. Conclusion
is chapter has explicated the entitlement-blame-anger model of participation in inter-
group violence. ere are three dependent variables: participation in intergroup violence,
intergroup anger, and outgroup blame. e entitlement-blame-anger model hypothesizes
that anger is the cause of participation; blame, the trigger of anger; and group entitlement vi-
olations, the roots of blame. is chapter has also outlined a large number of hypotheses that
could potentially offer alternative explanations for one or more of these dependent variables
(All the hypotheses are summarized in Table .). is concludes the theoretical section of
the dissertation. e next chapter considers issues of research design and measurement.
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CHAPTER 
Data and Methods
.. Introduction
... Researching Participation in Intergroup Violence
is dissertation examines the question of why people take part in intergroup violence.
An answer requires individual-level data with variation in levels of participation. In other
words, we need observations both of individuals both taking part and individuals demur-
ring to do so. ere are twomethods that can be used to collect such data: experimental and
observational. e ĕrst requires that the researcher simulate the key features of intergroup
violence in a laboratory and, aer manipulating the hypothesized triggers of participation,
record whether subjects take part or not. e second method utilizes the behavioral vari-
ation that found in a sample of people who live in an area where intergroup violence has
recently occurred.
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. e experimental method is
constrained by research ethics. Actual violence is, of course, unacceptable, so researchers
have turned to behavioral measures that are believed to be related to aggression and vio-
lence. Such measures include observing whether experimental participants ĕne those be-
longing to other groups (Abbink, Masclet, and Mirza ), or force them to listen to un-
pleasant sounds (Gubler ). Given that these behaviors are sanctioned by the authority
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ĕgure of the experimenter (Tedeschi and Quigley ), a gap in realism emerges between
these laboratory measures and the behavior of interest. Intergroup violence involves grue-
some face-to-face attacks on unarmed civilians, so this gap in realism may be quite large.
e construct validity of behavioral measures of participation in violence is thus fairly weak
(Tedeschi and Quigley ).
Research ethics constrain laboratory experiments on intergroup violence in other
ways. Even if a researcher was to stick to one of the safe measures of aggressive behavior
described above, it would still be unwise to manipulate the triggers of intergroup violence
using subjects from real groups that are at risk of attacking one another. Whether debriefed
or not, one cannot be sure that subjects will return to their community no more prejudiced
than when they arrived in the lab. Researchers oen resolve this problem by using artiĕcial
groups, or groups such as students and university administration that are psychologically
salient but not likely to attack one another (e.g. van Zomeren et al. ). e unfortunate
consequence of this solution is that it weakens the external validity of the study (Druckman
and Kam ).
In addition, the causal effect of intergroup anger on intentions to confront an out-
group has already been conĕrmed using laboratory experiments (Mackie, Devos, and Smith
; van Zomeren et al. ). is emotional pathway to violence has never been tested
in the context of intergroup violence, however, either with a sample of people from a com-
munity that is prone to intergroup violence, or using a dependent variable that measures
participation in violence.
ese existing laboratory results, coupled with the limitations of the experimental
approach to research on participation in violence, point toward the second method of re-
search—collecting observational data from a violence-prone context—as being potentially
more fruitful. To gather data to test the entitlement-blame-anger model, I thus use a public
opinion survey.
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... Research Site: Alexandra
I chose the urban slumofAlexandra, in Johannesburg, SouthAfrica as the site formy survey.
e  violence between local South Africans and foreigners began in Alexandra, and
intergroup tensions remain (Quintal ).
Alexandra is a propitious site to research participation in intergroup violence, for
four reasons. First, although the area previously experienced partisan violence in the early
s (Bonner and Nieagodien ), the  attacks were the ĕrst episode of violence
that targeted immigrants. us, Alexandra would seem to lack the “institutionalized riot
systems” and “riot specialists” that authors such as Brass () identify in Indian cities. Nor
were the participants in Alexandra inĘuenced by contagion of violence from other places
because the  riots began in Alexandra. Without specialists in violence, organizational
infrastructure, or bandwagon effects, participation in the ethnic riot in Alexandra is a more
difficult case to explain, and thus a sterner test for any account of individual participation.
Second, the  attacks occurred only three years before the ĕeldwork. Although
residents of the affected areas like Alexandra were unlikely to forget this nation-wide wave
of violence, this relatively short gap suggests that memories of the violence should be quite
vivid for respondents.Ƭ Indeed, none of the respondents reported ignorance about the 
attacks. Moreover, the occurrence of anti-immigrant violence in  did not change the
tense relationship between locals and foreigners in South African townships. Indeed, there
have been sporadic warnings that violence may recur (see Quintal ).
Given the recent occurrence of intergroup violence in Alexandra and the continued
salience of the ingroup-outgroup divide, asking a sample of residents about participation
in future intergroup violence is a meaningful exercise. Alexandra residents are likely to
Ƭis is in contrast to the methodology of Scacco (), for example, who gathered survey data on riot
participation seven years aer the  Nigerian riots took place.
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remember the previous attacks, and can therefore imagine what it means to take part. Con-
tinued tensions suggest also that a future attack on immigrants remains all too possible. A
public opinion survey in Alexandra on intergroup attitudes, emotions, and aggressive in-
tentions should thus yield valid measures.
In addition, such survey data on participation in intergroup violence is likely to avoid
the Ęoor effects that would be caused by sampling from a population where few are disposed
to attack another group. It also avoids the ceiling effect of sampling from a population where
most people are likely to riot, because only a minority of the ingroup typically take part in
these episodes of intergroup violence.ƭ
In sum, the novelty of the  violence, its recent occurrence, the presence of con-
tinued tensions between locals and immigrants, and the existence of behavioral and attitu-
dinal variation together suggest that a sample drawn from Alexandra would provide valid
and useful data for testing hypotheses regarding participation in intergroup violence.
In the next section I discuss how the survey was conducted before turning to an
explication of the wording of the survey items, and the measurement of the variables.
.. Conducting the Survey
... Initial Preparations
I began the ĕeldwork with some qualitative pilot research. In August , I conducted
 face-to-face interviews as well a number of more informal discussions with residents of
ƭScacco () for example, ĕnds that only  of adult males actually took part in the  riots in Jos
and Kaduna in Nigeria. She argues that virtually no women took part, producing an estimate that around 
of the adult population participated.
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Alexandra.Ʈ is preliminary research provided several insights that helped inform the later
survey.
First, I noticed the widespread incidence of negative beliefs about, and grievances
toward, African immigrants. e content of these largely centered on immigrants undercut-
ting wages, taking jobs, and living in government houses (see also Steinberg a; Misago
et al. ). Second, while anti-foreigner sentiments were commonly encountered, I also
found signiĕcant variation in attitudes and beliefs. ird, a few respondents showed signs
of anger when talking about foreigners taking jobs, etc., which instilled some conĕdence in
the key causal mechanism of the proposed model. Fourth, respondents did not show much
hesitance in discussing immigrants and the violence of , indicating that the threat of
social desirability bias was not as severe as one might imagine.⁴
I returned to Alexandra in April andMay  to conduct the public opinion survey.
I demarcated the research site using the traditional boundaries of “Old Alexandra.”⁵
Interviewers were recruited from a local survey ĕrm (Social Surveys Africa), who
were happy to provide work for some of their freelance ĕeldworkers. Four interviewers
were hired; all were all black South Africans who lived in Johannesburg (none resided in
ƮI worked with a prominent local resident to gain access to community leaders and the community itself.
Researchers who have conducted ĕeldwork in Alexandra advised me that it would be desirable to seek the
permission of informal leaders to avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings regarding my intentions (as
well as the intentions of my interviewers when it came to conducting the survey). Permission was granted in
all instances.
⁴Horowitz () notes that lack of regret is common among perpetrator groups aer ethnic riots.
⁵Old Alexandra is bounded byWynberg Road in the south, Vasco Da Gama Street in the north, st Street
in the west, and the Jukskei river in the east. ese boundaries are marked on the map in Figure .. Some
sources, such as census data, include additional areas to the north, east, and west. ese wealthier suburbs and
industrial areas have little to do with Alexandra.
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Figure .. Satellite Photograph of Alexandra
e boundaries of Alexandra are outlined in black. e two hostels are the hexagonal structures outlined
in grey; areas of apartment buildings are outlined in white. e remainder of Alexandra consists of houses
and shacks, as well as sports ĕelds, schools, and administrative buildings that are excluded from the sampling
frame.
Alexandra); three were male and one female; and each had at least three years’ experience.
... Translation
Alexandra is a linguistically diverse township.⁶ Fortunately, the African languages spoken
in South Africa fall into four internally homogenous groups, where the speakers of a lan-
guage within one group are typically able to understand speakers of another language within
⁶Indeed, respondents reported ten different ĕrst languages.
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the same group (Lewis ). Moreover, two of the language groups—the Nguni group fea-
turing Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, and Swazi, and the Sotho group featuring Sotho, Pedi, and
Tswana—are very large.⁷
e survey instrument was thus translated into two languages: one from the Nguni
group (Zulu) and one from the Sotho group (Tswana). Existing survey data⁸ show that Zulu
is the most popular language in Alexandra. More importantly, it is the lingua franca in
Johannesburg townships.⁹ Tswana was chosen because it was the language from the Sotho
group that the interviewers were most comfortable with.Ƭ⁰
I began the process of translation during the pre-ĕeldwork training period. I used
the method of decentering (Werner and Campbell ), where changes are made between
the original and target languages until all versions are satisfactory. e questions were read
aloud in Zulu and Tswana. Translations were recorded. Ambiguities and disagreements
were discussed, and if necessary, the original English wording was adjusted. Special atten-
tion was paid to important concepts such as emotion words. Working off the notes made
during this training period, the instrument was translated into Zulu and Tswana by teams
of two interviewers chosen according to their Ęuency with the target language.
⁷A large majority of Alexandra residents () reported speaking a language from one of these groups as
a ĕrst language.
⁸See Table . for further details.
⁹Recall that during the  riots, attackers asked suspected foreigners to give the Zulu word for “elbow.”
Ƭ⁰Two of the interviewers were native Tswana speakers and thus adept with Sotho and Pedi. ey also had
a good command of Zulu. e other two were Zulu-speakers who were comfortable with using the Tswana
instrument.
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... Sampling Respondents
Drawing a representative sample in a South African township such as Alexandra is challeng-
ing. ere is no official list of residents, households, or dwellings, few people have ĕxed-line
telephones, and even fewer have access to the internet. is challenge was overcome using
a two-step strategy. First, the sample was stratiĕed by housing type. Within each housing
type, population density does not vary much across space. Second, randomly selected start-
ing points were chosen within each housing type using satellite photographs.ƬƬ is method
ensures that, within each housing type, all dwellings have an equal chance of being selected
into the sample. e Alexandra Benchmark SurveyƬƭ also provides estimates of the pro-
portion of Alexandra residents living in each of these three housing types. Weights were
then constructed to ensure that residents of one housing type are not overrepresented when
analyzing the data.
ree housing types were used as strata. e ĕrst is the fairly regular mixture of
small single-story houses, shacks, and backyard rooms that constitutes the vast majority
of Alexandra’s housing stock. ere are also two other smaller, but distinct housing types:
government apartments, and the hostels.ƬƮ e sample was also stratiĕed by gender at the
point of respondent selection to guard against undersampling men. Population data for
ƬƬese photographs were obtained using Google Earth soware. e photograph in Figure . is an ex-
ample.
Ƭƭe Alexandra Benchmark Survey is a large (N = 2; 496)  survey of Alexandra households, com-
missioned bye Alexandra Renewal Project, an agency in the Gauteng Province Department of Housing. It
was designed to provide estimates of development and quality of life indicators for policymakers (Alexandra
Renewal Project ND). See Table . for a comparison with my results.
ƬƮGovernment apartments are outlined in white in Figure .; hostels are the hexagonal structures outlined
in grey. e remainder of Alexandra—aside from public facilities, the police station, schools, and the like—is
the mix of houses and shacks used as the ĕrst strata.
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gender was obtained from the Alexandra Benchmark Survey.
Starting points, or more formally, clusters, were selected by dividing each housing
type into equal-sized chunks using a satellite photograph of Alexandra—a task that was
made substantially easier by the grid street pattern of the area (clearly seen in Figure .).
ere were two hostel clusters, three apartment clusters and  house-and-shack clusters.
e Alexandra Benchmark Survey estimated that  of residents live in the area of houses
and shacks. Eighteen out the  clusters were therefore selected from this area, with only
one each from the hostels and apartments. Selection was done by numbering the clusters
and using a random number generator.
is stratiĕed, clustered design permits the random selection of dwelling units—
individual houses, shacks, apartments, and hostel rooms. Households and respondents are
then selected within these dwelling units.Ƭ⁴ e following method was used. Every day in
the ĕeld corresponded with a particular cluster. Each interviewer attempted to contact nine
respondents per day / cluster, producing a targeted sample of . A typical procedure was
for each cluster to be divided in four, with one interviewer assigned to each segment. Inter-
viewers ĕrst sampled dwelling units (house, shack, apartment, or hostel room) by walking in
a given direction and using a sampling interval that varied between three and seven. Upon
making contact with someone in a selected dwelling, interviewers asked for the number of
households sharing that house (and its yard), shack, apartment, or hostel room. e house-
hold was selected using the same sampling interval used to choose dwellings. Within each
household, interviewers selected a South AfricanƬ⁵ aged eighteen years old to serve as a re-
Ƭ⁴A household was deĕned for respondents as all the individuals who regularly eat from the same pot. is
technique is used in the Afrobarometer survey project (Afrobarometer Network ). One house was found
to be occupied by  households, both inside, and outside in backyard shacks and rooms.
Ƭ⁵If the household consisted only of foreign nationals, the interviewer apologized and counted this house-
hold as not eligible for the sample.
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spondent. A random number table was used.Ƭ⁶ e sample was also stratiĕed by gender at
this stage, with interviewers alternatively seeking men and women to interview. e survey
instrument was administered by interviewers using a face-to-face method. Respondents’
answers were recorded by interviewers on paper questionnaires.
One call-back was required for non-contact at the level of dwelling units, household,
or respondent, and no substitutions were permitted. Interviews were completed for  re-
spondents. ere were  instances of non-cooperation at the level of dwelling unit and
household and a further  at the respondent level,  cases of non-contact at the level of
dwelling or household and another four at the respondent level,  cases where non-contact
occurred for other reasons, and six cases of non-contact due to safety concerns in one clus-
ter.Ƭ⁷ e response rate (AAPOR ) for this survey is thus .. is is a similar response
rate to high-quality face-to-face surveys conducted these days in the United States such as
the American National Election Study and the General Social Survey (Dixon and Tucker
). e achievement of such a response rate despite the small number of callbacks and
the lack of respondent incentives can be attributed to two factors. First, a marked willing-
ness to be interviewed among residents of the area.Ƭ⁸ Second,  of the  days of ĕeldwork
took place on public holidays or weekends. is reduced the level of non-contact due to
Ƭ⁶is table featured rows for the date of interview and columns for the number of people of the appropriate
gender living in the household. enumber,n, in the relevant cell of the table gave then-th oldestman/woman
to be selected as a respondent.
Ƭ⁷A group of men began aggressively questioning the intentions of one interviewer in the “Beirut” area
(the lower le corner of Alexandra in Figure .), previously the site of partisan violence between the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC). e team le the area immediately.
Ƭ⁸is willingness to participate in the survey produced an unforeseen problem: one interviewer reported
that several individuals who were not selected into the sample nevertheless demanded to be interviewed. He
conducted brief interviews to assuage their curiosity, and then moved on.
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people being at work.
Table .. Coverage of the Sample
 Survey  Survey
Estimates Estimates
() () (S.E.)
Gender
Male 52:8 52:9 (3:0)
Female 47:2 47:1 (3:0)
Housing type
Apartments 2:5 2:5 (1:7)
Hostels 5:4 5:3 (3:9)
Houses and shacks 92:2 92:1 (4:1)
Employment Status
Employed 50:0 43:4 (3:2)
Not in the labor force 19:5 11:4 (1:5)
Unemployed 30:5 45:2 (2:6)
Age
- 20:0 19:2 (1:6)
- 32:3 33:2 (2:0)
- 27:7 30:9 (2:4)
+ 20:0 16:7 (2:1)
Language
Zulu 32:0 36:7 (4:0)
Pedi 25:0 21:1 (2:5)
Sotho 9:0 11:1 (1:5)
Tswana 13:0 10:8 (1:7)
Xhosa 7:0 9:4 (1:6)
Tsonga 7:0 5:6 (1:2)
Venda 5:0 4:0 (0:9)
Other 2:0 1:3 (0:4)
 survey estimates are from the  Alexandra Benchmark Survey (Alexandra Renewal Project ND).
Both the  and  estimates are weighted. Standard errors (in parentheses) are design-based.
Table . compares the marginals of my survey to those from the Alexandra Bench-
mark Survey (ABS).Ƭ⁹ A comparison of the two sets of marginals permits a check of the ade-
Ƭ⁹e latter results were not released with uncertainty estimates. Formal tests of difference of proportions
are thus not possible. ese results are useful however, because, ĕrstly they are more up-to-date than the most
recently available census data, which was gathered in ; secondly, the ABS results offer survey marginals
for gender, housing type, employment status, age, and language within the area of Old Alexandra—the same
population I sampled.

quacy of my sampling frame and sampling procedure.ƭ⁰ e  response distributions for
age and language group correspond quite closely to those from the ABS. e marginals for
employment status are not as concordant. My estimates of the proportion of people who are
unemployed and not in the labor force are larger than those obtained by the ABS.ere are a
number of possible reasons for these differences. First, the ABS may have produced a more
accurate sample than mine, especially when it came to tracking down students and people
with outside employment, who would leave Alexandra during the day. However, given that
two-thirds of my ĕeldwork days were weekends or public holidays, and that the two surveys
used a similar number of call-backsƭƬ this cannot be assumed. Second, these differences
may also reĘect the effects of different question wording. People who work in the informal
economy, or who hold part-time employment,ƭƭ may be looking for work despite being em-
ployed. Finally, levels of employment and unemployment are fairly Ęuid. Unemployment
may have increased from  to . In sum, although it is possible that students and
the employed were under-sampled, my sample appears quite representative of adult South
African residents of Alexandra.
.. Measurement
... Dependent Variable: Participation in Intergroup Violence
I have argued that the observational method of conducting research on participation in in-
tergroup violence has several advantages over the experimental method. As such, I use a
ƭ⁰Both sets of results are weighted. e results from my survey are weighted to adjust for the differential
probabilities of respondent selection due to household size and the stratiĕcation by housing type and gender.
No post-stratiĕcation is used.
ƭƬe ABS used two call-backs; I used one.
ƭƭirty-seven percent of the employed were self-employed or working part-time.
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public opinion survey to gather measurements of emotions and participation. ismethod-
ological decision leads to another fork in the road, however. ere are two quite different
ways that one could use a survey to measure participation in violence. On the one hand,
some researchers ask respondents to report whether they participated in previous incidents
of violence (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein ; Scacco ). Other researchers ask re-
spondents whether they will take part should an opportunity present itself in future (e.g.
Muller ). e ĕrst technique thus relies on self-reported memories of participation; the
second on self-reported intentions. Either of these measures is potentially more valid than
a simulated laboratory behavior. Both involve asking people to report their recollections of
participation or intentions to participate in collective behaviors that are salient and realistic
for people living in these areas.
However, if one uses recollections of previous participation in violence as the de-
pendent variable, then, to avoid confounding the data analysis, all other variables must sim-
ilarly be measured by asking subjects to think back to the time when violence took place.
Unfortunately, this strategy cannot be used for independent variables that are psycholog-
ical in nature, such as the questions on intergroup emotions and perceptions needed for
this study. Attitudes and emotions cannot be measured with any validity by asking subjects
to think back to how they felt three years ago; they have to be measured in the here and
now. Given that the independent variables for this study are required to be measured in the
present, the dependent variable has to be situated in the future: as a participation intention.
Aer all, a strategy of evoking and measuring emotions and perceptions in  to explain
recollections of behavior carried out in  would be prone to the criticism that the latter
cause the former. In this study, I thus situate the measure of participation in the future: I
ask respondents whether they would take part in a future attack on foreigners in Alexandra.
Similar intentional measures of behavior have been used by scholars studying the
determinants of voter turnout (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon ), choice of electoral

candidate (Hillygus and Jackman ), protest participation (Finkel,Muller, andOpp ;
Muller ), the political consequences of ethnic cleavages (Posner ), and the effects
of intergroup anger (Mackie, Devos, and Smith ; van Zomeren et al. ). e most
important disadvantage of this technique is that ameasure of actual behavior is replacedwith
a measure of intended behavior, introducing error. Meta-analyses of the intention-behavior
link show that behavioral intentions do have a causal relationship with behavior. Sheeran
() ĕnds that the average correlation, across  studies, is ., while Webb and Sheeran
() ĕnd a “small to modest” causal effect of intentions on behavior (Cohen’s d = .) in a
meta-analysis of experimental tests.ƭƮ
However, thismeasurement error could be systematic rather than random. emea-
sure of participation intentions might, in other words, consistently under- or over-estimate
the probabilities that certain people would take part in future. Some individuals may pro-
fess an intention to participate without any real likelihood of doing so. Others might deny
any intention to take part in future but are, in fact, likely to be mobilized because of their
social networks (Fuji ; McAdam ; Taylor ). In the former case, respondents
underestimate the costs of participation; in the latter, they underestimate the situational de-
terminants. To address both of these concerns, the survey also includes measurements of
actual participation in the  attacks and attendance at the community meetings where
these attacks were organized. Respondents who participated in the previous episode of vio-
lence are likely to fully understand the costs and dangers of taking part, and thus less likely
to overestimate their probability of participation. Respondents who attendmeetings, on the
other hand, are embedded in community social networks, and thus more likely to be mobi-
lized by their peers should violence recur. In the next chapter I will use these two additional
ƭƮe biserial correlation between having participated in any way in  and the variable measuring the
intention to participate in future is .; the correlation between any extreme form of participation (assault,
destruction of property, and intimidation of others) and participation intentions is ..
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variables to provide a robustness check of the anger-participation intentions link.
I also attempted to ensure respondents were realistically considering the costs and
situational determinants of participation in intergroup violence when asking about their in-
tentions. I ĕrst checked that all were familiar with the  riots,ƭ⁴ and then asked questions
about their participation in this previous episode of violence.ƭ⁵ Because the  attacks in
Alexandra grew out of an anti-foreigner toyi-toyi, I then asked respondents to imagine that
“a group of South Africans was marching through Alex, toyi-toying and demanding that the
foreigners leave.”
Once this context had been primed, I moved to questions regarding intentions to
take part should violence recur. Participation intentions is conceived as a latent variable
that varies from a desire to engage in physical aggression against the target group—at the
more aggressive end of the variable—to more passive behaviors such as refusing to help vic-
tims.ƭ⁶ Respondents’ intentions regarding four potential behaviors were measured using
survey questions. ese behaviors were chosen to provide variance across the latent dimen-
ƭ⁴All respondents were familiar, even the who reported not being inAlexandra at the time of the attacks.
ƭ⁵Details on these items will be discussed below.
ƭ⁶My initial interviews, conducted in Alexandra in June , and other interview research by Steinberg
(a) and Misago et al. () convinced me that social desirability issues would not present a major prob-
lem when asking people about their intentions to participate in future intergroup violence. Misago (), in
particular, found that people were willing to speak openly about the violence of , and their participation
therein, even in focus group situations. Despite clearly being an outsider to the area, my initial investigations
also yielded several individuals who expressed aggressive intentions regarding immigrants. My survey ĕeld-
workers were also quite experienced at asking sensitive questions (their previous project had involved asking
about attitudes to homosexuality in South African townships: a far more delicate topic than anti-immigrant
attitudes and intentions). Being black South African residents of Johannesburg, they were also part of the
ingroup, and quite likely to be trusted by respondents. More generally, Horowitz (, –) notes the
absence of remorse characterizing communities that perpetrate deadly ethnic riots.
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sion of intergroup aggression. I ĕrst asked respondents if they would simply join up with a
mob that was toyi-toying and singing anti-foreigner songs, if someone asked them to. en,
at the more aggressive end of the participation continuum, respondents were asked if they
would assault someone if other people were doing so and destroy shacks if others were doing
so.ƭ⁷ Finally, to obtain variance at the more paciĕc end of the scale, respondents were asked
if they would help (or refuse to help) a victim hide from themob.ƭ⁸ ere were four response
options for these questions: “would deĕnitely / probably / might do this” and “would not
do this.”
Table .. Participation Intentions: ItemWording, Coding, Don’t Know Responses and Missing Values
Items and Coding
 
Don’t Miss-
Know ing
Now I would like to ask you some questions about what you would do if there was an-
other group who wanted to chase the foreigners away, like in . Imagine that a group
of South Africans was marching through Alex, toyi-toying and demanding that the for-
eigners leave.
() Would you join in the toyi-toying if people that you know asked you to join in? . .
I would deĕnitely do this = . Probably do this, Might do this, Don’t know = . Would
not do this = .
() Would you help any foreigners hide from the crowd? . .
I would deĕnitely do this = . Probably do this, Might do this, Don’t know = . Would
not do this = .
() If other people began hitting the foreigners, would you also hit them? . .
I would deĕnitely do this = . Probably do this, Might do this, Don’t know = . Would
not do this = .
() If other people began destroying the foreigners’ shacks, would you also do this? . .
I would deĕnitely do this = . Probably do this, Might do this, Don’t know = . Would
not do this = .
Figure . shows the response distributions for these four items. Each of the four
ƭ⁷Reports on the  violence indicated that the destruction of foreigners’ shacks was a common behavior
(Misago et al. ).
ƭ⁸See Table . for the exact wording of these questions.
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plots corresponds to one of the items used to measure participation intentions, with the ver-
tical bars showing the weighted percentage of the sample choosing each response category.
e percentage expressing a deĕnite intention to participate in a form of anti-immigrant ag-
gression varied considerably across the questions. Twelve percent of respondents said they
would deĕnitely assault someone,  said that they would destroy property,  expressed
an intention to join in with a group that was toyi-toying, while  claimed that they would
deĕnitely not help any victims.ƭ⁹
ese differing proportions follow from the measurement strategy of asking about
behaviors that vary in their degree of aggression. To use the language of measurement the-
ory, each item has a different level of “difficulty” given a respondent’s overall level of inten-
tion to participate in future. e most aggressive respondents will ĕnd the question on not
helping victims to be very “easy,” while slightly more paciĕc respondents will ĕnd the item
regarding their intention to assault someone to be “difficult.” In other words, the thresholds
between say, intending to “probably” and intending to “deĕnitely” perform a behavior, vary
across items. is information about the location of item thresholds is lost when creating an
additive scale, even if one weighs the sum by, for example, factor loadings. To measure the
underlying latent variable of participation intentions, I use an item response theory (IRT)
model that explicitly uses this information on item difficulty or thresholds in addition to
information on item-scale correspondence (“item discrimination”).
IRT permits model-basedmeasurements of latent variables using information about
responses and items.Ʈ⁰ e probability of a respondent responding a particular way to any
ƭ⁹e “help” item is reverse-coded for the purposes of scale construction. Don’t know responses were
recoded to the response category “might do this;” missing data were imputed using multiple imputation. See
Table . for further details on the extent of missingness and don’t know’s; see the ĕnal section in this chapter
for further details on the multiple imputation method.
Ʈ⁰See Embretson andReise () for an overview, andDelli Carpini andKeeter () for an early political

Figure .. Response Distributions of Participation Intention Items
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e grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category across each of the four
participation intention survey items; the numbers below each bar show the weighted number of respondents
choosing each category. Note that the scale for the “help” item is reĘected when constructing the participation
intentions measure. TotalN = 497.
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given item—say, choosing a response of “would deĕnitely” to the “destroy” item—ismodeled
in IRT using a logistic or cumulative normal curve. e slope of the curve is determined by
item discrimination parameters, which are comparable to the factor loadings or corrected
item-total correlations from classical test theory. e intercept of each curve is usually the
point on the latent variable where the curve crosses the  threshold for the probability of
observing a given response, and is measured using item difficulty or threshold parameters.
Respondent scores on the latent variable are then measured as a function of both
item difficulty and item discrimination parameters. Each unique combination of response
patterns across all items corresponds to a unique score on the latent variable. For example,
all respondents selecting “deĕnitely” to the four items in the participation intentions scale
constitute one response pattern, while the set of respondents choosing “deĕnitely” for the
toyi-toyi item and “deĕnitely not” for the other three form another response pattern, and so
on.
Figure . shows, however that respondents tended to offer deĕnitive intentions to
either take part or abstain from the behavior in question. Few professed uncertainty re-
garding their intentions by choosing either the “might do this” or “would probably do this”
response options. is bifurcation of responses is perhaps to be expected when asking peo-
ple about salient but contentious issues such as intended participation in violence. is
sparseness of data in the intermediate categories does, however, present an obstacle to scale
construction. On the one hand, there is little information to estimate the thresholds be-
tween the “might” and “probably” categories. On the other hand, additional analyses show
that a simple additive scale composed of the items does not increase monotonically across
the intermediate categories of the “assault” and “destroy homes” items.
When faced with sparsely populated and non-monotonic response categories, Bond
science application.
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and Fox () suggest collapsing some categories of the response set to create indicators
with better measurement properties. Recoding the “assault” and “destroy” items as trichoto-
mous—by collapsing the two intermediate categories into one—resolves both these difficul-
ties. It is also recommended to recode all items that share response sets in the same fashion,
so trichotomous measures were created for the other two items as well.ƮƬ
An IRTmodel for ordinal data, the graded response model (Samejima ), is then
used to estimate the latent variable of participation intentions. is model requires that the
latent variable be unidimensional, which can be veriĕed by the pattern of eigenvalues of
the tetrachoric correlation matrix of items. In this case, only the ĕrst eigenvalue is greater
than one (See Table .), supporting unidimensionality. e graded response model esti-
mates a score on the latent variable for each respondent using both item thresholds and item
discrimination parameters. A 2 test shows that the model is a good ĕt for the data.Ʈƭ
e parameter estimates are presented in Table .. As expected, the item tapping
respondents’ intentions regarding help for victims is located at a lower, more paciĕc level
on the latent scale than the other three indicators. is points to the utility of this item in
distinguishing respondents who are extremely unlikely to take part in future violence from
those who are merely unlikely. e other three items all have higher item thresholds, show-
ing that they provide information on the more violent end of the scale. e discrimination
parameter (here labeled the factor loading) for the helping item is, however, much weaker
than the corresponding parameter for the other three items, indicating that this item does
not add as much information to the overall scale. e helping item, in other words, has a
ƮƬNote that this recoding does not increase measurement error in the overall scale. Cronbach’s alpha re-
mains at a level of . whether the additive scale is constructed using the three or four-point polytomous
indicators.
Ʈƭ2 = 1:36, d.f. = 2, p = :51. e null hypothesis of this test, which cannot be rejected, is that the model
ĕts.

Table .. Measurement Model of Participation Intentions
Items Item Factorresholds Loadings
st nd
Intend to hit :69 :74 :94
Intend to destroy :65 :70 :94
Intend to toyi-toyi :43 :50 :82
Intend to help (reversed) :13 :30 :43
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix 2:93 :70
Cronbach’s alpha :87
Parameter estimates from a -parameter IRT model for ordinal data obtained using a design-based robust
weighted least squares estimator. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresholds correspond to the [,]
scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used to estimate eigenvalues and
Cronbach’s alpha. Test of model ĕt: 2 = 1:36 (d.f. = 2, p = :51).
lower item-scale correlation. Nevertheless, this item is retained for constructing the scale
because of its utility in adding information about the less aggressive respondents.
e measure of participation intentions is then recoded so that it takes a minimum
value of zero and a maximum value of one.ƮƮ e distribution of this variable is plotted in
Figure .. It is clear that the distribution is characterized by a few peaks, corresponding to
the particularly common response patterns observed in respondents’ answers.Ʈ⁴ e distri-
bution is also positively skewed.Ʈ⁵ A logged version of this dependent variable is thus also
calculated (displayed in the second plot of Figure .) to ensure that any statistical results
ƮƮNote that this scale correlates at . with an additive scale of the original four-point items.
Ʈ⁴e most frequent response pattern, seen at a level of roughly . in plot , obtains from respondents
who said that they would not do any of the behaviors, including refusing to help victims. e second most
frequent pattern can be seen at a value of  in the latent variable measure; these respondents would not do any
of the aggressive behaviors but would deĕnitely help victims. Note that there are  different response patterns
in total.
Ʈ⁵Skewness= :67.  conĕdence interval= [:53 : :81].
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Figure .. Distribution of the Participation Intentions Variable
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e ĕrst plot shows the weighted distribution of the participation intention variable, which is calculated us-
ing a kernel density estimator. e second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y1, is
transformed using the formula y2 = log(y1 + 1).
are not driven by correlations induced by skewness.Ʈ⁶
I now move on the measurement of the other major independent variables, begin-
ning with blame.
... Blame
Psychological research identiĕes two major components of the concept of blame. Attribu-
tions of responsibility for some harm are required, but so is a sense that the harm is also un-
fair (Ferguson and Rule ; Shaver ). I thus sought to measure two scales: one asking
respondents whether they attribute responsibility to foreigners for various harms suffered
by their group; the other, whether respondents regard various harms as unfair. Because both
are necessary conditions for blame, the concept of outgroup blame is ultimately measured
Ʈ⁶e skewness statistic of the logged variable is :21. ( conĕdence interval= [:08 : :33]).
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as the product of the responsibility and unfairness scales.
Rather than ask about attributions of responsibility and unfairness in the abstract, I
sought to contextualize the survey items using various sources of harm that would be real-
istic and meaningful to Alexandra residents. ere are no shortage of harms in Alexandra.
AIDS, unemployment, and crime are rife.Ʈ⁷ Any of these might be perceived by individuals
to be a serious harm facing their group. When it comes to blame of immigrants in South
Africa, however, two types of ingroup harm stand out as particularly important in existing
studies (Misago et al. ; Steinberg a): unemployment and lack of housing. Respon-
dents were thus asked about unfairness and attributions of responsibility in the contexts of
these two ingroup harms. Unfairness was also asked following the measurement of group
endowments and entitlements, while attributions of responsibility were alsomeasured in the
contexts of three additional harms: crime, government corruption, and lack of respect for
people in Alexandra. Given that these survey questions are realistic to respondents, ques-
tions about emotional and attitudinal responses to these stimuli therefore ought to produce
valid measures. I will proceed by discussing the measurement of the unfairness scale, fol-
lowed by the attributions of responsibility scale.
Unfairness was measured at three different points in the survey, aer short vignettes
about foreigners working in Johannesburg and living in government houses in Alexandra,
and again aer the intergroup endowment and entitlement comparisons.Ʈ⁸ On each occa-
sion I invited respondents to consider the unfairness of each of these situations by presenting
Ʈ⁷On AIDS:  of adults aged –, and living in urban informal areas, were HIV positive in 
Shisana et al. (, ); unemployment:  of theweighted sample ofmy survey reported being unemployed
and looking for work; crime:  of African respondents in the Institute for Security Studies  National
Victims of Crime Survey did not feel safe walking around their areas at night, compared with  of white
respondents (Pharoah ).
Ʈ⁸See the measurement of group entitlements violations, below, for more details on these items.

short arguments why one might think each fair or, alternatively, unfair. us, following the
vignette about foreigners “working as gardeners at houses” in Johannesburg, I presented a
reason why this may be considered fair: “some people say that foreigners are prepared to
do that hard work, so it is fair if they have those jobs;” and then a reason why this may con-
sidered unfair: “others say that they are taking those jobs from South Africans, so it is not
fair.”Ʈ⁹ Respondents were then asked to choose a response from a ĕve-point response set
ranging from “very fair” to “very unfair”.
Questions measuring attributions of outgroup responsibility for harms suffered by
the ingroup were posed in the contexts of ĕve harms suffered by the ingroup. Respondents
were asked whether foreigners take locals’ jobs and housing, engage in criminal activity, and
illegally obtain South African identiĕcation documents.⁴⁰ In addition to these largely mate-
rial concerns, respondents were also asked whether they blamed foreigners for the symbolic
harm of disrespecting locals (the exact wording of the items is presented in Table .).
e fourmaterial blame items are presented in a forced choice format, where respon-
dents chose between blaming foreigners, not blaming foreigners, or expressing uncertainty
or ambivalence. Given the prevalence of narratives blaming immigrants in Alexandra, the
measurement strategy here was to force respondents to at least consider alternative evalu-
ations. e two symbolic blame items then asked respondents whether they agreed or dis-
agreed, using a ĕve-point response set, to statements that foreigners “think they are better
than South Africans” and “are respectful to South Africans.”
e response distributions for both the unfairness and attribution of responsibility
items are presented in Figure .. Most respondents found the situations posed to them in
Ʈ⁹See Table . for exact wording of all blame items.
⁴⁰ese were all common allegations heard fromAlexandra residents during preliminary research (see also
Misago et al. ).

Table .. Blame: ItemWording, Coding, and Percent Don’t Know or Missing
Items
 
Don’t Miss-
Know ing
Unfairness
() Around here, there are some foreigners who do jobs like working as gardeners at
houses in Joburg. Some people say that foreigners are prepared to do that hard work, so
it is fair if they have those jobs. Others say that they are taking those jobs from South
Africans, so it is not fair. What do you think? How fair is it for these foreigners to have
those jobs?
. .
It is very fair = . Mostly fair = . Uncertain or mixed, Don’t know = . Mostly unfair =
. Very unfair = .
() Around here, there are some foreigners who live in RDP houses near Alex. Some
people say that foreigners must have saved some money from their jobs to buy those
houses, so it is fair if they live there. Other people say that this is not their country so
they should never be allowed to get those houses. What do you think? How fair is it for
these foreigners to live in those houses?
. .
() OK, so you said [referring to the group entitlement and endowment questions that
had just been asked] that: South Africans are higher than foreigners OR foreigners are
higher than South Africans OR foreigners and South Africans are at the same level. How
fair are these positions on the ladder of South Africans and the foreigners?
. .
Attributions of Responsibility
() Do the foreigners usually do jobs that South Africans do not want (= ), or do the
foreigners take jobs that South Africans want (= )? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don’t
know = ).
. .
() Domost of the foreigners get identity books illegally (= ), or domost of the foreign-
ers follow the law (= )? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don’t know = ).
. .
() Do most of the foreigners live in shacks and backyard rooms (= ), or do most of the
foreigners live in RDP houses that are meant for South Africans (= )? (Uncertain or
ambivalent, Don’t know = ).
. .
() Aremost of the foreigners criminals (= ) , or aremost of the foreigners not criminals
(= )? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don’t know = ).
. .
() Do you agree or disagree that most of the foreigners think they are better than South
Africans?
. .
Strongly agree = . Agree = . Uncertain, don’t know= . Disagree = . Strongly disagree
= .
() Do you agree or disagree that most of the foreigners are respectful to South Africans? . .
Strongly agree = . Agree = . Uncertain, don’t know= . Disagree = , Strongly disagree
= .

Figure .. Response Distributions of Outgroup Blame Items
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e grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category, across each of the
nine outgroup blame survey items; the numbers below each bar show the weighted number of respondents
choosing each category. TotalN = 497.

the survey—foreignersworking in Johannesburg, living in government houses, and ingroup-
outgroup endowment comparisons—to be quite unfair: , for example thought it “un-
fair” or “very unfair” for foreigners to live in government houses. Perhapsmore surprisingly,
given the previous anti-immigrant violence in Alexandra, is that  of the sample viewed
foreigners working in Johannesburg as “fair” or “very fair.” e responsibility items show
even more mixed results. While majorities blame foreigners for taking jobs from South
Africans and committing crime, and a huge majority of  blame foreigners for illegally
obtaining South African identity documents, only around a third believe that foreigners
compete with South Africans for government housing. e two items measuring attribu-
tions of responsibility for symbolic harm also show relatively few extreme responses. In
sum, these descriptive results conĕrm existing interview research by showing that foreign-
ers are blamed for several sources of harm to locals. And although there is not a large con-
stituency of locals who are prepared to vigorously defend the rights of immigrants, there is
some variation in levels of outgroup blame.
Both the attributions of responsibility and unfairness scales are unidimensional, as
only the ĕrst eigenvalue of their respective correlation matrices is greater than one. ey
also form reliable scales.⁴Ƭ ese two variables are then measured using two separate IRT
models. e parameter estimates can be seen in Table ..⁴ƭ 2 tests for both models show
that we cannot reject the null hypotheses of both models ĕtting the data.⁴Ʈ
Given that attributions of responsibility and unfairness are both necessary compo-
⁴ƬCronbach’s alpha = . and ., respectively.
⁴ƭTo permit model identiĕcation, unfairness is estimated using a graded response model with item dis-
crimination parameters constrained to be equal. A factor analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix shows,
however, that these three items all load highly on the ĕrst factor (housing: .; jobs: .; entitlement: .). e
graded response model for attributions of responsibility allows all discrimination parameters to vary.
⁴ƮAttributions of responsibility: 2 = 12:16, d.f. = 9, p = :20. Unfairness: 2 = 3:15, d.f. = 2, p = :21.

Table .. Measurement Models of Attributions of Responsibility and Unfairness
Items Itemresholds FactorLoadings
st nd rd th
Attributions of responsibility
Responsible: lack respect :08 :47 :64 :89 :74
Responsible: superior :10 :40 :64 :95 :64
Responsible: crime :31 :49 :75
Responsible: jobs :47 :74 :62
Responsible: housing :44 :54 :44
Responsible: illegal documents :00 :19 :47
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix 2:74 :88
Cronbach’s alpha :75
Unfairness
Fairness: housing :01 :18 :27 :49 :67
Fairness: jobs :18 :38 :49 :77 :67
Fairness: entitlement :20 :43 :56 :74 :67
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix 1:98 :57
Cronbach’s alpha :74
Attributions of responsibility and unfairness are measured using IRT models for ordinal data, which are es-
timated using a design-based robust weighted least squares estimator. e discrimination parameters (factor
loadings) for the unfairness model are constrained to be equal. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresh-
olds correspond to the [,] scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used
to estimate eigenvalues and Cronbach’s alpha.
nents of blame, the ĕnal variable of outgroup blame is calculated as the product of these two
components.⁴⁴ Individual with high scores on this variable thus both attribute responsibility
to the outgroup for harms suffered by their ingroup, and regard this outgroup behavior as
unfair.
ismeasure of blame is rescaled to have aminimumof zero and amaximumof one.
As can be seen in the the ĕrst plot of Figure ., the variable is positively skewed.⁴⁵ A log
transformation is used to reduce this skewness.⁴⁶ Both variables will be used in subsequent
⁴⁴Note that the two components have a correlation of ..
⁴⁵Skewness= :42.  conĕdence interval= [:30 : :54].
⁴⁶Skewness aer transformation= :13 ( conĕdence interval= [ :00 : :25]).

Figure .. Distribution of the Blame Variable
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e ĕrst plot shows the weighted distribution of the blame variable, which is calculated using a kernel density
estimator. e second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y1, is transformed using the
formula y2 = log(y1 + 1).
statistical analyses.
... Anger
Anger is conceived in this dissertation as one of the half dozen or so core emotions, mapping
onto such everyday English words as “angry,” “cross,” “irritated,” “annoyed,” and “furious.”
As such, following the example of Mackie, Devos, and Smith (), the emotion words
“angry” and “irritated” were chosen to measure the concept of anger.
Intergroup anger, furthermore, is an angry emotional reaction that is felt on behalf
of one’s group and directed at some other group. Respondents were therefore primed about
the local-foreigner distinction before intergroup emotions were measured. To ensure that
responses were based on actual emotions, respondents were further primed about salient
ingroup-outgroup issues. e emotion items were situated immediately following the two
short vignettes describing foreigners working in Johannesburg and living in government

houses.⁴⁷ Emotional reactions were also gathered following the the group endowment and
group entitlement items (see the next section).
In each of these three situations, respondents were presented with a list of nine emo-
tion words⁴⁸ followed by three questions. e ĕrst asked respondents to choose the word
that “best describes how you feel, as a South African” about the situation just described.
e second question then asked respondents how intensely they felt their chosen emotion,
using a four-point response set ranging from “not strong at all” to “very strongly.” e ĕnal
question in each situation asked respondents to choose another emotion from the list that
“next best” described how they felt.⁴⁹
ere are thus three emotion questions in each of three survey contexts: foreigners
working, living in government houses, and the group endowment comparisons. As detailed
⁴⁷ese vignettes are described above, in the section on blame. e exact wording can be found in Table
..
⁴⁸Aside from anger and irritation, the other seven words were jealousy, happiness, pride, worry, sadness,
shame, and no feeling. Anger and irritation were listed third and fourth on the response set.
⁴⁹is method of asking respondents to choose emotions from a categorical response set most likely pro-
duces more random measurement error than an alternative technique of using a Likert scale response set for
each possible emotional reaction (asking, in other words, how angry, irritated, etc. respondents feel). How-
ever, I believe that the categorical response set method is less likely to produce measurement error that is
correlated with the dependent variable than the Likert scale response set method. By burying the emotion
words of interest—anger and irritation—within a larger list, the categorical response set technique ensures
that respondents remained naïve regarding my central hypotheses, thus avoiding demand characteristics. In
addition, the number of emotion questions one can reliably ask is constrained because emotions are dimin-
ished by their measurement; the intensity of experienced emotion, in other words, is reduced by asking people
to report the emotions they are feeling (Keltner, Locke, and Audrain ; Schwartz and Clore ). e
Likert scale method, which requires one question for each emotion, would thus produce weak measures of
whichever emotions were measured later in the battery. e categorical response set method avoids this prob-
lem by allowing various emotional reactions to be measured using a single question.

Table .. Anger: ItemWording, Coding, and Percent Don’t Know or Missing
Items and Coding
 
Don’t Miss-
Know ing
(a) Please tell mewhich of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African,
about these foreigners having jobs in Joburg?
. .
Angry, irritated = . Happy, proud, jealous, worried, ashamed, disappointed, no feeling
or neutral, don’t know = .
(b) How strongly do you feel this emotion? . .
Very strongly = . Quite strong, a little strong, don’t know = . Not strong at all = .
Anger measure () = (a) (b)
(a) Please tell mewhich of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African,
about these foreigners living in RDP houses in Alex?
. .
(b) How strongly do you feel this emotion? . .
Anger measure () = (a) (b)
(a) Please tell mewhich of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African,
about the position in society of the foreigners and the position in society of SouthAfrican
people living in Alex?
. .
(b) How strongly do you feel this emotion? . .
Anger measure () = (a) (b)
() Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South
African, about these foreigners having jobs in Joburg?
. .
() Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South
African, about these foreigners living in RDP houses in Alex?
. .
() Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South
African, about the position in society of the foreigners and the position in society of
South African people living in Alex?
. .
in Table ., the ĕrst indicator for intergroup anger is whether the respondent chose “angry”
or “irritated” as the best description of how he or she felt in each of the three contexts. ese
dummy variables are then multiplied by the second set of emotion questions—the degree to
which the chosen emotion is experienced—to produce three polytomous measures. ree
additional dummy variables, for whether “angry” or “irritated” were chosen as the next best
emotion descriptions, are also calculated. In total then, there are six measures of intergroup
anger; within each survey context, there is one polytomous measure of whether and to what
degree intergroup anger is experienced, and one dichotomous measure of whether inter-

group anger is experienced as a secondary emotion.
Figure .. Response Distributions of Anger Items
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e grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category, across each of the six
intergroup anger survey items. e three measures on the top row combine an indicator for whether anger
or irritation is mentioned as the ĕrst emotional reaction with a subsequent question regarding the degree to
which the emotion is felt. e three items on the bottom row are indicators for whether anger or irritation
is mentioned as a second emotional reaction. e numbers below each bar show the weighted number of
respondents choosing each category. TotalN = 497.
e distributions of these six anger items are depicted in Figure .. irty-six per-
cent of respondents mentioned “angry” or “irritated” as their ĕrst emotional reaction, and
 mentioned one of these as their second emotional reaction, following the foreigner

working in Johannesburg vignette.⁵⁰ e percentages for the housing vignette situation are
 and ; for the group endowment comparison situation,  and .⁵Ƭ As the top
row in Figure . shows, very few respondents indicated feeling “a little” anger or irritation
as a ĕrst reaction to the three questions. ese responses were collapsed with the those who
reported feeling “quite” angry or irritated. e result is three trichotomous indicators for
respondents’ ĕrst emotional reactions to the three situations presented in the survey, as well
as the other three dichotomous indicators for respondents’ second emotional reactions.
Table .. Measurement Model of Anger
Items Item Factorresholds Loadings
st nd
Jobs, st mention & degree :41 :51 :58
Housing, st mention & degree :39 :49 :55
Entitlement, st mention & degree :53 :60 :56
Jobs, nd mention :47 :86
Housing, nd mention :43 :62
Entitlement, nd mention :54 :51
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix 2:92 :77
Cronbach’s alpha :79
Parameters from a -parameter IRT model for ordinal data, which is estimated using a design-based robust
weighted least squares estimator. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresholds correspond to the [,]
scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used to estimate eigenvalues and
Cronbach’s alpha. Test of model ĕt: 2 = 12:46, d.f. = 9, p = :19.
e latent variable of intergroup anger is measured using an item response mea-
surement model based on these six observed indicators.⁵ƭ e location and discrimination
⁵⁰Don’t know responses were recoded as responses of “no feeling” on the emotion word choice items, and
as responses of “a little” on the intensity of emotion items. See Table . for details.
⁵ƬTwenty-nine percent of respondents never mentioned anger or irritation,  chose one of these words
only once, while one percent chose these words the maximum of six times.
⁵ƭA graded response model is used. is model requires that the latent variable be unidimensional. Pre-
liminary analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix reveals that only the ĕrst eigenvalue is greater than one,

(factor loading) parameter estimates can be found in Table .. A 2 test shows that the
model ĕts well.⁵Ʈ
Finally, the intergroup anger variables is rescaled to have a minimum of zero and
a maximum of one; the distribution is shown in the ĕrst plot of Figure .. Although the
latent variable takes on  discrete values, one can see that the modal response is zero.
is response is chosen by the  of respondents who never described their emotional
reactions as either “angry” or “irritated.” As such, the variable is positively skewed.⁵⁴ A log
transformation goes some way to reducing the skewness.⁵⁵ Both variables will be used in
subsequent statistical analyses.
... Group Entitlement Violations
e concept of group entitlement violations is based upon four intergroup evaluations: the
actual positions (or endowments) enjoyed by the in- and outgroups, and the positions each
are believed to deserve (or entitlements). ese four perceptions are measured using a ver-
sion of Cantril’s () ladder scale. is ladder was described to respondents as repre-
senting the position that a group held in society and the respect that they got from others.
Respondents were shown a graphic of a ladder with seven rungs, numbered from one to
seven. Higher rungs thus implied a higher level of group endowment or entitlement. e
rung chosen by the respondent was recorded as the response for each question.⁵⁶
supporting an interpretation of unidimensionality (see Table .). In addition, these six items form a reliable
scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .).
⁵Ʈ2 = 12:46, d.f. = 9, p = :19.
⁵⁴Skewness= :50 ( conĕdence interval= [:37 : :63]).
⁵⁵Skewness aer transformation= :21 ( conĕdence interval= [:08 : :33]).
⁵⁶“Don’t know’s” were recoded as missing because there is no suitable intermediate category that corre-
sponds to the uncertainty of such responses. Note that over nine percent of the responses for the outgroup

Figure .. Distribution of the Intergroup Anger Variable
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e ĕrst plot shows the weighted distribution of the intergroup anger variable, which is calculated using a ker-
nel density estimator. e second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y1, is transformed
using the formula y2 = log(y1 + 1).
Table .. Group Entitlement Violations: ItemWording, Coding, and Percent Don’t Know or Missing
Items and Coding
 
Don’t Miss-
Know ing
Imagine that society is a ladder like on this card. Some people have a high position in
society and get lots of respect from others. We can say that these people are at the top of
the ladder. Other people have a low position and get little or no respect from others. We
can say that these people are at the bottom of the ladder.
() Where do you think South Africans living in Alex are on the ladder these days? . .
– Ladder scale.  = Bottom.  = Top. Don’t know = missing.
() Where do you think South Africans living in Alex should be on the ladder? . .
() And now what about the foreigners? Where do you think the foreigners living in
Alex are on the ladder these days?
. .
() Where do you think the foreigners living in Alex should be on the ladder? . .

Figure .. Distribution of Responses Group Endowment and Group Entitlement Items
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Each plot displays the distribution of responses for each of the four seven-point indicators used to construct the
group entitlement violation variable. e highest value, here six, is described to respondents as representing a
high social position, with zero being low. N = 497.
e distributions of responses for each of these items are displayed in Figure ..⁵⁷
e items referring to the actual and entitled position of locals are on the le (plots  and
), while the items referring to foreigners on the right (plots  and ). Respondents tend to
place their group slightly below the midpoint of scale when it comes to actual position or
endowments (mean = .). e outgroup are appraised as only slightly higher on the scale
(mean = .), and still in a middling position overall.⁵⁸
entitlement item were “don’t know’s,” possibly due to the abstract nature of this question. See the ĕnal section
of this chapter for a discussion of how missing data were treated. Table . contains the exact wording and
percentage of missing data for each item.
⁵⁷e vertical axis for these plots is the ladder scale that was presented to respondents. It has been rescaled
to the [,] interval here to makes this ĕgure more readily comparable with Figure ..
⁵⁸ese relative positions are consistent with research that describes immigrants in South African town-

Figure .. Distribution of Ingroup, Outgroup, and Group Entitlement Violation
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e ĕrst plot displays perceived violation of ingroup entitlement—or ingroup entitlements (plot  in Figure
.) minus ingroup endowments. e second plot shows perceived violation of outgroup entitlement, which
is measured as outgroup endowments minus outgroup entitlements. e third plot displays the main variable,
group entitlement violations, which is simply the sum of the two previous measures. N = 497.
e situation is markedly different when comparing ingroup and outgroup entitle-
ments (plots  and ). Residents of Alexandra believe that locals deserve a high position—a
majority choose the top two rungs of the ladder (mean = .). In contrast, they feel that
foreigners are not entitled to very much at all—a majority choose the lowest two rungs on
the ladder for this item (mean = .). is ĕgure thus shows that while the sample does not
perceive much inequality in Alexandra, they believe that there should be inequality, with
locals on top.
Figure . then continues this analysis by plotting the distributions of three vari-
ships as slightly more likely to be employed or self-employed than locals, but by no means wealthy (Center for
Development and Enterprise ).

ables calculated using the four intergroup evaluations. Ingroup violations of entitlement
is displayed in the ĕrst plot. is measure is simply the difference between ingroup enti-
tlements and ingroup endowments, or the gap between what the ingroup have and what
they believe they deserve.⁵⁹ A large majority () receive a positive score for this variable,
indicating that they feel the ingroup is getting less than entitled. e second plot displays
outgroup violations of entitlement: the degree to which the outgroup are exceeding their
entitlement (outgroup endowments – outgroup entitlements). Although distributed more
broadly across the possible scale than the ingroup measure,  of respondents still believe
the outgroup are getting more than they deserve. e rd plot, displays the distribution of
violations of group entitlement, the main variable of interest in this section. is is simply
the sum of the two previousmeasures of ingroup and outgroup violation of entitlement. An-
other way of thinking about this variable is that it measures the cumulative number of rungs
on the ladder that both the in- and out-groupsmustmove to get from the current intergroup
situation to the one that a respondent regards as normatively desirable. e average respon-
dent feels that the in- and outgroup must move a total of . rungs on the ladder, while 
of respondents believe that group endowments are incongruent with group entitlements in
Alexandra. ese descriptive results suggest a broadly-held grievance among South African
residents of Alexandra.
e variables discussed thus far—participation intentions, blame, intergroup anger,
and group entitlement violations—are the main measures frommy theoretical model. Vari-
ables measuring concepts from alternative hypotheses and control variables will be dis-
cussed next.
⁵⁹As such, there is a close correspondence between this measure and the Davies’ () “J-curve” version
of relative deprivation.

... Variables From Other Hypothesized Models
Table . refers to a number of additional variables that are required to test alternative mod-
els for participation in intergroup violence. ese measurement of these variables will be
discussed in this section, and will proceed according to model.
In the previous chapter, I argued that the most likely source of selective incentives
that could motivate participants in intergroup violence is looting. I sought to measure op-
portunities for looting indirectly, to avoid social desirability biases. As such, I asked respon-
dents how many people, in their view, had looted in the previous anti-immigrant attacks.⁶⁰
My assumption was that these beliefs about what happened in  would play a major role
in shaping beliefs about the likelihood of opportunities to loot in future.⁶Ƭ I refer to this
variable as perceived opportunities for looting.
ere are two variables required for the social inĘuence model. Research shows the
importance of social networks and horizontal ties in mobilizing participants in collective
action (McAdam ; Taylor ). In Alexandra, individuals who attend community
policing meetings are likely to be bound up in these webs of reciprocity and, moreover,
known by their peers. ese meetings were also the sites where the violence of  was
organized (Misago ). Individuals who attend these meetings are thus likely to be mobi-
lized into participation, should the violence recur. As such, I asked respondents about their
attendance at community meetings in .⁶ƭ irty-one percent of the sample reported at-
⁶⁰e response set has four options: “no-one;” “just a few people;” “some people;” and “many people.”
⁶Ƭe exact wording of the question and response set is described in Table . in the Appendix to this
chapter.
⁶ƭA few respondents indicated that they had attended twenty meetings—more than double the meetings
of everyone else. To reduce the effect of these outliers, the responses are coded into ĕve categories: none, one,
two or three, four or ĕve, and six or more.

tending at least one meeting by the time of the survey in April; with  attending four or
more.
e effects of social inĘuence on outgroup blame will be tested using a measure of
exposure to blame from peers. is variable is measured by adding the responses for three
items, which asked respondents how oen they had heard other people blaming foreigners
() for taking jobs; () taking houses meant for South Africans; and () acting like they are
better than locals.⁶Ʈ Seventy percent of respondents claim to have heard other people blam-
ing foreigners for taking jobs, “all of the time” or “quite oen;” the corresponding responses
for the houses and superiority questions are  and .
e inĘuence of leaders is hypothesized to play a role in outgroup blame. Blame from
leaders is, like blame from peers, also measured using three items, which asked respondents
if they heard leaders blaming immigrants for () for taking jobs; () taking houses meant for
South Africans; and () acting like they are better than locals.⁶⁴ Most respondents had no
experience of hearing leaders blame the outgroup:  claimed to have never heard leaders
blame foreigners for taking jobs, with the “never” responses for the houses and superiority
questions being  and . Given these highly skewed responses, the items were coded
as dichotomous and added together to form a four-point scale.⁶⁵
e realistic group conĘictmodel requiresmeasures of unemployment,working as an
informal trader, and living in low quality housing. As I argued in the previous chapter, each
of these is a plausible source of a collective incentive to take part in an attack on foreigners.
⁶Ʈe response sets have four categories, ranging from “all of the time” to “never.” See Table . in the
Appendix to this chapter for further details. e scale is also reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .) and unidimen-
sional. See Table . for the measurement properties of all other variables measured using two more items.
⁶⁴e response sets again have four categories, ranging from “all of the time” to “never.”
⁶⁵“Never” responses were coded as zero, otherwise one.

Unemployment is coded as working full or part-time, whether self-employed or not.⁶⁶ A
dummy variable for working as an informal trader is created out of an open-ended question
asking respondents what job they have.⁶⁷ Low quality housing is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the respondent lives in a shack (in a yard, or free-standing), an outside
room built in someone’s yard, or a hostel room.⁶⁸
e frustration-aggressionmodel suggests that aversive conditions may produce ag-
gression targeted at other parties, such as foreigners in Alexandra. Poverty and support for
an opposition party are two measures of these aversive conditions.⁶⁹ Poverty is measured
using the technique of Gibson (): respondents are asked which goods, from a list of
six, are owned by their household: refrigerator, microwave, television, computer, car, and
cellular telephone. ese items were chosen because they were expected to vary in their
⁶⁶An additional dummy variable for those not in the labor force—students, the retired, etc.—will also be
included in subsequent statistical analyses. is permits a cleaner contrast to be drawn between those looking
for a job, and those with a job. e response distribution is provided in Table ..
⁶⁷e following answers were taken to be indicators of being an informal trader: “vendor,” “street vendor,”
“tuck shop,” “spaza shop.” Less than three percent (N = 17) of respondents reported working as an informal
trader.
⁶⁸e omitted category thus includes respondents living in government apartments or formal houses.
iry-six percent of respondents lived in formal houses,  in rooms in yards,  in shacks in yards,  in
hostel rooms,  in free-standing shacks, and  in apartments.
⁶⁹ese factorsmight appear to beweakmeasures of frustrationwith low levels of construct validity. Recall,
however, that Berkowitz’s () reconceptualization of frustration-aggression theory breaks with previous
conceptualizations of frustration as a subjective state (Dollard et al. ; Gurr ). Frustration is instead
viewed as an aversive event, trigger, or experience: an objective condition that is unpleasant to an individual
who is affected. Being poor and supporting an opposition party in a context where all levels of government
are controlled by the ANC both ĕt this deĕnition.

prevalence across the sample.⁷⁰ is allows the scale to distinguish between respondents of
averagematerial status and those who aremuchworse, ormuch better, off. A two-parameter
logistic IRT model, with both item threshold and item discrimination parameters is used to
measure the latent variable of poverty.⁷Ƭ
Party support is measured by asking respondents which party they preferred. Due to
the small number of respondents who expressed support for a party other than the African
National Congress (ANC), this variable was collapsed into three categories: supports ANC,
supports an opposition party, and does not support any party.⁷ƭ
e culture of violence model posits that individuals who accept social norms sup-
porting violence are more likely to take part in collective violence, but also more likely to
experience intergroup anger. is support for violence is measured using two survey items,
which ask respondents () whether it is acceptable for the community to use violence and
() whether talking is the best way to resolve intergroup conĘicts.⁷Ʈ An additive scale was
calculated from the two items.⁷⁴
⁷⁰ey do vary:  own a television;  a cellular telephone;  a refrigerator;  a microwave; 
a car; and  a computer.
⁷Ƭe six items tap a unidimensional construct because only the ĕrst eigenvalue of the tetrachoric correla-
tion matrix is greater than one. e scale is also reliable: Cronbach’s alpha = ..
⁷ƭe original distribution of responses is as follows: ANC, ; no party, ; Democratic Alliance, ;
Inkatha Freedom Party, ; other, . ere were a fairly high number of missing responses (.), as well
as a few “don’t know” responses (.), no doubt due to the history of partisan violence in Alexandra. For
this variable, “don’t know’s” are recoded as support for no party. Missing values for all variables were imputed
using the method of multiple imputation. See the end of this chapter for more details.
⁷ƮFive-point agree-disagree response sets were used. Eighty-ĕve percent agreed or strongly agreed with the
ĕrst question;  disagreed or strongly disagreed with the second.
⁷⁴e scale is reliable: Cronbach’s alpha = ..

e authoritarian-threat model argues that authoritarian predispositions are acti-
vated by threats to ingroup cohesion andwelfare, producing intolerance (Feldman and Sten-
ner ; Stenner ). Following Feldman (), authoritarianism is conceived as a set
of beliefs lying on a social conformity versus individual freedom dimension. e concept is
measured using two two forced choice items adapted from Feldman’s battery: respondents
were asked whether () freedom allows people to reach their potential or produces disorder;
and () whether people should be guided by their feelings or by the rules.⁷⁵ An additive scale
was calculated from these two items.⁷⁶
e ĕnal model considered in this dissertation is the psychoanalytic theory of pro-
jection. It holds that an individual may transfer blame onto another group to avoid aversive
feelings of guilt and fear about the individual’s own group. is concept is measured by ask-
ing respondents about their emotional reactions to the  attacks in Alexandra. e same
list of nine emotionwords was presented as a response set; aversive emotions toward the 
riots were coded as one for respondents choosing responses of “worried” or “ashamed.”⁷⁷
⁷⁵irty-nine percent of respondents chose the authoritarian option for the ĕrst question, freedom pro-
duces disorder;  chose the authoritarian option for the second, that people should be guided by the rules.
Respondents were also presented with an intermediate response option of uncertain or ambiguous. See Table
. for exact wording and coding.
⁷⁶e reliability is quite poor but adequate for a two-item scale: Cronbach’s alpha = ..
⁷⁷e original theory focuses on guilt rather than shame and fear rather than anxiety. Researchers such
as Lazarus (), however, regard guilt and shame, on the one hand, and anxiety and fear, on the other, as
manifestations of the same core emotions. Fieen percent of respondents expressed anxiety and  expressed
shame.

... Control Variables
Finally, there are several additional variables that will be included in multivariate statistical
analyses. ese will be used to control for any possible confounding factors that might be
thought to explain, for example, both blame and participation intentions.
Identiĕcation as South African (versus some other nationality) is necessary to ex-
perience intergroup anger directed at foreigners. Care was taken to ensure that this local-
foreigner divide was foremost in the minds of respondents while the survey was conducted.
As such, one of the initial questions asked respondents to self-identify as South African
(when offered a choice between South African and foreign).⁷⁸ While the direction of social
identity is necessary for the questions on intergroup anger to be meaningful, the intensity
of this social identity might also play a role in participation intentions, intergroup anger,
and blame. In particular, those respondents with weaker attachments to the South African
identity might feel less anger on behalf of this group. As such, strength of national identity
is used as a precision covariate.
e national identity items were located near the beginning of the survey. ree
items, adapted from Gibson () and Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior () were
then asked: the importance of the South African identity to the respondent, how different
the respondent felt to other SouthAfricans, andwhether respondent would take an insult di-
rected against their group personally.⁷⁹ An additive scale is created from these three items.⁸⁰
⁷⁸e interview was terminated with those who identiĕed as foreign. See the section on sampling respon-
dents, in this chapter, for more details.
⁷⁹e ĕrst two items used four-point response sets that ranged from “very important/different” to “not
important/different at all.” e third item used a ĕve-point agree-disagree response set.
⁸⁰e responses to the national identity items were heavily skewed towards strong identiĕcation:  of
respondents said the identity was very important to them;  said there was no difference at all between

Although the dependent variable is intentions to participate in future violence, self
reports of participation in the previous attacks of  were also collected during the survey.
Bem () argues that people may infer their own attitudes from the behaviors they have
chosen. It may be the case, in other words, that respondents’ self-reported emotions to the
outgroup are inĘuenced by whether they participated in the  violence. Participation in
the  attacks will be used to control for the possibility that previous intergroup behavior
determines current intergroup attitudes and emotions.
e biggest challenge in asking people about their participation in violence are so-
cial desirability and fear of disclosure effects. To reduce these effects as much as possible,
I used the method that Scacco () adapted from the Gallup secret ballot technique for
the purposes of asking Nigerians about their participation in the Jos and Kaduna riots. For
each of the ĕve participation questions, respondents were given a separate card and asked
to circle the letter corresponding to the correct answer. ey were then instructed to seal
the card in an envelope and return it to the interviewer. e interviewer thus never saw
the answers to these questions.⁸Ƭ e response set also included a “forgiving phrase” (Weis-
berg , )—“I did this, and regret it now”—to make it easier for respondents to give a
truthful answer.⁸ƭ
Respondents were asked whether, during the attacks of , they had () joined
them and other South Africans; and  strongly agreed that they would take an insult against their nation
personally. As such, the reliability of the scale is poor: Cronbach’s alpha = ..
⁸ƬScacco () randomly assigned her respondents to be asked about participation either using a conven-
tional question posed by interviewers, or using this method; she ĕnds signiĕcantly higher levels of participa-
tion using the secret ballot technique. Note that there were also only two respondents who refused to take part
in this section of the survey. Indeed my interviewers reported that several respondents questioned the need
for the privacy measures.
⁸ƭe other possible responses were: “I did not perform the behavior” and “I did this, and do not regret it.”

in the toyi-toyi, () threatened or intimidated anyone, () looted, () physically harmed
anyone, or () destroyed any shacks.⁸Ʈ An indicator was created that received a value of
one if a respondent reported “I did this” for any of the ĕve questions, and a value of zero
otherwise.⁸⁴
Respondent’s level of education, age, years lived in Alexandra,⁸⁵ and gender are also
collected and used as control variables.
e survey also included several open-ended questions. One asked respondents for
their views on why the violence of  occurred. A second was asked immediately follow-
ing each participation intention item, and asked respondents to explain their stated inten-
tions. ese will be used to provide illustrations when presenting statistical results.
.. Preparing to Analyze the Data
... Missing Data
As is oen the case, some respondents refused to provide answers for certain questions, or
responded with “don’t know.” Wherever possible, “don’t know” answers were recoded as
some appropriate level on the response scale.⁸⁶ Refusals resulted in missing values.
⁸Ʈ. (N = 44) of the adult South African population of Alexandra reported performing at least one of
the behaviors in the  riots; . (N = 40) reported that they went no further than joining in the toyi-toyi;
and . (N = 17) claimed to have physically assaulted someone.
⁸⁴e ĕve items form a reliable scale: Cronbach’s alpha = ..
⁸⁵Some authors note that a tension in Alexandra between “insiders,” who have been in the area longer, and
newcomers (Nieagodien ).
⁸⁶e only exception was the group entitlement and endowment items, where there was no suitable point
on the ladder scale for “don’t know’s;” these responses (N = –) were recoded as missing. Details on the
extent of missingness by item and the treatment of “don’t know’s” are provided in Tables ., ., ., ., as

Missing values were handled using the method of multiple imputation. is proce-
dure uses an algorithm to impute missing data based on the values of observed data (see
Rubin ; King et al. ). A small number of complete datasets is created. Five is
adequate for a sample of this size where most variables show less than  of their values
missing (Rubin ). e algorithm is stochastic, such that each of the imputed datasets
differs slightly from the others.
Statistical analyses are then conducted on all data-sets before the results are com-
bined. e additional uncertainty generated through the use of estimated data is reĘected
in the variance of the ĕve imputed values for each missing datum, and ultimately in the
variance of the parameter estimates in any model using multiply-imputed datasets.
An important distinction is whether missing values are ignorable or non-ignorable.
ey are ignorable when the missing values are uncorrelated with the observed values; oth-
erwise, non-ignorable. If wealthier respondents are more likely to refuse to answer a ques-
tion on income, for example, then such missing data would be non-ignorable. When miss-
ing data are non-ignorable, multiple imputation does not provide an unbiased solution—but
neither does single imputation or listwise deletion (King et al. ). When data are ignor-
able however, multiple imputation generates unbiased estimates of the true values, and is
more efficient than listwise deletion because no observations are lost.
In only two of my survey items were a signiĕcant percentage (greater than ) of
the data missing: outgroup entitlement and party support. Missing data for the ĕrst item
is largely due to “don’t know” answers. It thus appears to be attributable to unfamiliarity
with the abstract ladder scale rather than respondents censoring their views of outgroup
entitlement.⁸⁷ ese missing data can thus be regarded as ignorable.
well as ., in the appendix to this chapter.
⁸⁷Indeed, the survey featured much more contentious questions about the outgroup such as intentions to

e situation is not as clear for the question on party support. Given the history of
partisan violence inAlexandra, it is not surprising that almost  of respondents refused to
offer an answer to this question. Further analyses reveals that refusing to offer an answer to
this question is drivenmore bywhere respondents live than by the demographic correlates of
particular parties.⁸⁸ It thus seems likely that missing data on this question are also ignorable
and amenable to multiple imputation.
... Empirical Strategy
e entitlement-blame-anger model is a recursive model: the effects Ęow in one direction
from the foundational variable of group entitlement violations, to the dependent variable of
intended participation. Recursive models require that each antecedent variable be exoge-
nous to the next in the causal chain. A recursive system of equations can be estimated in
an unbiased fashion by running separate regressions on each of the endogenous variables in
turn while including all exogenous variables and controls. Separate regressions will thus be
used to test the determinants of participation intentions, intergroup anger, and blame.
As I argued in the previous chapter, this assumption appears justiĕed for the effects of
anger on participation intentions, and the effects of group entitlement violations on blame.
In the case of the relationship between anger and blame, however, existing research suggests
participate in future violence against this group. Only around – of the responses for these questions were
missing and/or “don’t know’s”.
⁸⁸A dummy variable for refusals for the party support question is correlated (tetrachoric correlation) with
both being Zulu (.) and living in Sector  (.). Being Zulu in Alexandra is associated with being a supporter
of a particular party, the IFP, while Sector  is where partisan violence occurred in the early s. A logistic
regression of the refusals dummy, however, ĕnds that being Zulu is no longer a signiĕcant independent variable
when living in Sector  is included in the equation. It is thus location, rather than ethnicity, which determines
hesitance to answer the party support question.
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that this assumption of exogeneity may be incorrect. Blame may produce anger and vice
versa. I will thus also consider a non-recursive model that includes a feedback loop between
blame and anger. Such non-recursive system of equations cannot be estimated piecemeal
using separate regressions. Instead, a simultaneous equation model will be used to examine
whether anger and blame are both endogenous to the other.
e data have two other features that require special attention, whether using a re-
gression or simultaneous equation framework. First, the sample, while representative of
adult South African residents of Alexandra, is not a simple random sample. Instead, the
survey utilizes a complex sampling design.⁸⁹ Second, each statistical result reported here is
a combination of estimates conducted on the ĕve datasets created through multiple impu-
tation.⁹⁰
emethod I will use to analyze the data under the assumption of a recursive model
is a survey regression with design-based coefficient estimates and standard errors.⁹Ƭ e re-
gression coefficients are identical to those obtained with weighted least-squares, but the esti-
mates of uncertainty are design-based. Using thismethod, each of the steps of the theoretical
⁸⁹e correct point estimates of quantities of interest such as means and regression coefficients can be
calculated from such survey data by conducting weighted analyses. Design-based estimates of uncertainty,
which take the stratiĕcation and clustering of the sampling into account, are also required however (see Weis-
berg ). In some cases these are twice as large as ordinary standard errors based on the assumption of a
simple random sample—although this design effect varies.
⁹⁰Point estimates, such as means and regression coefficients are simple to calculate frommultiply imputed
data. ey are simply the average of the ĕve separate the point estimates across the ĕve imputed datasets.
Standard errors, however, require a combination of both the average within-dataset variance, as well as the
across-dataset variance. See King et al. ()
⁹ƬI use the svyglm and Mitools functions from the survey library for R (Lumley ). e former uses
a pseudo-maximum likelihood to estimate parameters and standard errors; the latter combines these models
across imputed datasets.

model will be tested in turn, with participation intentions being the dependent variable in
the ĕrst step, followed by intergroup anger and normative blame.
Non-recursive relationships will be tested using simultaneous equation models for
complex survey data and imputed datasets.⁹ƭ
Finally, because the previous attacks appear to have been organized in community
policing meetings, and the level of violence varied across community policing districts, I
include ĕxed effects for these districts to capture the effects of any unobserved district-level
characteristics. I also include ĕxed effects for the language of the interview to control for
differences in translation.
⁹ƭI use the Mplus program (Muthén andMuthén ). Mplus uses a maximum-likelihood estimator with
design-based standard errors that are robust to non-normality. When a recursive structure is speciĕed, this
program produces identical results to the svyglm function in R.

Appendix
Table .. Other Variables: ItemWording, Coding, and Percent Don’t Know or Missing
Items and Coding
 
Don’t Miss-
Know ing
Authoritarianism
Now I want to ask you some questions about how you think that people should behave
in life.
() Do you think that giving people more freedom will just mean more disorder (= ),
or will allow people to reach their full potential (= )? (Uncertain / ambivalent, Don’t
know = ).
. .
() Do you think that people should be guided mostly by their feelings (= ), or people
should be guided mostly by society’s rules (= )? (Uncertain / ambivalent, Don’t know
= ).
. .
Aversive emotions about  riots
Please tell me which of these feelings best describes how you feel about the attacks on
the foreigners of ?
. .
Worried, ashamed = . Happy, proud, angry, irritated, jealous, disappointed, no feeling
or neutral, don’t know = ).
Blame by leaders
At these meetings, did you hear the CPF leaders or the izinduna …
() blaming foreign people from other African countries for taking jobs from South
Africans?
. .
Yes a lot, quite a bit, a little = . No, don’t know = )
() blaming foreign people fromotherAfrican countries for taking houses that aremeant
for South Africans?
. .
() saying that foreigners act like they are better than South Africans? . .
Blame by peers
Since the beginning of the year, how oen have you heard other people …
() blaming the foreigners for taking jobs from South Africans? . .
All of the time = . Quite oen = . Rarely = . Never, don’t know = .
() blaming the foreigners for taking houses that are meant for South Africans? . .
() saying that foreigners act like they are better than South Africans? . .
Education
What is the highest level of education you have personally achieved? . .
Primary school = . Some high school but nomatric (high school diploma) = . Finished
matric, artisan’s certiĕcate = . University degree, Teacher’s college diploma, Technikon
diploma, Some other post-matric diploma = .
Employment status

Which one of these statements best describes your working life? . .
Working full-time, part-time, for myself = Working. Not working–housewife, stu-
dent, retired, Unemployed–not looking for work = Not in the labor force. Unem-
ployed–looking for work = Unemployed.
Informal trader
What is the job that you have now or used to have? . .
“vendor”, “street vendor”, “tuck shop”, “spaza shop” = 
Lives in low quality housing
What type of housing does the respondent live in? . .
Shack in shack area, hostel room, backyard shack, backyard room or garage = . Flat,
formal house = .
Meeting attendance
ere are sometimes community meetings in Alex that are held by leaders such as the
people from the community policing forum or the izinduna. So far this year, how many
of these meetings in Alex have you attended?
. .
, don’t know = .  = . - = . - = . + = .
National identity
() How important is it to you that you are a South African? . .
Very important = . Quite important = . A little bit important, don’t know = . not
important at all = .
() How different do you feel from most other South Africans living in Alex? . .
Very different = . Quite different = . A little bit different, don’t know = . Not different
at all = .
() Would you agree or disagree that if someone says bad things about South Africans,
it feels like they are insulting you personally?
. .
Strongly agree = . Agree = . Uncertain, Don’t know = . Disagree = . Strongly
disagree = .
Support for violence
() Do you agree or disagree that sometimes it is acceptable for the community to use
violence to achieve its goals?
. .
Strongly agree = . Agree = . Uncertain, don’t know= . Disagree = . Strongly disagree
= .
() Do you agree or disagree that talking is usually the best way to resolve conĘicts be-
tween groups of people?
. .
Strongly agree = . Agree = . Uncertain, don’t know= . Disagree = . Strongly disagree
= .
Party support
Which of these political parties do you like the most? . .
DA, IFP, COPE, UDM, PAC, other = Other. I don’t like any party, don’t know = None.
ANC = ANC.
Perceived opportunities for looting
How many people stole things from the foreigners’ shacks in the attacks of ? . .
No people = . Just a few people, Don’t know = . Some people = . Many people = .

Poverty
Do you or anyone else in your household own a …
() TV? . .
No = . Don’t know = missing. Yes = .
() cell-phone? . .
() fridge? . .
() microwave? . .
() computer? . .
() car? . .
Previous participation
For the next few questions, you will be ĕlling in your own answers on a separate card
to ensure your privacy. When I read out each question, you must mark your answers
yourself on your card. For each question, you must make a cross. So if the st answer I
read is the right one for you, then make a cross on ‘A’. If the nd answer is the right one
for you, make a cross on ‘B’. If the rd answer is the right one, make a cross on ‘C’. Many
people from Alex were involved in the attacks on foreigners in . Can you tell me if
any of the following things happened during those attacks?
() Did you join in the toyi-toyi-ing and singing? . .
I did this and feel that it was the right thing to do, I did this and regret it now = . I did
not do this, not living in Alexandra at the time = .
() Did you threaten or intimidate anyone into joining in? . .
() Did you steal any things from a foreigner’s shack? . .
() Did you physically harm any foreigners? . .
() Did you destroy anyone’s shack? . .

Figure .. Location of Alexandra within Johannesburg

CHAPTER 
Results
.. Introduction
is chapter uses the survey data to test the entitlement-blame-anger model of participa-
tion in intergroup violence. Given the recursive nature of the model, I examine each of the
components in turn. I begin with participation intentions, verifying whether the data offer
support for the entitlement-blame-anger model, or perhaps any of the alternative models
that were proposed in Chapter . I then turn to the determinants of anger and blame.
Before discussing these multivariate analyses, however, I begin with some simpler
bivariate analyses of the data. e ĕrst is a correlation matrix of all the variables.Ƭ
A few of these correlations are worth pointing out. First, the bivariate relationships
among participation intentions, anger, blame, and group entitlement violations are all strong
(for survey data): the correlations between these variables range from . for participation
intentions-group entitlement violations to . for blame-anger. is pattern of correlations
is consistent with the entitlement-blame-anger model.
Second, measures of exposure to material competition (being unemployed, working
Ƭe table lists three kinds of correlations. Pearson’s correlations are used when both variables are con-
tinuous; polychoric correlations, when both variables are polytomous (or dichotomous); and polyserial corre-
lations when one variable is continuous and the other polytomous. Continuous variables are deĕned as those
with more than seven ordered categories. See Table . for a complete categorization.
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
as a trader, and living in low quality housing) are very weakly correlated ( . to .) with
participation intentions. e aversive conditions of poverty and support for opposition par-
ties show stronger correlations (. and .) but these are still lower than the correlations for
blame and anger. e correlation between perceived opportunities to loot and intentions
to participate in future are negative, which suggests that looting does not act as a selective
incentive motivating participation.
ird, I have already noted that previous participation and intentions to participate
in future are fairly strongly correlated: .. But the relationships between anger, blame and
group entitlement violations are moderate to strong, with the correlations ranging from
. to .. e main independent variables are thus correlated with both intentions to
participate in future and actual participation in the past. is lends further weight to the
entitlement-blame-anger model. If the model is correct, we would expect that anger and
blame be correlated both with intentions to participate in future as well as actual participa-
tion in the past.
I now turn to a closer analysis of the relationship between intergroup emotions and
intentions to participate in future violence. Figure . shows the average participation inten-
tions score across each of the nine possible emotional reactions to the other group.ƭ ese
average levels of participation intention are broken down further by each of the three sit-
uations in the survey in which emotional reactions were measured—competition over jobs
and houses, and the group endowment and entitlement comparisons.
e ĕgure shows that respondents who report feeling angry or irritated show higher
propensities to participate in future violence.Ʈ Respondents feeling proud, happy, or no feel-
ƭ“Anger” and “irritation” are disaggregated solely for the purposes of this ĕgure. In all analyses that follow,
intergroup anger is measured using both terms.
Ʈe average participation intentions score for those feeling either anger or irritation is .. e weighted
mean for the sample is ..

Figure .. Bivariate Relationships Between Intergroup Emotions and Participation Intentions
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Each bar shows the average level of participation intentions for respondents who chose the each of the nine
possible emotion words, as either their ĕrst or second choice, in each of the three contexts in the survey.
Vertical lines indicate the  conĕdence intervals.
ing report the lowest levels of participation intentions (.–.), with the worried, ashamed,
and disappointed showing moderate levels of participation intentions (.–.).⁴ ese re-
sults are consistent with expectations about the effects of intergroup emotions on intergroup
behavior: intergroup anger produces a desire for confrontation with the other group; other
negative emotions, such as anxiety, result in a more cautious response; and pride and happi-
ness produce an intention to act in a positive fashion toward the outgroup, by, for example,
⁴Few respondents chose the word “jealous,” but those that did also had quite high scores on the partic-
ipation intention scale (.). Note that feeling jealous at the other group is not included as an indicator of
intergroup anger by Mackie, Devos, and Smith () (see also van Zomeren et al. ). I follow these au-
thors’ leads in excluding it.

helping them.
Second, the effect of emotions on participation is fairly consistent across the jobs,
housing, and endowment comparison situations. Respondents who chose “anger” as their
emotional reaction to the vignette about a foreigner working in Johannesburg have an av-
erage score on the participation intentions scale of .. e corresponding scores for those
choosing “angry” in the housing and group endowment situations are . and .. If we
can conceive of the three survey situations as arenas of intergroup competition or types of
threat, then the variance in participation intentions is largely accounted for by emotions,
rather than these arenas of competition. Emotional variation thus clearly matters more for
participation intentions than variation in type of intergroup competition.
Correlation is not causation, however, so we need to move to a multivariate analysis
to see if these relationships between anger and participation hold up even aer accounting
for possible confounds. is will be the task of the rest of this chapter. It is structured as
follows. I consider each of the dependent variables of participation intentions, anger, and
blame in turn. Within each of these sections I will evaluate the effects of the hypotheses and
models summarized in Table . beginning with the entitlement-blame-anger model. First,
what are the determinants of intentions to participate in future violence?
.. Explaining Participation Intentions
... Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model
Tables . presents the results of four survey regressionmodels of participation intentions on
various explanatory and control variables. e ĕrst model, Model .., includes the main
effects of all variables hypothesized to have an effect on participation;⁵ Model .. includes
⁵All variables are scaled to ĕt the [,] interval.

the same variables, but participation intentions, anger, and blame are log-transformed to
reduce skewness. Model .. includes an interaction between working as a trader and
meeting attendance, but is otherwise the same as Model ... Model .. then adds an
additional control variable: participation in the previous episode of violence in .
I will ĕrst consider the effects of anger on participation intentions. In all models, the
effect is signiĕcant and positive. Because these models control for the variables that are an-
tecedent in the entitlement-blame-angermodel, the coefficient of anger here is the estimated
direct effect (corresponding to the right-most arrow in Figure .). e standardized effect
is .. Although much reduced from the bivariate correlation of ., this result controls for
confounds that might be thought to produce both anger and participation intentions, such
as exposure to material competition with the outgroup, the mobilizing effect of attending
community meetings, the frustrations of poverty, and even participation in the previous
anti-immigrant attacks.⁶
e observed relationship between anger and participation intentions thus does not
appear to be a spurious correlation produced by the effect of material threat from the out-
group, for example. Measures of this and other confounds are included in the regressions.
It still remains possible, however, that the association between anger and participation in-
tentions can be interpreted using a reversal of the causal process, where the intention to
participate in future causes anger.
In this reverse causal story, anger is an expressed rationalization for an intention
to take part in violence that has other motives. e data at hand do not permit a test of
this hypothesis. But existing research on anger, and the nature of the emotional experience
suggest that it is very unlikely. A large body of research shows that the causes of anger lie in
⁶e association between previous participation and participation intentions is virtually zero when con-
trolling for anger, blame, and the other covariates. Recall that the bivariate correlation is .. is pattern of
results is consistent with participation in the  attacks also being explained by anger and blame.
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
perceptions of blame of some other party and the attendant sense of injustice. While there
is some evidence that discomfort and pain can result in anger (Berkowitz ), there is no
evidence that anger can be called upon to mask one’s more self-interested motives. Indeed,
according to Frank (), the evolutionary utility of social emotions, such as anger, rests
on their ability to produce behavior that may not be in one’s immediate interest.
Nor is it very likely that respondents falsely expressed anger during the survey to
mask their more venal motives. e questions on participation and intentions to partic-
ipate were asked at the end of the survey, aer all the items measuring the independent
variables. Moreover, the anger questions were not posed in the abstract, but were instead
asked in reference to fairly detailed vignettes designed to prompt realistic emotional reac-
tions in respondents. It thus seems very unlikely that the effect of anger that I have reported
can be interpreted as respondents expressing feelings of anger, either as an effect of their
intentions to participate in future violence, or to mask their true motivations. Rather, all
the evidence supports the causal process advanced in the model: anger at another group
increases the intention to take part in violence against that group.
A ĕnal concern that one might have with these results is the link between participa-
tion intentions and actual participation. Even if anger is associated with greater intentions
to take part, would it also be associated with a greater likelihood of participation, should an
opportunity present itself?
e measure of participation intentions might consistently under- or over-estimate
the probabilities that certain people would take part in future. Some individuals may pro-
fess an intention to participate without any real likelihood of doing so. Others might deny
any intention to take part in future but are, in fact, likely to be mobilized because of their
social networks (Fuji ; McAdam ; Taylor ). In the former case, respondents
underestimate the costs of participation; in the latter, they underestimate the situational
determinants. To address both of these concerns, interaction terms between anger and par-

ticipation in the  attacks, on the one hand, and attendance at the community meetings,
on the other, are included. e former model permits a consideration of whether anger ex-
plains participation intentions among the subsample who participated in , who fully
understand the costs and dangers of taking part. e latter model veriĕes whether anger
has a diminished effect among the subsample who are embedded in community social net-
works, and thus more likely to be mobilized by their peers should violence actually recur.
Neither of these interaction effects is signiĕcant.⁷ e reported effect of anger is thus prob-
ably not driven by individuals who either underestimate or overestimate the likelihood that
they will take part in future.
Moving from anger to blame, Table . shows that blame of the outgroup also has a
signiĕcant and substantial regression coefficient. is effect was not predicted by the theo-
retical model. It represents the direct effect of blame on participation intentions aside from
the indirect effect that is mediated by anger. e size of this direct effect is large, with a
standardized coefficient of . (Model ..). Blaming the outgroup for unfairly harming
one’s own group thus also results in an increased desire to participate in future violence. If
anger represents the “hot” pathway to participation, this direct effect of blame suggests that
there is also a “cooler,” non-emotional channel.⁸
⁷Anger-participation in  interaction term: Coef. =  ., S.E. = ., p = .. Anger-meeting atten-
dance interaction term: Coef. = ., S.E. = ., p = ..
⁸A comparison of the standardized effects of anger and blame might suggest that blame is the more im-
portant variable. is conclusion may be justiĕed. But note that anger is a more difficult variable to measure
than blame. Respondents who are not engaged in the interview may not experience any emotional reaction
to the vignettes, even if they blame foreigners in the abstract. Moreover, as I mentioned before, the inten-
sity of experienced emotion is reduced by asking people to report their emotional reactions (Keltner, Locke,
and Audrain ; Schwartz and Clore ). To the extent that anger is less well-measured than blame, its
regression coefficient will be more attenuated.

e most distal variable in the entitlement-blame-anger model, violations of group
entitlements, does not show any direct effect on participation intentions. Later in the chapter
I will examine whether it has direct effects on anger, or as hypothesized, on blame.
In sum, the evidence presented thus far supports the entitlement-blame-angermodel.
Anger has a signiĕcant effect on participation intentions, and one that is robust to the inclu-
sion of numerous control variables. emodel may require some revision however, because
blame also appears to result in an increased intention to attack the other group, indepen-
dently of the emotion of anger. e remainder of this section will consider the evidence for
pathways to participation outside of the entitlement-blame-anger model, beginning with
selective incentives.
... Alternative Explanations for Participation
Selective Incentives. Would-be participants may be motivated primarily by the prospect
of personal reward, rather than any deep-seated blame of the outgroup. In situations of
intergroup violence, people may “riot for proĕt,” as Banĕeld () put it. Indeed, looting
was quite common in , with  of residents stated that “some” or “many” people had
looted.
e question is whether looting is an epiphenomenon that occurs during incidents
of intergroup violence or whether mass participation is actually propelled by the promise
of looting. e multivariate analysis in Table . can provide some insight. e coefficient
for perceived opportunities for looting, however, is negative in Table .. is indicates
that the promise of looting does not make individuals more willing to participate in future
intergroup violence.⁹ e hypothesis of selective incentives is not supported.
⁹e negative effect of this variable is surprising, but is possibly because would-be participants do not see
themselves as looters. If participation is motivated by anger and blame, then participants regard their actions
as righting a wrong (see also Horowitz ). Some of the open-ended responses corroborate this view that

is result is not very surprising when one considers other features of intergroup
violence. In Alexandra in , for example, there were thousands of participants. e
targets were fewer in number and were, in any case, hardly wealthy themselves. e a priori
probability of reward from looting would thus appear to be low.
Social inĘuence. Rather than be motived by rewards, participants may be motivated to
avoid the costs of non-participation. Leaders and other participants may apply social pres-
sure to those who appear less interested in taking part. ese pressures range from the
subtle to the coercive, from feelings of shame and guilt to threats of violence. Whatever
the mechanism, these pressures can be more readily brought to bear on residents who at-
tend community meetings. ese are the occasions where the  violence was organized.
ey also involve repeated face-to-face encounters between community members and com-
munity leaders.Ƭ⁰
Evidence from the survey shows that some level of coercion does occur. Fieen
percent of respondents claimed that “some” or “many” people were intimidated into taking
part in , and  admitted, in the open-ended questions asked aer the participation
intention items, that such social pressures would compel them to take part.ƬƬ
However, the regression results do not show any substantial association between
participants separate themselves from looters: respondent , for example, said that “some stupid people
don’t understand toyi-toying. ey become wild and steal from innocent people.”
Ƭ⁰Attendance at these meetings is high:  of respondents claimed to have attended at least one meeting
from January to May ; . attended six or more.
ƬƬRespondent , for example, said he will “just pretend to join in to show solidarity so people don’t see
me as an outsider too.” Respondent  would also join in, “because if I don’t my community will think I’m
a sell-out.”

meeting attendance and participation intentions.Ƭƭ ere is thus no evidence that exposure
to social pressures, whether coercive or not, is sufficient to increase an individual’s intentions
to take part in violence.
Indeed, a strategy of coercion would seem to suffer the same problem as paying par-
ticipants: the chaos of the riot means that it would be next to impossible to monitor those
who had been coerced. Organizers would have to expend all their efforts in coercing and
monitoring an otherwise unwilling mob. Rather than taking part in intergroup violence out
of social pressure or coercion, people appear to join willingly. As Horowitz (, ) put
it, “the deadly ethnic riot is a pickup game.”
Meeting attendance may play a slightly different role however. Scacco () sug-
gests that it increases the likelihood of participation through a conditional relationship with
collective incentives. is hypothesis is discussed next.
Realistic Group Competition. Locals and immigrants compete over three major mate-
rial resources in Alexandra: jobs, government housing, and customers for street traders. An
attack on immigrantsmight increase the supply of all of these.ƬƮ ey are public goods, how-
ever, because nonparticipants cannot be excluded from also beneĕtting. us, while such
collective incentives provide a possible motive for participation, exposure to social pressure
provides themeans by which collective motives are transformed into individual action. Par-
ticipation, according to this model, requires that individuals both stand to beneĕt from the
provision of some collective good, and be discouraged from free-riding. e three collective
incentives are measured with, respectively, indicators for being unemployed, living in low
ƬƭScacco also ĕnds that meeting attendance, by itself, has little impact on participation in riots in Nigeria.
ƬƮSeveral respondents made this point when asked why they intended to participate in violence in future.
Respondent , for example said: “if things go well, I will also beneĕt;” while respondent  noted that:
“it’s my chance to have opportunities, to ĕght for a better life.”

quality housing, and making a living as an informal trader. Exposure to social pressure, as
before, is measured with the variable for attendance at community meetings.
e conditional nature of these hypotheses requires that they be tested using inter-
action terms between each of the three incentives andmeeting attendance. Only the interac-
tion term for being an informal trader and attending meetings is signiĕcant, and is reported
in Models .. & .Ƭ⁴
is interaction term reports the effect ofworking as an informal trader as the level of
meeting attendance increases from the lowest observed level (no meetings attended) to the
highest observed level (six or more meetings attended). e theory is a little more speciĕc,
however. It requires that being a trader would only be linked to increased participation
intentionswhen the individual attends communitymeetings. Consequently, not only should
the coefficient be greater for those who attend compared to those who do not, it should be
close to zero in the former instance and positive in the latter. We require, in other words,
the marginal effects of the interaction terms.
Marginal effects are most readily communicated using ĕgures. Figure . shows the
marginal effects of making a living as an informal trader as meeting attendance (x-axis)
increases. It is clear that the required pattern is shown: the effect is close to zero for re-
spondents who did not attend any community meetings in , and positive for those who
attended meetings. Moreover, the effect is signiĕcantly greater than zero for respondents
who attended at least one meeting in .
Ƭ⁴e coefficient for the unemployed  meeting attendance term is  . (S.E = .); for the low quality
housingmeeting attendance term, it is . (S.E = .). Table . also shows that Alexandra residents who are
not active in the labor force are signiĕcantly less likely to want to take part in future violence than those who
are working (the omitted category of the dummy variable). Additional analyses, not reported here, ĕnd that
most of this effect is produced by the students in the sample. An interaction term for between being inactive
in the labor force and attending meetings is not signiĕcant.

Figure.. Marginal Effects ofWorking as aTrader onParticipation Intentions by Level ofMeetingAttendance
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e bold line indicates the marginal effects of being a trader on participation intentions (vertical axis) by
level of meeting attendance (horizontal axis). e dashed lines show the  conĕdence intervals around the
marginal effect estimates. Covariates fromModels .. included.
Despite the prevalence of narratives describing competition over housing and jobs
as the trigger of the  violence, locals who earn their livings as informal traders appear to
have more credible reasons to attack foreigners than those who are unemployed or lack ad-
equate housing. e difference is that traders can reasonably expect that attacking their for-
eign competitors will reduce the competitive threat. In order to conduct business in Alexan-
dra, a trader must actually be present at a stall or table in the area. For a foreigner to return
to their stall aer an episode of anti-immigrant violence would be very risky.
ere is no similar rationality of violence for South Africans who experience compe-
tition in the general labor market or over access to housing. Many of the jobs that residents
of Alexandra hold or seek take the form of wage employment throughout the city of Jo-
hannesburg (Center for Development and Enterprise ). While attacking one’s foreign
competitors in Alexandra may drive them out of the immediate area, such localized ethnic
cleansing is not sufficient to prevent the target group from continuing to hold jobs in other

parts of the city. e housing motivation for participation in collective violence is also dubi-
ous because the  attacks did not feature mobs trying to force people out of government
houses, and indeed, violence did not occur in these areas. e victims were from the old
area of Alexandra and lived in shacks and backyard rooms (Misago et al. ).
e effect of being a trader and attending community meetings suggests an alter-
native, instrumental pathway to participation in violence.Ƭ⁵ is instrumental pathway ap-
pears to be quite separate to the entitlement-blame-anger mechanism because adding the
interaction term to the equation does not reduce the effects of anger and blame at all (com-
pare Models .. and ..). ere is also no signiĕcant interactive relationship between
being a trader, attending meetings, and either anger or blame.Ƭ⁶
Frustration-Aggression. InBerkowitz’s revised frustration-aggression theory (; ),
aversive conditions produce aggression, which is displaced onto some target. Twomeasures
of aversive conditions are used in the regression models in Table .: poverty and support
for an opposition party. Both show a positive bivariate correlation with participation inten-
tions.Ƭ⁷ When included in Table . with the other covariates, however, these effects are no
longer signiĕcant. e frustration induced by poverty and support for an opposition party
thus does not directly increase intentions to take part in intergroup violence. Later in this
chapter, I will explore whether these variables have indirect effects on participation, which
are mediated through either blame or anger.
Ƭ⁵is alternative pathway is not a general explanation for participation in intergroup violence. ere were
only  respondents who reported working as traders. is is less than one-third of the proportion of Alexan-
dra residents who admitted taking part in the  attacks. is calculation is based on the proportions as
weighted by the sampling weights.
Ƭ⁶ese interaction models are not shown.
Ƭ⁷e poverty correlation is .; that for opposition party support is .. See Table ..

Culture of Violence. Some authors argue that South African townships are afflicted by a
culture of violence given that the state has historically neglected to provide impartial justice
and, indeed, has instigated much violence itself. Subscription to this culture of violence is
measured with two items capturing a respondents’ support for violence. e correlation
between this index and participation intentions is fairly strong (.). As the regression in
Table . show, this association remains signiĕcant when the effects of other covariates are
controlled.Ƭ⁸ Individuals who believe that violence is an acceptable strategy for the group to
pursue its interests are more willing to take part in a future attack on foreigners.
... Summary
is concludes the analysis of the direct determinants of intentions to participate in inter-
group violence. As hypothesized, anger plays an important role. But blame and support
for violence also shape decisions about taking part in an attack. We now shi our attention
to the triggers of anger. Given the substantial association between anger and participation
intentions, any variable that has a direct effect on the former may also have an indirect, me-
diated effect on the latter. Both sorts of relationships will be considered in the next section.
.. e Triggers of Anger
... Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model
Table . presents three regression models of intergroup anger. As before, these are survey
regressions with weighted estimates and design-based standard errors. ey also include
ĕxed effects for community policing sectors and interview language. e ĕrst model, Model
.., includes all the explanatory variables that were hypothesized to trigger anger, notably,
Ƭ⁸e standardized regression coefficient is ..
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
blame. e next model, .., repeats this speciĕcation, but uses the log-transformed ver-
sions of anger and blame to ensure that any results are not driven by skewness. e ĕnal
model, .., adds the indicator for previous participation to the equation ...
e entitlement-blame-anger model postulates that intergroup anger is triggered by
a belief that the outgroup is to blame for some unjust hardship or harm suffered by the in-
group. e bivariate correlation between these variables is indeed large, .. e regression
effect is also substantial; the standardized coefficient is .. Including controls for material
competition with the outgroup, aversive conditions, gender, education, and previous par-
ticipation in violence does not reduce the strength of the blame-anger link by very much.
e entitlement-blame-anger model posits a mediational role for anger. We have
already seen that blame has a direct effect on willingness to participate in future intergroup
violence, but, according to the model, blame also works by triggering angry reactions to the
outgroup. Blame is thus hypothesized to also have an indirect effect. e substantial effects
of blame on anger, on the one hand, and anger on participation intentions, on the other, are
consistent with this indirect pathway between blame and participation intentions. e size
of this mediation effect is .. A formal test conĕrms that this effect is signiĕcant.Ƭ⁹
I have shown that the blame-anger link is robust to controlling for various possible
confounds. But could this association be the result of a reverse effect, where feelings of anger
produce increased blame? Existing research does, in fact, ĕnd evidence for this causal path-
way. Quigley and Tedeschi () and Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (), for example,
ĕnd that experimentally manipulated anger increases the tendency to blame another party,
while Miller () and Solomon () argue that perceptions of injustice are both a con-
sequence and a determinant of anger. Anger, in short, may result in blame, as well as blame
resulting in anger.
Ƭ⁹Sobel test statistic = ., p < ..

To test the reciprocal effects of blame and anger, I move from using separate regres-
sions to a simultaneous equation model. More speciĕcally, I move from the assumption
of a recursive model, where effect follows cause without feedback loops, to a non-recursive
model. As Figure . indicates, this model includes the endogenous variables of blame,
anger, and participation intentions. e relationship between anger and participation inten-
tions is treated as a single pathway from the former to the latter. Blame and anger, however,
are modeled as having reciprocal effects on each other.
Figure .. Non-Recursive Simultaneous Equation Model With Feedback Loop
 
Participation 
intentions 
Blame 
 
 
Anger 
 
.43 
(.05) 
−.06 
 (.12) 
.27  
(.08) 
.58 
(.11) 
Violations of group 
entitlements  
Support for  
violence 
Observed variable simultaneous equation model. Estimates are obtained using maximum likelihood. Regres-
sion coefficients, along with design-based standard errors in parentheses, are indicated next to their respective
paths. Instrumental variables are shown in grey. All the other covariates from Models .., .., and ..
are included in this SEM. Overall model ĕt: Akaike Information Criterion = ..
Non-recursive models, such as this one, are not identiĕed without some unique in-
formation about the endogenous variables (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyat ). Iden-
tiĕcation of this particularmodel requires at least one unique predictor for each endogenous
variable of anger and blame.ƭ⁰ To serve as a unique predictor, we require a variable that the-
ory or past experience has shown to have an causal relationship with one of the endogenous
ƭ⁰is model is block recursive: the block containing the endogenous variables of blame and anger is non-
recursive, but the block containing the endogenous variable of participation intentions is recursive, given the
former block. I thus focus this discussion on the non-recursive block and its two equations.

variables, but not the other. In other words, two instrumental variables are required: one
for anger and one for blame.
e theoretical model suggests a possible instrument for blame: group entitlement
violations. I have argued that violations of group entitlements are the likely source of attri-
butions of outgroup blame, but there is no reason to suspect that this variable will have an
effect on anger, aside from the entitlement-blame-anger pathway. In other words, group en-
titlements violations should not be correlated with the residuals of the equation predicting
anger.
ere is also a potential instrument for anger: the respondent’s support for violence.
Research has shown that the extent to which aggression is believed to be an acceptable op-
tion actually inĘuences whether anger is experienced (Mackie, Devos, and Smith ; Sell,
Tooby, and Cosmides ). ere are no theoretical explanations that link such beliefs
with increased blame of an outgroup, however.ƭƬ
is non-recursive model is speciĕed as a set of two simultaneous equations—one
with anger as an endogenous variable and blame as an exogenous variable, and the other
with the reverse pattern. e equations also include the two instrumental variables; support
for violence is included in the ĕrst equation, but not the second; and group entitlement
violations is included in the second but not the ĕrst (see Figure .). e two equations also
include an identical set of control variables.ƭƭ
e results of this simultaneous equation model are shown in Figure .. e effect
of blame on anger remains positive and signiĕcant. e reverse effect is small, however, and
ƭƬNote that support for violence would be expected to have an effect on participation intentions, indepen-
dent of its effect on anger. is does not matter for identifying the two simultaneous equations for anger and
blame, however, as participation intentions is not part of this non-recursive block of endogenous variables in
Figure ..
ƭƭese control variables are those included in Models .. and ...

not signiĕcantly differentiable from zero. e results suggest that the covariance between
these two variables can be largely accounted for by the ĕrst pathway, that of blame on anger.
A comparison of a measure of model ĕt, the Akaike Information Criterion, for both the
recursive model (which lacks the feedback loop between anger and blame) and this non-
recursive model shows that the recursive is the better ĕtting model.ƭƮ I thus stick to the
simpler recursive model for the remainder of this chapter.
e evidence thus supports the hypothesis that blame of the outgroup triggers anger
toward that group. A large number of existing studies, oen using experimental methods,
have shown the link between blame and anger (Averill ; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure
; Smith and Ellsworth ; Betancourt and Blair ). Mackie, Devos, and Smith
() and vanZomeren et al. () have additionally shown that outgroup blameproduces
intergroup anger. My ĕndings conĕrm these existing results using data from a real context
of intergroup conĘict.
I proposed several additional hypotheses for why respondents might express anger
to the outgroup. e evidence for these hypotheses will be examined below.
... Alternative Explanations for Anger
Realistic Group Competition. Respondents who are more likely to experience conĘict
with immigrants over material resources are hypothesized to be more angry at this out-
group. As outlined earlier, there are three subgroups of Alexandra residents who are partic-
ularly likely to experience intergroup relations as conĘictual: the unemployed, those living
in shacks and hostel rooms, and those working as street traders. As Table . shows, how-
ever, none of these variables exhibit any meaningful association with anger. Anger at the
ƭƮeAkaike InformationCriterion (AIC) is a relativemeasure ofmodel ĕt that penalizes the log-likelihood
by 2k, where k is the number of estimated parameters. e lower the value of the AIC, the better the ĕt. AIC
for recursive model:  .; AIC for nonrecursive model:  .

outgroup is thus not a function of competition for resources with that group.ƭ⁴ e previ-
ous section showed that exposure to material threat from the outgroup does not indepen-
dently increase the likelihood that one participates. It also does not have an indirect effect
on participation that operates through the mechanism of anger.
Frustration-Aggression. Contemporary revisions of the frustration-aggression theory
(Berkowitz , ) hold that frustrations may result in anger as well as aggression. e
previous section found that neither poverty nor opposition party support had a signiĕcant
effect on participation intentions. Table . shows that neither exhibits a relationship of
any signiĕcance with anger. ere is thus no evidence for the frustration-aggression model
when it comes to reactions of intergroup anger.
eCulture of Violence. Support for violencemay not only increase the likelihood of tak-
ing part in violence, but also the likelihood of even feeling angry. As I described in Chapter
, one of the appraisals that results in anger is an evaluation of the costs of aggression. To
the extent that respondents regard violence as normatively acceptable, they will be likely to
evaluate acts of aggression as low in cost, and thus more likely to experience anger. Support
for violence does indeed show a signiĕcant association with anger in the regression models
in Table ..ƭ⁵ Individuals who do not support violence are thus less likely to experience
anger, even holding the intensity of blame constant.
ƭ⁴Unlike the realistic group competition hypotheses for participation intentions, there is no expectation
that being unemployed, for example, must be coupled with meeting attendance for an effect to be observed
on anger. Meeting attendance mobilizes the desire for confrontation; this is necessary for participation, but
not for anger. We are thus interested in the unconditional relationships between these measures of collective
incentives and anger.
ƭ⁵e standardized effect = ..

OtherVariables. Hearing leaders blame the outgroup for harms to the ingroup also shows
a signiĕcant effect on anger. is effect is unexpected. In Alexandra, much of the authority
enjoyed by the leaders of community policing fora comes from their engagement with the
police (Steinberg b). Blame from community leaders may thus add an authoritative
stamp of approval to violence against foreigners.
... Summary
In conclusion, the regression analysis presented in this section conĕrms that blame of an
outgroup is closely related to anger at the group. Blame has by far the largest effect on anger
of any variable that was considered here. While some authors argue that anger and blame
actually have reciprocal causal relationships, using simultaneous equation models, I ĕnd
no evidence that anger leads to blame. e anger-participation intentions and blame-anger
links have both been supported thus far. In the next section, I move on to consider the
determinants of blame, and whether the evidence supports the hypothesized link between
entitlement violations and blame.
.. e Roots of Blame
... Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model
We have seen that individuals who blame the outgroup are particularly likely to feel anger
toward that group and be willing to take part in violence against that group. To embed these
participants in the contexts in which violence actually occurs, we need to search for the
foundations of anger and blame.
To this end, Table . includes four survey regression of blame. e ĕrst model,
.., includes the group entitlement violations variable, all the other independent variables
that were hypothesized to have an effect on blame, and other control variables. e second

model, .., disaggregates group entitlement violations into its constituent parts: ingroup
and outgroup violations of entitlement. e third model, .., breaks these down further
into the four basic group endowment and entitlement evaluations. e ĕnal model, ..,
returns to the speciĕcation used in .., but also includes an interaction term between au-
thoritarianism and group entitlement violations.
e entitlement-blame-anger model argues that the roots of blame lie in violations
of group entitlement: when the actual positions held by the in- and outgroups are believed
to be incongruent with those positions that the in- and outgroups are believed to deserve.
Model .. shows that group entitlement violations do in fact exhibit a strong, positive
association with blame. e standardized effect is ., which is virtually the same as the
bivariate correlation of .. Blame and group entitlement violations are thus clearly closely
related.ƭ⁶
e appeal of this measure of group entitlement violations is not primarily its high
correlation with blame, but rather that it offers a means of linking attributions of blame to
contexts and history. Perceptions of group endowments, on the one hand, are contextual
evaluations, and thus shaped in large part by who gets what. Perceptions of group entitle-
ment, on the other hand, are shared beliefs about who ought to get what. ese latter per-
ceptions are thus inĘuenced by historical forces (Blumer ). In the case of Alexandra,
the position and privileges believed to be entitled by locals and foreigners are shaped heavily
by the experience of apartheid (see also Landau ). e central feature of apartheid was
the denial of citizenship, with its attendant rights, to black South Africans. is exclusion-
ary ideology appears to live on in the inequality that Alexandra residents belief should exist
ƭ⁶Blamemediates the effect that group entitlement violation has on anger. emediation effect is . (Sobel
test statistic = ., p < .).
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
between locals and immigrants.ƭ⁷
e responses to the open-ended questions about why the attacks of  took place
andwhy they intended to participate (or not participate) in future vividly illustrate this com-
parison between the status and welfare believed to be enjoyed by each group and the status
and welfare believed to be deserved by each. Respondent , for example explains her
intention to take part as follows (emphasis added): “I think I will be ĕghting for my rights
of getting a job and a house.” Like many others, this respondent understands her motives
in terms of competition over resources, but this understanding is colored by a view that she
deserves a job and a house; she has an entitlement to such resources. Some of the responses
go further in suggesting that not only do locals deserve such resources, but that foreigners
do not. Respondent  puts it as follows: “nothing belongs to them here, all they have is
ours and I hate them with all my heart.”
A number of respondents link differing group entitlements to South Africa’s tran-
sition to democracy, echoing Landau () and Nieagodien (), who emphasize the
historical roots of the violence. Respondent , for example, argues that: “we South
Africans don’t enjoy our democracy because of foreigners; they get everything that we’re
supposed to get.” Respondent  expresses a similar view: “I don’t think it is fair for
us to share our freedom and democracy with them; our fathers suffered alone to put South
Africa where it is today.”
is feeling of normative violation inĕltrates other perceptions: foreigners do not
just take jobs, they undermine wages; they do not just buy government houses, they bribe
officials; they are not merely in South Africa to work, but also to commit crime and sell
drugs. Respondent  claims that “foreigners act like they are more South African than
us;” while respondent  asks: “just imagine feeling like a stranger in your own country.”
ƭ⁷See Figure ..

Moving back to the regression results, models .. and  include disaggregatedmea-
sures of group entitlement violations. Model .. uses separate measures of ingroup and
outgroup violations of entitlement. e former is the degree to which the ingroup is get-
ting less than deserved; the latter is the degree to which the outgroup are getting more than
deserved. While both show positive and signiĕcant associations with blame, the effect of
outgroup violations of entitlement is especially strong.ƭ⁸ e degree to which the outgroup
is believed to have exceeded its entitlement thus matters more for blame (and anger) than
the extent to which the ingroup is getting less than it deserve.
In Model .., these measures are disaggregated further into the four basic compo-
nents of ingroup and outgroup evaluation. One of these evaluations, the level of ingroup
entitlement, shows no signiĕcant effect. But the other three evaluations are linked with
blame. e level of welfare and status deserved by the outgroup shows a particularly strong
(negative) effect on blame.ƭ⁹
While existing theories of intergroup conĘict, such as relative deprivation theory
(Gurr ; Runciman ), do make use of intergroup evaluations, they tend to focus
on three of the four possible intergroup evaluations: the in- and outgroup’s actual level of
welfare, and the level of welfare that the ingroup believes it is owed. Few scholars have
followed the lead of Blumer () and Horowitz () and included the fourth evaluation
that I consider: what the other group deserves. As these results show, the level of welfare
and status to which the outgroup is entitled is the most important of the set of intergroup
evaluations when it comes to attributions of outgroup blame.
e rest of this section examines the evidence for other pathways to blame.
ƭ⁸e standardized coefficient for outgroup violations of entitlement is .; for the ingroup measure, it is
..
ƭ⁹e standardized effects are, ingroup endowments:  .; ingroup entitlements: .; outgroup endow-
ments: .; outgroup entitlements:  ..

... Alternative Explanations for Blame
Social InĘuence. Respondents who hear friends and neighbors blaming foreigners for
taking jobs and houses are more likely to attribute blame to foreigners themselves. Expo-
sure to blame from peers has a substantial and signiĕcant effect on outgroup blame.Ʈ⁰ is
result supports an interpretation that expressions of blame are subject to social conformity,
where individuals are inĘuenced by the opinions and beliefs of the majority. While there
may be some pressure to express views that are consistent with one’s peers, the mechanism
here is likely to be informational rather than normative. e frequencywithwhich one hears
attributions of blame provides information about the distribution of such beliefs among the
peer group. When outgroup blame is common in an individual’s social network, then she is
likely to attribute blame to foreigners herself.
Elite Mobilization. Community leaders do not appear to be able to inĘuence mass per-
ceptions of outgroup blame. e coefficients for this variable are close to zero. e role that
leaders play in organizing violence is thus more circumscribed than it appears in accounts
of intergroup violence that imply a strong, even deterministic role for leaders (Snyder ;
Wilkinson ). Rather than “stoking tensions” or “stirring up trouble,” the role of lead-
ers may be limited to organizing the focal points for violence, such as meetings or other
collective events.ƮƬ
Realistic Group Competition. Individuals who are particularly exposed to competition
with immigrants over jobs and houses were hypothesized to be more likely to blame this
outgroup for unfairly taking these resources. Yet this hypothesis is not supported. None
Ʈ⁰e standardized coefficient (Model ..) is ..
ƮƬI also showed that blame from leaders has an small effect on anger. is may represent an ability to add
authoritative approval to aggression against the outgroup.

of the subgroups who are particularly likely to compete with foreigners for resources—the
unemployed, those living in shacks and hostel rooms, and informal traders—show an in-
creased level of blame of this outgroup. In fact, informal traders show lower levels of blame
compared to people who make their living in other ways.Ʈƭ e realistic group competi-
tion model thus does not account for any of the three dependent variables of participation
intentions, anger, or blame.
Frustration-Aggression. Individuals who experience aversive conditions are hypothe-
sized to be more likely to attribute blame to immigrants. ere are two measures of aversive
conditions: poverty, and supporting an opposition party. Table . shows that poverty is in-
deed associated with higher levels of outgroup blame, holding all other variables constant.ƮƮ
ere is no such effect from being an opposition supporter. us, while poorer individuals
are readier to blame immigrants than individuals who live more comfortably, opposition
party supporters are no more likely to blame the outgroup than supporters of the ANC.e
frustration-aggression model, in sum, appears to help explain the displacement of blame,
rather than aggression, onto another group.
Authoritarianism-reat. reats to the ingroup have been shown to activate authori-
tarian predispositions, resulting in a pattern of intolerant and aggressive cognition and be-
havior (Feldman and Stenner ). In particular, I hypothesized that threats and authori-
tarianism will show a conditional relationship; when an individual both perceives threats to
Ʈƭis ĕndingmay be surprising, considering that traders who attend community meetings express keener
intentions to take part in violence against the outgroup. is shows that, to the extent that such collective
interests have any relationship with participation, they exert inĘuence through a pathway other than blame
and anger.
ƮƮe standardized regression coefficient is ..

the ingroup and holds authoritarian values, he will be attribute more blame to the outgroup.
emeasure of threat is group entitlement violations because it captures both the inequality
of group endowments as well as the gaps between what each group has and deserves. An in-
teraction term between group entitlement violations and the authoritarian scale is included
in Model ... e effect is positive and signiĕcant.Ʈ⁴
e theory of the authoritarian-threat dynamic proposes a more speciĕc pattern of
interaction than merely a positive interaction, however. It argues that high levels of threat
to the ingroup activate authoritarian values. e implication is that, at low levels of threat,
authoritarians do not differ signiĕcantly from non-authoritarians in their political attitudes
(such as outgroup blame); only when threat is higher does a difference between these two
types emerge. To test this more speciĕc set of hypotheses, we need to examine the marginal
effects of the interaction terms. e theory is supported to the extent that themarginal effect
of authoritarianism is approximately zero when threat is low, and signiĕcantly positive when
threat is high.
e marginal effects of the interaction terms are displayed graphically in Figure ..
e solid line shows the regression effect of authoritarianism on blame, across the observed
levels of group entitlement violations. e ĕgure shows that at the lowest observed levels
of threat, authoritarianism has a negative effect on blame. Yet there are few observations at
the extremes of the group entitlement violation scale. It is preferable to only consider the
marginal effects of authoritarianism across the interquartile range of group entitlement vio-
lations—from . to .. At the lower quartile, the effect of authoritarianism is not signiĕcantly
different than zero; at the upper quartile, it is signiĕcantly greater than zero. As hypothe-
sized, at low levels of threat, authoritarianism has no effect on blame, while at higher levels,
it has a positive effect.
Ʈ⁴e standardized effect is ..

Figure .. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism on Participation Intentions by Group Entitlement Violation
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e top plot displays the marginal effects of authoritarianism on blame (vertical axis) by group entitlement
violations (horizontal axis). e smaller, bottom plot shows the distribution of the group entitlement violation
measure. All covariates fromModel .. are included.
Psychoanalytic Projection. e ĕnal alternative model of blame to consider is the psy-
choanalytic theory of projection. is theory argues that individuals unconsciously project
negative emotions onto another group; they then blame this scapegoat. As the regression
coefficients in Table . show, respondents who reported experiencing aversive emotions
(shame and anxiety) toward the  riots do not, however, express higher levels of out-
group blame. ere is thus no support for the theory of projection in this data.
... Summary
e section showed that group entitlement violations are strongly related with attributions
of outgroup blame. I argued that the appeal of the former is that it permits us to link individ-
ual emotions, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies to broad, historically-shaped evaluations

about each groups’ endowments and entitlements. Hearing peers blame the outgroup is also
associated with greater individual blame of the outgroup. Finally, the aversive conditions of
poverty produce a pattern of displaced blame, where foreigners are the targets. To conclude
this chapter, I will summarize the main ĕndings.
.. Conclusion: Summary of Findings
is chapter has tested the proposed entitlement-blame-anger model using survey data col-
lected in Alexandra. e four key variables of participation intentions, anger, blame, and
violations of group entitlements are all highly intercorrelated, as the model predicts.
I then test each causal link of the model using regression analysis. e assumption
of this method is that the causal processes implicit in the model can be tested by controlling
for possible confounding factors. e evidence supports the model: anger has a positive
effect on intentions to participate in future intergroup violence; blame, a positive effect on
anger; and violations of group entitlements, a positive effect on blame.Ʈ⁵ Blame turns out
to be even more important than hypothesized, because it also has a large, positive effect on
participation intentions. ese effects obtain aer controlling for background factors such
as gender, age, and education, as well as alternative theoretical explanations, including the
extent of material competition with the outgroup, exposure to social inĘuence, and beliefs
about the availability of selective incentives.
I also use theoretical explanations to argue that none of these effects could be inter-
preted as a causal effect in the opposite direction to that hypothesized. In the one instance
where theory suggested that both causal directions were possible—the association between
anger and blame—the use of instrumental variables supports the hypothesis that blame pro-
duces anger, and not the reverse.
Ʈ⁵See Figure . for a graphical summary.

Figure .. Results of Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model
 
Participation 
intentions 
Blame 
 
 
Anger 
 
.31 (.05) 
.52 (.04) 
 
.22 (.07) 
 
.49 (.05) 
Violations of group 
entitlements  
Estimated using pseudomaximum likelihood. Covariates frommodels .., .., and .. included. Effects
are standardized.
Perceiving that the ingroup is getting less than their just deserts and that an outgroup
is getting more than they are entitled results in the outgroup being blamed for harming the
ingroup. e effect of the former is stronger than the latter, indicating that shared beliefs
about the rights and privileges deserved by the outgroup are a particularly important, but
neglected, component of intergroup conĘict and violence. Blame then triggers feeling of
intergroup anger, and anger and blame together increase the motivation to attack the other
group. Laboratory experiments have already pointed toward the roots of intergroup anger
in perceptions that the other group have committed a normative harm, and have already
shown the tendency of those experiencing intergroup anger to desire confrontation with
that group. is data from Alexandra, where group conĘict permeates everyday life, adds
external validity to these experimental ĕndings.
is chapter has also presented a number of other signiĕcant ĕndings. A summary
of the hypotheses is displayed in Table .. Hypotheses that are supported by the evidence
presented in this chapter are shown in boldface font.
e social inĘuence model is supported for blame but not for participation inten-
tions. Blaming the outgroup is partly a function of hearing one’s peers doing the same. But
attending community meetings does not make people readier to take part in intergroup vi-
olence. e evidence here therefore suggests that social networks may shape beliefs about
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
the outgroup more easily than behavior toward that group.
e realistic group competition model argues that a collective incentive is required
in addition to peer mobilization to produce collective action against some outgroup. is
model is supported for one measure of exposure to realistic competition with the outgroup
—working as an informal trader. Informal traders—who stand to beneĕt if their foreign
competitors are too afraid to sell their goods in Alexandra—show a greater willingness to
take part in future violence, but only if they attend meetings where their motives can be
mobilized. None of the other kinds of realistic intergroup competition show any effect on
participation intentions, anger, or blame.
e frustration-aggression model is supported for blame, but not anger or partici-
pation intentions. e aversive conditions of being poor is associated with greater blame
of the outgroup. e other measure of aversive conditions, supporting an opposition party,
does not show any effect, however.
ere is strong evidence for the culture of violence model. Respondents’ support
for violence turns out to have signiĕcant effects on both anger and intentions to take part
on future intergroup violence. ere is thus both a direct effect on participation inten-
tions—those who support violence are less constrained by the normative costs of attacking
others—as well as an indirect effect that operates through anger.
Finally, the authoritarianism-threatmodel is supported. Authoritarianismand group
entitlement violations show a signiĕcant and positive interaction term in the blame regres-
sions. e evidence also shows, in agreement with the model, that authoritarian predisposi-
tions are activated by the threat posed by incongruent group endowments and entitlements.
When this threat is at a low level, authoritarianism has no effect on blame; when threat is
higher, authoritarian values are associated with greater blame of the outgroup.
In the next chapter I offer some concluding comments and discuss the broader im-
plications of this research.

CHAPTER 
Conclusion
ere is a large scholarly literature on intergroup violence. Most of this research, however,
searches for causes at the ecological level. Although necessary, theories at this level of anal-
ysis are not sufficient for a full understanding of intergroup violence. ey explain why
leaders or groups may stand to beneĕt from an attack against another group, but they do
not account for why a multitude of people participate. e question of why people partici-
pate, moreover, does not appear to have a straightforward answer because, on the face of it,
the dangers and risks of taking part appear to outweigh any private material beneĕts.
Existing explanations for participation in collective violence in the political science
literature includemechanisms such as selective incentives (Humphreys andWeinstein ),
group security (Scacco ), and social inĘuence (Humphreys and Weinstein ; Fuji
; McDoom ). But all these factors appear to underdetermine participation given
the risks, the weakness or absence of leadership, and the lack of any substantial material
beneĕt to participants or groups. Instead, I propose an emotional theory of participation in
intergroup violence: the entitlement-blame-anger model.
According to this model, participation is motivated by emotional reactions of inter-
group anger. Anger is useful in this respect because it shapes both the preference for con-
frontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese ;
Lerner and Keltner ). Intergroup anger, in turn, is triggered by appraisals that the out-

group are to blame for some harm suffered by the ingroup. Blame and anger are then rooted
in evaluations of group endowments and group entitlements. ese are widely-shared be-
liefs concerning who gets what and who deserves what in a given society. us, when group
endowments and group entitlements are incongruent, either because the outgroup are en-
joying resources to which they are not entitled, or the ingroup getting less than their share,
the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced and large numbers of ingroup members may
become willing to take part in violence directed at that group.
I test this model using survey data from Alexandra, a township in Johannesburg,
South Africa, where a national wave of violence between locals and African immigrants
began in , and where intergroup tensions remain. At the end of the previous chapter, I
summarized the evidence offered by this survey data for the entitlement-blame-angermodel.
Letme quickly recap the highlights. I ĕnd that intergroup anger is associated with intentions
to take part in another attack on outgroups. As hypothesized, anger is triggered in large part
by outgroup blame. Blame also has a direct effect on intentions to take part in future violence
against the outgroup, in addition to this indirect effectmediated by intergroup anger. Finally,
blame rests in large part on perceptions that the outgroup are gettingmore than they deserve
and the ingroup, less.
.. Contributions
is dissertationmakes twomajor contributions. First, it proposes a novel theory for partic-
ipation in intergroup violence. Mackie, Devos, and Smith () ĕrst developed the concept
of intergroup emotions and showed the role this concept plays in conĘict. My dissertation
goes further by tailoring intergroup emotions theory for the context of violent conĘict be-
tween ethnic, religious, and communal groups. As such, I propose outgroup blame as the
immediate precipitant of intergroup anger. I also link blame and anger to shared beliefs

about group entitlement and group endowment. is permits individual emotions and par-
ticipation decisions to be embedded in the broader literature on conĘict. ere is a partic-
ular link with theories that emphasize group entitlement (Horowitz ), group position
(Bobo and Hutchings ; Blumer ), group status (Petersen ), and relative depri-
vation (Gurr ; Runciman ).
Second, I test the proposed model using a new individual-level dataset gathered in
a setting where intergroup violence is a salient and realistic phenomenon. A few political
scientists have already examined the determinants of participation using survey data col-
lected in violence-prone settings (Humphreys and Weinstein ; Scacco ). ese
researchers, however, ignore psychological factors such as intergroup emotions and group
entitlements. And political scientists who do consider emotions use macrolevel approaches
(Petersen ), which cannot separate participants fromnonparticipants, or interviewmeth-
ods (Wood ), which are not ideal for testing hypotheses about emotions. A third set of
scholars, typically social psychologists, use experimental tests of the effects of emotions on
intergroup conĘict. ey do so, however, using artiĕcial laboratory situations, and using
Western, student samples (Mackie, Devos, and Smith ; van Zomeren et al. ). My
dissertation is thus the ĕrst project to examine emotions and participation in intergroup
violence using individual-level data gathered in a setting where such violence is only too
real.
.. Generalizability
While the theory is tested using data from a native-immigrant conĘict in South Africa, it
is designed to be of relevance to episodes of violence occurring in other parts of the world
and directed against other kinds of outgroups—religious, racial, linguistic, ideological, and
so on. Indeed, the main variables of group entitlement evaluations, blame, and anger are

useful partly because they are universal psychological constructs. ey can thus provide
explanatory leverage even as the cultural and historical backdrops to conĘicts vary. Whether
the theory indeed generalizes in this respect is an empirical matter that should be veriĕed
with future research.
One speciĕc factor that might be thought to limit the generalizability of the study is
the extent to which intergroup violence is endemic or, alternatively, novel in a given con-
text. As described, Alexandra experienced intergroup violence in  (as well as partisan
violence in the early s). Aside from this episode, mass participation in violence against
immigrants has never previously occurred. To what extent can the results be generalized
to settings where () intergroup tensions exist, but without having previously manifested in
violence, or () intergroup violence is endemic?
It seems plausible that in situations of chronic conĘict, the costs and beneĕts of tak-
ing part become clearer to would-be participants, given the ability to observe the conse-
quences of others’ participation. Private incentives, in other words, would seem to play a
larger role in decisions to take part or not. As Brass argues, in India, where Hindu-Muslim
violence is endemic, an “institutionalized riot system” is said to exist, where numerous actors
have discovered means of proĕting from riots. Yet despite the possibly more pronounced
role of instrumental motivations when it comes to participation in situations where inter-
group violence is endemic, the thousands of participants that are observed in these settings
points toward a diversity of motivations, including the emotional pathway I have proposed
here. And with respect to settings where intergroup tensions have never previously pro-
duced violence, it would seem that would-be participants have less idea about the possible
beneĕts and costs of taking part. If anything, an emotional explanation should have even
more utility for accounting for participation in these settings than in Alexandra.

.. Limitations
Two caveats should be acknowledged and addressed. First, while we are interested in the
behavior of participation, my dependent variable is respondents’ intentions to participate in
the future. is measurement strategy was taken to permit valid measurements of emotions
and other independent variables. It is no use, for example, to use actual participation as the
outcome and three year old memories of intergroup emotions as the explanation.
Nevertheless, these intentions might not translate readily into actual behavior if re-
spondents underestimate the costs of taking part or the situational factors that push people
into conĘict. I tested these possibilities using interaction terms. ese interactions—of
anger and previous participation in intergroup violence, and anger and meeting attendance
—are not signiĕcant. e effects of anger on participation intentions are thus no lower
among respondents who understand the costs of taking part, because they have done it be-
fore, or among respondents who are exposed to the mobilizing effects of social networks.
e second caveat concerns the testing of the causal links in the model. I sought
to measure and control for as many confounds as possible, including background factors
such as gender and age, material conĘict with the outgroup, and exposure to the inĘuence
of peers and leaders. My cross-sectional, observational data are, however, not perfect for
testing causal relationships. Nevertheless, as I argued, experimental methods are either not
practical, for ethical reasons, or require a design that entails an artiĕcial laboratory situation,
divorced from the real world context of intergroup violence.
In addition, the nature of emotion should increase our conĕdence that the asso-
ciation that I have demonstrated between anger and participation intentions represents a
causal effect of anger on violent behavior. e evolutionary function of anger as a credible
deterrent against rapacity and norm violation (Frank ; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides )
implies that the emotion cannot be used in a self-interested way, whether to mask one’s true

motives, or to serve as a means of accessing some other resource.
.. Broader Implications
e primary aim of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of why thousands
of people take part in collective violence against another group. My research, however, has
two further implications: for the macrolevel literature on conĘict, and for the political par-
ticipation more generally. I begin with the former.
While I try to answer the question of why people participate in intergroup violence,
my ĕndings perhaps also shed some light on the bigger question of why intergroup vio-
lence occurs at all. In particular, the entitlement-blame-anger model intersects both with
the body of research that focuses on the mobilizing role of leaders, as well as the literature
that emphasizes group-level motivations.
Although I do not situatemy research at this level of analysis, my ĕndings are consis-
tent with the idea that intergroup violence requires mobilization by leaders (e.g. Wilkinson
). In particular, my research suggests two methods by which leaders can organize a
mob to attack another group. First, leaders may be able to provide some authoritative sup-
port for violenceƬ by linking the outgroup to some alleged normative violation. I ĕnd that
hearing leaders scapegoat the outgroup in this fashion increases levels of intergroup anger.
Second, although I show that anger at the outgroup increases the intention to take part in
future violence, even widespread anger is not sufficient for an attack on the outgroup to take
place. At a minimum, there also needs to be a focal point to coordinate the intentions of so
many disparate individuals. Leaders would be well-placed to provide such a focal point by,
for example, organizing a meeting or march, where where, among the collective, passions
ƬIn Alexandra, this authority is derived from the close relationship that leaders of community policing
fora have with police. In other contexts, it may stem from different sources, such as holding elected office.
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can spill over into violence.
My research also resonates with the broader literature that emphasizes group level
motivations for intergroup violence. One such theory holds that competition between two
groups over material resources leads to violence between these groups (Dancygier ;
Olzak ). Another theory argues that the relative deprivation produced by a gap between
ingroup endowments and expectations results in conĘict (Gurr ; Runciman ). My
ĕndings suggest, however, that neither realistic group competition, nor relative deprivation
is sufficient for intergroup violence to occur. What also matters is the belief that the other
grouphas no right to take resources that “belong” to the ingroup. Indeed,my evidence shows
that these normative evaluations of “who deserves what” are more important than the brute
facts about “who gets what.” us, according to my entitlement-blame-anger model, labor
market competition may result in intergroup violence, but primarily because it produces a
sense of normative violation. Andwhile fraternal relative deprivationmight also be linked to
fraternal violence, much of the force of this link depends upon beliefs about the entitlements
of the other group.
A second further implication of my dissertation is for political participation. Al-
though I focus on the question of why people take part in violence against other groups,
my model could be adapted for confrontations against the state. If one expands the concept
of group to include the state,ƭ group entitlements and intergroup anger can be used to ex-
plain participation in protests, riots, and rebellion. us, if the authorities are believed to
have acted in a way that exceeds their entitlements, the ingroup may perceive a normative
violation, feel anger, and be eager for a confrontation.Ʈ
ƭSuch a usage is fully consistent, by the way, withMackie and Smith’s intergroup emotions theory (Mackie,
Devos, and Smith ).
Ʈemost likely point of contact with the authorities is the police. e  LosAngeles riots,  French
riots, and  English riots, for example, were all linked to excessive behavior by police.

is extension of themodel to aggressive political participation (Muller ) would
also help extend the literature on emotions and politics. e concept of emotion is currently
thriving in studies of American political behavior. It has also been used by qualitative schol-
ars of conĘict in comparative politics (Petersen ; Wood ). However there appears
to be considerable scope and utility in using emotion in quantitative studies of comparative
political behavior.

Bibliography
Abbink, Klaus, David Masclet, and Daniel Mirza. . “Inequality and Riots: Experimental Evi-
dence.” CREEDWorking Paper Series, University of Amsterdam.
Adorno, eodore W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. . e
Authoritarian Personality. Oxford, UK: Harpers.
Afrobarometer Network. . “Afrobarometer Round  Survey Manual.” http://www.
afrobarometer.org/files/documents/survey_manuals/survey_manual_r4_english.pdf.:
Afrobarometer Network. January , .
Alexandra Renewal Project. ND. “Alex Benchmark Survey .” http://www.alexandra.co.za/
downloads/oppres_benchmarksurvey_pres_0508.pdf: Alexandra Renewal Project. August ,
.
Alvarez, R. Michael, and Jonathan Nagler. . “Economics, Issues and the Perot Candidacy: Voter
Choice in the  Presidential Elections.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
American Psychological Association. ND. “Glossary of Psychological Terms.” http://www.apa.org/
research/action/glossary.aspx.: American Psychological Association. December , .
Anderson, Craig A., and Brad J. Bushman. . “Human Aggression.” Annual Review of Psychology
: –.
Ansolabehere, Stephen D., Shanto Iyengar, and Adam Simon. . “Replicating Experiments Using
Aggregate and Survey Data: e Case of Negative Advertising and Turnout.” American Political
Science Review (): –.
Asch, Solomon E. . “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority Of One Against a
Unanimous Majority.” Psychological Monographs (): –.
Averill, James R. . Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion. New York: Springer.
Axelrod, Robert. . “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms.” American Political Science Review
(): –.

Banĕeld, Edward C. . e Unheavenly City. New York: Little, Brown and Company.
Banks, Antoine J., andNicholas A. Valentino. . “Emotional Substrates ofWhite Racial Attitudes.”
American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Barkow, Jerome H. . “Prestige and Culture: A Biosocial Interpretation.” Current Anthropology
(): –.
Bates, Robert H. . “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa.” Compar-
ative Political Studies (): –.
Bates, Robert H. . “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Con-
temporary Africa.” In State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild,
and Victor Olorunsola. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Bem, Daryl J. . “Self-Perception eory.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed.
Leonard Berkowitz. Vol.  Academic Press pp. –.
Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. . Voting: A Study of Opinion
Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Berkowitz, Leonard. . Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Berkowitz, Leonard. . “Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination And Reformulation.”
Psychological Bulletin (): –.
Berkowitz, Leonard. . “On the Formation andRegulation ofAnger andAggression: ACognitive-
Neoassociationistic Analysis.” American Psychologist (): –.
Berkowitz, Leonard. . Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences, and Control. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Berkowitz, Leonard. . “Appraisals and Anger: How Complete Are the Usual Appraisal Accounts
of Anger?” In International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psycho-
logical, and Social Processes, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger. New
York: Springer chapter , pp. –.
Betancourt, Hector, and Irene Blair. . “A Cognition (Attribution)-Emotion Model of Violence
in ConĘict Situations.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (): –.
Bettencourt, B. Ann, and Norman Miller. . “Gender Differences in Aggression as a Function of
Provocation: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin (): –.

Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. . “Civil War.” Journal of Economic Literature ():
–.
Blumer, Herbert. . “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.” Paciĕc Sociological Review
(): –.
Bobo, Lawrence. . “Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Con-
Ęict?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (): –.
Bobo, Lawrence, and Vincent L. Hutchings. . “Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Ex-
tending Blumer’seory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context.” American Sociological
Review (): –.
Bodenhausen, Galen V., Lori A. Sheppard, and Geoffrey P. Kramer. . “Negative Affect and Social
Judgment: e Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness.” European Journal of Social Psychology
(): –.
Bond, Trevor G., and Christine M. Fox. . Applying the Rasch Model: Fundamental Measurement
in the Human Sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Bonner, Philip, and Noor Nieagodien. . Alexandra: A History. Johannesburg: Wits University
Press.
Brader, Ted. . Campaigning for Hearts AndMinds: How Emotional Appeals in Political AdsWork.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. . “What Triggers Public Opposition to
Immigration? Anxiety, GroupCues, and Immigrationreat.”American Journal of Political Science
(): –.
Brass, Paul R. . e of an Idol. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brass, Paul R. . e Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. Seattle: Uni-
versity of Washington Press.
Brubaker, Rogers, and David D. Laitin. . “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence.” Annual Review of
Sociology : –.
Brundage, W. Fitzhugh. . Under Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South. Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press.

Campbell, Donald T. . “Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives.” InNebraska Symposium on
Motivation, ed. David Levine. University of Nebraska Press pp. –.
Cantril, Hadley. . e Pattern of Human Concerns. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Center for Development and Enterprise. . “Immigrants in Johannesburg: Estimating Numbers
and Assessing Impacts.” CDE In Depth No. . Johannesburg: Center for Development and Enter-
prise.
Chagnon, Napoleon A. . “Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population.”
Science (): –.
Chong, Dennis, and JamesH. Druckman. . “Framingeory.”Annual Review of Political Science
: –.
Cialdini, Robert B., and Noah J. Goldstein. . “Social InĘuence: Compliance and Conformity.”
Annual Review of Psychology : –.
Cohen, Dov, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdle, and Norbert Schwarz. . “Insult, Aggression,
and the Southern Culture of Honor: An ‘Experimental Ethnography’.” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology (): –.
Collins, Randall. . Violence: A Micro-Sociological eory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Crosby, Faye. . “AModel of Egoistical RelativeDeprivation.” Psychological Review (): –.
Cummins, Denise D. . “Cheater Detection is Modiĕed by Social Rank: e Impact of Domi-
nance on the Evolution of Cognitive Functions.” Evolution and Human Behavior (): –.
Cummins, Denise D. . “Dominance, Status, and Social Hierarchies.” Ine Handbook of Evolu-
tionary Psychology, ed. David M. Buss. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Dancygier, Rafaela M. . Immigration and ConĘict in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Darwin, Charles. . e Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London: John Murray.
Davies, James C. . “Toward aeory of Revolution.” American Sociological Review (): –.
Dawkins, Richard. . e Selĕsh Gene. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

de Tocqueville, Alexis. . e Old Regime and the French Revolution. New York: Anchor Books.
de Waal, Frans, B.M. . Chimpanzee Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
DeFigueiredo, Rui, and Barry R. Weingast. . “e Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism
and Ethnic ConĘict.” In Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Jack L. Snyder, and Barbara F.
Walter. New York: Columbia University Press.
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. . “Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First
ings First.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Deutsch, Morton, and Harold B. Gerard. . “A Study of Normative and Informational InĘuences
upon Individual Judgment.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (): –.
DiPasquale, Denise, and Edward L. Glaeser. . “e Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of
Urban Unrest.” Journal of Urban Economics (): –.
Dixon, John, and Clyde Tucker. . “Survey Nonresponse.” In Handbook of Survey Research, ed.
Peter V. Marden, and James D. Wright. nd ed. London: Emerald pp. –.
Dollard, John, Neal E.Miller, LeonardW.Doob, O.H.Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears. . Frustration
and Aggression. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Downs, Anthony. . An Economic eory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Druckman, James N., and Cindy D. Kam. . “Students as Experimental Participants.” In Cam-
bridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science, ed. James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green,
James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. –.
Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson. . “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’
Conversations Limit Elite InĘuence.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Dube, Nobayethi. . “‘Many Shades of the Truth’: e Ramaphosa Case Study.” In South African
Civil Society and Xenophobia, ed. David Everatt. Johannesburg, South Africa: Strategy & Tactics.
Ekman, Paul. . “Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotions.” In
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. J.R. Cole. Vol. . Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press pp. –.
Ekman, Paul. . “An Argument for Basic Emotions.” Cognition and Emotion (–): –.
Ekman, Paul, Robert W. Levenson, and Wallace V. Friesen. . “Autonomic Nervous System Ac-
tivity Distinguishes Among Emotions.” Science (): –.

Elias, Norbert. . e Civilizing Process, Vol.I. e History of Manners. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Ellis, Christopher, and James A. Stimson. . Ideology in America. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Ellis, Lee. . “Dominance and Reproductive Success Among Nonhuman Animals: A Cross-
Species Comparison.” Ethology & Sociobiology (): –.
Elster, Jon. . “Rationality, Emotions, and Social Norms.” Synthese (): –.
Elster, Jon. . “Emotions and Economiceory.” Journal of Economic Literature (): –.
Embretson, Susan E., and Steven Paul Reise. . Item Response eory for Psychologists. Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Fauvelle-Aymar, Christine, and Aurelia Segatti. . “People, Space and Politics: An Exploration of
Factors Explaining the  Anti-Foreigner Violence in South Africa.” In Exorcising the Demons
Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecra in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Jo-
hannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press pp. –.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. . “Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War.” World
Development (): –.
Feldman, Stanley. . “Enforcing Social Conformity: A eory of Authoritarianism.” Political
Psychology (): –.
Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. . “Perceived reat and Authoritarianism.” Political Psy-
chology (): –.
Ferguson, Tamara J., and Brendan G. Rule. . “An Attributional Perspective on Anger and Ag-
gression.” In Perspectives on Aggression: eoretical and Empirical Reviews, ed. Russell Geen, and
R. Edward Donnerstein. New York: Academic Press pp. –.
Fessler, Daniel M.T. . “Madmen: An Evolutionary Perspective on Anger and Men’s Violent
Responses to Transgression.” In International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant
Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles
Spielberger. New York: Springer pp. –.
Festinger, Leon. . “Aeory of Social Comparison Processes.” Human Relations (): –.
Finkel, Steven E., and Edward N. Muller. . “Rational Choice and the Dynamics of Collective
Political Action: EvaluatingAlternativeModelswith PanelData.”American Political Science Review
(): –.

Finkel, Steven E., Edward N. Muller, and Karl-Dieter Opp. . “Personal InĘuence, Collective
Rationality, and Mass Political Action.” American Political Science Review (): –.
Frank, Robert. . Passions Within Reason: e Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W.W.
Norton.
Freud, Sigmund. . Totem and Taboo. New York: Moffat Yard & Co.
Frijda, Nico H. . e Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frijda, NicoH. . “e Psychologists’ Point of View.” InHandbook of Emotions, ed.Michael Lewis,
Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett. rd ed. New York: Guilford pp. –.
Frijda, NicoH., Peter Kuipers, and Elisabeth ter Schure. . “RelationsAmongEmotion, Appraisal,
and Emotional Action Readiness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (): –.
Fromm, Erich. . Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt.
Fuji, Lee Ann. . Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, .
Gastil, Raymond D. . “Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence.” American Sociological
Review (): –.
Gibson, James L. . Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Gibson, James L. . “Do Strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence From the South
African Case.” Political Psychology (): –.
Gibson, James L. . “Land Redistribution/Restitution in South Africa: A Model of Multiple Val-
ues, as the Past Meets the Present.” British Journal of Political Science (): –.
Gibson, James L., andAmandaGouws. . “Truth andReconciliation in SouthAfrica: Attributions
of Blame and the Struggle over Apartheid.” American Political Science Review (): –.
Gibson, James L., and Marc Morjé Howard. . “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of
Jews.” British Journal of Political Science (): –.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. . “On the Legitimacy of National
High Courts.” American Political Science Review (): –.

Ginges, Jeremy, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Khalil Shikaki. . “Sacred Bounds on Rational
Resolution of Violent Political ConĘict.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ():
–.
Glick, Peter. . “Choice of Scapegoats.” In On the Nature of Prejudice:  Years Aer Allport, ed.
John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, and Laurie Rudman. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G.
Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. . “A Global Model for Forecasting Political
Instability.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Gollwitzer, Mario. . “Do Normative Transgressions Affect Punitive Judgments? An Empirical
Test of the Psychoanalytic ScapegoatHypothesis.”Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin ():
–.
Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. . Passionate Politics: Emotions and
Social Movements. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Gubler, Joshua R. . “eMicro-Motives of Intergroup Aggression: A Case Study in Israel.” PhD
Dissertation. University of Michigan.
Gurr, Ted Robert. . Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Halperin, Eran, Alexandra G. Russell, Carol S. Dweck, and James J. Gross. . “Anger, Hatred,
and the Quest for Peace: Anger Can Be Constructive in the Absence of Hatred.” Journal of ConĘict
Resolution (): –.
Halperin, Eran, DaphnaCanetti-Nisim, and SivanHirsch-HoeĘer. . “eCentral Role ofGroup-
Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel.” Political
Psychology (): –.
Hamber, Brandon. . “‘Have No Doubt It Is Fear in the Land.’ An Exploration of the Continuing
Cycles of Violence in South Africa.” South African Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health
(): –.
Harris, Bronwyn. . “Arranging Prejudice: Exploring Hate Crime in Post-Apartheid South
Africa.” Race and Citizenship in Transition Series. Cape Town: Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation.
Hetherington, Marc, and Elizabeth Suhay. . “Authoritarianism,reat, and Americans’ Support
for the War on Terror.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Simon Jackman. . “Voter Decision Making in Election : Cam-
paign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy.” American Journal of Political Science
(): –.
Horowitz, Donald L. . Ethnic Groups in ConĘict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Horowitz, Donald L. . e Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. . “”Networks in Context: e Social Flow of Political
Information.” American Political Science Review (): –.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and ErinCassese. . “On theDistinct Political Effects of Anxiety
and Anger.” In e Affect Effect: e Dynamics of Emotion in Political inking and Behavior, ed.
Ann N. Crigler, Michael MacKuen, and George E. Marcus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. . “reat, Anxiety, and Sup-
port of Anti-terrorism Policies.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Hume, David. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. . “Who Fights? e Determinants of Partici-
pation in Civil War.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
ICTR. . “Case No. ICTR---T. Judgement.” International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Izard, Carroll E. . “Basic Emotions, Relations Among Emotions, and Emotion-Cognition Rela-
tions.” Psychological Review (): –.
Javeline, Debra. a. Protest and the Politics of Blame: e Russian Response to UnpaidWages. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Javeline, Debra. b. “e Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia.” American
Political Science Review (): –.
Keltner, Dacher, and James J. Gross. . “Functional Accounts of Emotions.” Cognition and Emo-
tion (): –.
Keltner, Dacher, Kenneth D. Locke, and Paul C. Audrain. . “e InĘuence of Attributions on the
Relevance of Negative Feelings to Personal Satisfaction.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
(): –.

Kiewiet, Roderick D. . Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: e Electoral Effects of Economic Is-
sues. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, Donald R., and LynnM. Sanders. . “Mimicking Political Debate with Survey Questions:
e Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks.” Social Cognition (): –.
King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. . “Analyzing Incomplete Polit-
ical Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation.” American Political Science
Review (): –.
Kirkpatrick, David D. . “Sectarian Clash in Egypt Kills a Dozen and Leaves  Churches in
Flames.”e New York Times,May .
Klandermans, Bert. . “Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Re-
source Mobilizationeory.” American Sociological Review (): –.
Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Jr. Robert S. Wyer. . “e
Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments.” American Journal of Political Sci-
ence (): –.
Kulik, JamesA., andRoger Brown. . “Frustration, Attribution of Blame, andAggression.” Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology (): –.
Kuran, Timur. . Private Truths, Public Lies: e Social Consequences of Preference Falsiĕcation.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kynoch, Gary. . “Crime, ConĘict and Politics in Transition-Era South Africa.” African Affairs
(): –.
Landau, Loren. . “Introducing the Demons.” In Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia,
Violence and Statecra in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Johannesburg, South
Africa: Wits University Press pp. –.
Lasswell, Harold D. . Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, and Kate Freitas. . “reat, Authoritarianism, and Selective
Exposure to Information.” Political Psychology (): –.
Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, James Polichak, and Charles Taber. . “Explicating the Black
Box rough Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and reat.” Political Analysis ():
–.

Lazarus, Richard S. . Emotion and Adaption. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. . “Fear, Anger, and Risk.” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology (): –.
Lerner, Jennifer S., JulieH.Goldberg, andPhilip E. Tetlock. . “Sober Secondought: eEffects
of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility.” Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin (): –.
Lewis, M. Paul, ed. . Ethnologue: Languages of the World. th ed. SIL International.
Lichbach, Mark. . “An Evaluation of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed Political ConĘict?’ Stud-
ies.”World Politics (): –.
Lichbach, Mark. . e Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Lieberson, Stanley, and Arnold R. Silverman. . “e Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of
Race Riots.” American Sociological Review (): –.
Lodge, Milton, and Charles Taber. . “ree Steps Toward a eory of Motivated Political Rea-
soning.” In Elements of Political Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Rationality,
ed. Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Lumley, omas. . Complex Surveys: A Guide to Analysis Using R. New York: Wiley.
Lutz, Catherine, and Geoffrey M. White. . “e Anthropology of Emotions.” Annual Review of
Anthropology : –.
Mackie, Diane M., ierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith. . “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining
OffensiveActionTendencies in an IntergroupContext.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(): –.
Malhotra, Neil, andAlexander G. Kuo. . “Attributing Blame: e Public’s Response toHurricane
Katrina Attributing Blame: e Public’s Response to Hurricane Katrina.” Journal of Politics ():
–.
Marcus, George E. . “e Structure of Emotional Response:  Presidential Candidates.”
American Political Science Review (): –.
Marcus, George E. . “Emotions in Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science : –.

Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. . Affective Intelligence and Po-
litical Judgment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Marsh, Michael, and James Tilley. . “e Attribution of Credit and Blame to Governments and
Its Impact on Vote Choice.” British Journal of Political Science (): –.
Mattes, Robert, Donald Taylor, David McDonald, Abigail Poore, and Wayne Richmond. . “Still
Waiting For the Barbarians: SAAttitudes to Immigrants and Immigration.” Cape Town: Migration
Policy Series No. . e Southern African Migration Project.
McAdam, Doug. . “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: e Case of Freedom Summer.” Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology (): –.
McCullough, Michael E. . Beyond Revenge: e Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct. San Fran-
cisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
McDoom, Omar. . “Who Kills?: Social InĘuence, Spatial Opportunity, and Participation in
Inter-Group Violence.” London, UK: PSPE working papers , London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Milgram, Stanley. . “Behavioral Study of Obedience.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
(): –.
Miller, Dale T. . “Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice.” Annual Review of Psychology :
–.
Misago, Jean-Pierre. . “Disorder in a Changing Society: Authority and the Micro-Politics of
Violence.” In Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecra in Contemporary
South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press pp. –.
Misago, Jean-Pierre, Tamlyn Monson, Tara Polzer, and Loren Landau. . “May  Violence
Against Foreign Nationals in South Africa: Understanding Causes and Evaluating Responses.” Jo-
hannesburg: Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa / University of the Witwater-
srand.
Mitchell, Edward J. . “Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam.”World
Politics (): –.
Mogg, Karin, AndrewMathews, Carol Bird, and RosanneMacgregor-Morris. . “Effects of Stress
andAnxiety on the Processing ofreat Stimuli.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ():
–.

Monson, Tamlyn, and Rebecca Arian. . “Media Memory: A Critical Reconstruction of the May
Violence.” InExorcising theDemonsWithin: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecra in Contempo-
rary South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press pp. –.
Muller, Edward N. . “A Test of a Partial eory of Potential for Political Violence.” American
Political Science Review (): –.
Muller, EdwardN. . Aggressive Political Participation. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.
Muller, Edward N. . “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.” Amer-
ican Sociological Review (): –.
Muthén, Linda K., and Bengt O. Muthén. . Mplus User’s Guide. th ed. Los Angeles: Muthén &
Muthén.
Mutz, Diana C. . Impersonal InĘuence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Atti-
tudes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mutz, Diana C. a. “e Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation.”
American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Mutz, Diana C. b. “Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic eory in Practice.”
American Political Science Review (): –.
Mutz, Diana C., and Jeffery J. Mondak. . “Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based
Judgments of Fairness and Well-Being.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Nadeau, Richard, Richard G. Niemi, and Timothy Amato. . “Emotions, Issue Importance, and
Political Learning.” American Journal of Political Science (): –.
Nagel, Jack H. . “Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis.” World Politics ():
–.
Newham, Gareth, Temba Masuku, and Jabu Dlamini. . “Diversity and Transformation in the
South African Police Service: A Study of Police Perspectives on Race, Gender and the Community
in the Johannesburg Policing Area.” Johannesburg: Criminal Justice Programme, Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
Nieagodien, Noor. . “Xenophobia’s Local Genesis: Historical Constructions of Insiders and
the Politics of Exclusion in Alexandra Township.” In Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia,
Violence and Statecra in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Loren Landau. Johannesburg, South
Africa: Wits University Press pp. –.

Nyar, Annsilla. . “‘What Happened?’ A Narrative of the May  Xenophobic Violence.” In
South African Civil Society and Xenophobia, ed. David Everatt. Johannesburg, South Africa: Strat-
egy & Tactics chapter .
Olson, Mancur. . e Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olzak, Susan. . “e Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban Racial Violence,
–.” Social Forces (): –.
Olzak, Susan. . e Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and ConĘict. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Ortony, Andrew, Gerald L. Clore, and Allan Collins. . e Cognitive Structure of Emotions. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. . “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives (): –.
Paluck, Elizabeth Levy. . “Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and ConĘict Using the Media: a Field
Experiment in Rwanda.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (): –.
Panksepp, Jaap. . Affective Neuroscience: e Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Paxton, Pamela, John R. Hipp, and Sandra T. Marquart-Pyat. . Nonrecursive Models: Endogene-
ity, Reciprocal Relationships, and Feedback Loops. Number  in “Quantitative Applications in
the Social Sciences” ousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Petersen, Roger D. . Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Petersen, Roger D. . Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-
Century Eastern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Petersen, RogerD. .Western Intervention in the Balkans: e StrategicUses of Emotion inConĘict.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pharoah, Robyn. . “National Victims Of Crime Survey: Overview Of Key Findings.” ISS Paper
. Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies.
Pinker, Steven. . eBetter Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking.

Posen, Barry R. . “e Security Dilemma and Ethnic ConĘict.” Survival (): –.
Posner, Daniel N. . “e Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas
Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries inMalawi.”American Political Science Review (): –.
Quigley, BrianM., and James T. Tedeschi. . “Mediating Effects of BlameAttributions on Feelings
of Anger.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (): –.
Quintal, Genevieve. . “Alex Residents reaten Foreigners Over RDP Homes.” Mail and
Guardian,  October.
Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. . Politics in Plural Societies: A eory of Democratic
Instability. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Reeves, Madeleine. . “A Weekend in Osh.” London Review of Books : –.
Roseman, Ira J. . “Cognitive Determinants of Emotion: A Structural eory.” Review of Person-
ality & Social Psychology : –.
Roseman, Ira J., and Craig A. Smith. . “Appraisal eory: Overview, Assumptions, Varieties,
Controversies.” InAppraisal Processes in Emotion, ed. Klaus Scherer, Angela Schorr, and Tom John-
stone. New York: Oxford University Press pp. –.
Rubin, Donald B. . Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: Wiley.
Rubin, Donald B. . “Multiple Imputation Aer + Years.” Journal of the American Statistical
Association (): –.
Runciman,W.G. . Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality
in Twentieth-Century England. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Russell, James A. . “A Circumplex Model of Affect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(): –.
Russett, Bruce M. . “Inequality and Insurgency: e Relation of Land Tenure to Politics.”World
Politics (): –.
Samejima, Fumiko. . Estimation of Latent Ability Using a Response Pattern of Graded Scores.
Number  in “Psychometric Monographs” Richmond, VA: Psychometric Society.
Scacco, Alexandra. . “Who Riots? Explaining Individual Participation in Ethnic Violence.” PhD
Dissertation. Columbia University.

Scherer, Klaus R. . “Appraisaleory.” InHandbook of Cognition and Emotion, ed. TimDalgleish,
and Mick Power. New York: Wiley pp. –.
Schwartz, Norbert, and Gerald L. Clore. . “Mood, Misattribution and Judgments of Well-Being:
Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy (): –.
Scott, James. . e Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Sears, David O., Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer. . “Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing:’ Self-
Interest or Symbolic Politics?” American Political Science Review (): –.
Sell, Aaron, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides. . “Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger.”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (): –.
Shaver, Kelly G. . eAttribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and Blameworthiness. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Shaver, Phillip, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson, and Cary O’Connor. . “Emotion Knowledge:
Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ():
–.
Sheeran, Paschal. . “Intention-Behaviour Relations: A Conceptual and Empirical Review.” In
EuropeanReview of Social Psychology, ed.Wolfgang Stroebe, andMilesHewstone. th ed. London:
Wiley pp. –.
Sherif, Muzafer. . In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup ConĘict and Coop-
eration. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Shisana, Olive, omas Rehle, Lieckness Simbayi, and Ntombizodwa Mbelle. . outh African
National HIV Prevalence, HIV Incidence, Behaviour and Communication Survey, . Pretoria,
South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press.
Smith, Craig A., and Phoebe C. Ellsworth. . “Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion.” Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology (): –.
Smith, Craig A., and Richard S Lazarus. . “Emotion andAdaptation.” InHandbook of Personality
eory and Research, ed. Lawrence A. Pervin. st ed. New York: Guilford chapter , pp. –.

Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. . “Predisposing Factors and Sit-
uational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities.” American Political Science
Review (): –.
Snyder, David, and Charles Tilly. . “Hardship and Collective Violence in France,  to .”
American Sociological Review (): –.
Snyder, Jack L. . From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist ConĘict. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Solomon, Robert C. . A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Southern AfricanMigration Project. . “e Perfect Storm: e Realities of Xenophobia in Con-
temporary South Africa.”Migration Policy Series No. . Cape Town: Southern AfricanMigration
Project.
Staub, Ervin. . e Roots of Evil: e Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Steinberg, Johnny. a. “South Africa’s Xenophobic Eruption.” ISS Paper . Johannesburg: In-
stitute for Security Studies.
Steinberg, Johnny. b. in Blue: e Unwritten Rules of Policing South Africa. Johannesburg:
Jonathan Ball.
Stenner, Karen. . e Authoritarian Dynamic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, Henri. . “Experiments in IntergroupDiscrimination.” Scientiĕc American (): –.
Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. . “An Integrativeeory of Intergroup ConĘict.” Ine Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel. Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole pp. –.
Taylor, Michael. . “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action.” In Rationality and Revo-
lution, ed. Michael Taylor. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. –.
Tedeschi, James T., and Brian M. Quigley. . “Limitations of Laboratory Paradigms for Studying
Aggression.” Aggression and Violent Behavior (): –.
Tedeschi, James T., and Richard B. Felston. . “Perceived Injustice and the Expression of
Grievances.” In Violence, Aggression and Coercive Actions, ed. James T. Tedeschi, and Richard B.
Felston. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. pp. –.

oits, Peggy A. . “e Sociology of Emotions.” Annual Review of Sociology : –.
Tilly, Charles. . e Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tooby, John, and Leda Cosmides. . “Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions and eir Re-
lationship to Internal Regulatory Variables.” In Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis, Jean-
nette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett. rd ed. New York: Guilford pp. –.
Trivers, Robert. . “e Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology ():
–.
Trivers, Robert. . e Folly of Fools: e Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life. New
York: Basic Books.
Turner, John C. . Social InĘuence. Belmont, CA: omson Brooks/Cole.
Turner, John C., Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, andMargaret S. Wetherell.
. Rediscovering e Social Group: A Social Categorization eory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
UN News Service. . “South Africa: Foreigners Displaced By Xenophobic Attacks Anxious Over
Future – UN.” UN News Service, August .
United Nations Development Programme. . Human Development Report . New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Valentino, Benjamin A. . Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, .
Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L.
Hutchings. . “Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: e Role of Emotions in Political Par-
ticipation.” Journal of Politics (): –.
van Zomeren, Martijn, Russell Spears, Colin Wayne Leach, and Agneta H. Fischer. . “Put Your
Money Where Your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies rough Group-Based
Anger and Group Efficacy.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (): –.
Varshney, Ashutosh. . Ethnic ConĘict and Civic Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Varshney, Ashutosh. . “Ethnicity and Ethnic ConĘict.” InOxford Handbook of Comparative Poli-
tics, ed. Carles Boix, and Susan Stokes. NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press chapter , pp. –.
Vearey, Joanna. . “Hidden Spaces and Urban Health: Exploring the Tactics of Rural Migrants
Navigating the City of Gold.” Urban Forum (): –.

von Hippel, William, and Robert Trivers. . “e Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception.”
Brain and Behavioral Sciences (): –.
Waller, Lyndith. . “IrregularMigration to SouthAfricaDuring the First TenYears ofDemocracy.”
Migration Policy Brief No. . Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project.
Watson, David, and Auke Tellegen. . “Toward a Consensual Structure of Mood.” Psychological
Bulletin (): –.
Webb, omas L., and Paschal Sheeran. . “Does Changing Behavioral Intentions Engender
Behavior Change? A Meta-Analysis of the Experimental Evidence.” Psychological Bulletin ():
–.
Weiner, Myron. . Sons of the Soil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weisberg, Herbert F. . e Total Survey Error Approach: A Guide to the New Science of Survey
Research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Weiss, Howard M., Kathleen Suckow, and Russell Cropanzano. . “Effects of Justice Conditions
on Discrete Emotions.” Journal of Applied Psychology (): –.
Werner, Oswald, and Donald T. Campbell. . “Translating, Working rough Interpreters, and
the Problem of Decentering.” In A Handbook of Cultural Anthropology, ed. Raoul Naroll, and
Ronald Cohen. New York: American Museum of Natural History.
Wilkinson, Steven I. . Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. . “e Emotional Beneĕts of Insurgency in El Salvador.” In Passionate
Politics: Emotions and SocialMovements, ed. JeffGoodwin, JamesM. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta.
University of Chicago Press pp. –.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. . Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Yanagizawa-Drott, David. . “Propaganda and ConĘict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide.”
Typescript. Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School, Harvard University.

